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K A T E  A N D R I A S  
The New Labor Law 
abstract . Labor law is failing. Disfigured by courts, attacked by employers, and rendered 
inapt by a global and fissured economy, many of labor law’s most ardent proponents have aban-
doned it altogether. And for good reason: the law that governs collective organization and bar-
gaining among workers has little to offer those it purports to protect. Several scholars have sug-
gested ways to breathe new life into the old regime, yet their proposals do not solve the basic 
problem. Labor law developed for the New Deal does not provide solutions to today’s inequities. 
But all hope is not lost. From the remnants of the old regime, the potential for a new labor law is 
emerging. 
 In this Article, I describe and defend the nascent regime, which embraces a form of social 
bargaining long thought unattainable in the United States. The new labor law rejects the old re-
gime’s commitment to the employer-employee dyad and to a system of private ordering. Instead, 
it locates decisions about basic standards of employment at the sectoral level and positions un-
ions as political actors empowered to advance the interests of workers generally. This new labor 
law, though nascent and uncertain, has the potential to salvage and secure one of labor law’s 
most fundamental commitments—to help achieve greater equality, both economic and political—
in the context of the twenty-first century economy. 
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introduction 
American labor unions have collapsed.
1
 While they once bargained for 
more than a third of American workers, unions now represent only about a 
tenth of the labor market and even less of the private sector.
2
 In the process, the 
United States has lost a core equalizing institution in politics and the economy.
3
 
Employment law, which protects employees on an individual basis irrespective 
of unionization, has not filled the void.
4
 Economic inequality is at its highest 
point since the Gilded Age, when unionization rates were similarly low.
5
 Work-
ers have declining influence not only in their workplaces, but also in policy-
making at the state and federal levels.
6
 
For several reasons, current law offers little hope for reversing the trend.
7
 
The familiar explanation, and the focus of most attempts at labor law reform, is 
 
1. See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 10-30 (2014); cf. RICHARD B. FREEMAN 
& JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984) (describing, as of the mid-1980s, the 
role of trade unions in the United States). 
2. ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 1; see also Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members  
Summary, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, (2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm 
[http://perma.cc/3RU3-SPBS] (providing data about union membership in 2015). Despite 
recent declines, unions still represent about thirty-five percent of public sector workers; the 
unionization rate in the private sector is about six percent. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra. 
3. ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 4-8; see Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Poli-
tics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United 
States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152 (2010). 
4. See infra Section I.B. 
5. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23-24 (2014). Inequality has in-
creased even during periods of economic growth and increased productivity. Id. 
6. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILD-
ED AGE 2, 285 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 79-81, 157-58 (2012); ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 170-81; 
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE 
BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69-95 (2012); Thomas Byrne Edsall, The 
Changing Shape of Power: A Realignment in Public Policy, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW 
DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 269 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) [hereinafter RISE 
AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER]; Hacker & Pierson, supra note 3, at 28; Monica  
Davey, with Fewer Members, A Diminished Political Role for Wisconsin Unions,  
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/with-fewer-members 
-a-diminished-political-role-for-wisconsin-unions.html [http://perma.cc/2843-GB8P]. 
7. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527, 1611-12 (2002) (arguing that the National Labor Relations Act has ossified); Alan 
Hyde, The Idea of the Idea of Labour Law: A Parable, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 88, 97 (Guy 
Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011) [hereinafter IDEA OF LABOUR LAW] (declaring that the 
“Idea of Labour Law” as a source of inspiration “is really over”); Paul Weiler, Promises To 
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that the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) weak enforcement mecha-
nisms, slight penalties, and lengthy delays—all of which are routinely exploited 
by employers resisting unionization—fail to protect workers’ ability to organize 
and bargain collectively with their employers.
8
 But two other factors are per-
haps even more important to labor law’s failure to protect workers’ right to or-
ganize and bargain in ways that help redistribute both economic and political 
power. First, the NLRA, with its emphasis on firm-based organizing and bar-
gaining, is mismatched with the globalized economy and its multiple layers of 
contracting.
9
 Indeed, these “fissured” corporate structures were adopted by 
employers in part to reduce labor costs and diminish the potency of the NLRA 
and employment law.
10
 Second, the NLRA was never designed to ensure the 
vast majority of workers significant influence over the economy or politics.
11
 
Unlike legal regimes prevalent in Europe, the NLRA does not empower unions 
to bargain on behalf of workers generally, nor does it provide affirmative state 
support for collective bargaining.
12
 Instead, it establishes a system of volunta-
ristic, decentralized unionism: collective bargaining is a private negotiation be-





Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 
1769 (1983) (noting that “[c]ontemporary American labor law more and more resembles an 
elegant tombstone for a dying institution”). For additional scholarship exploring labor law’s 
decline, see infra Section I.A.2. But see Lance Compa, Not Dead yet: Preserving Labor Law 
Strengths While Exploring New Labor Law Strategies, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609, 610-12 
(2014) (arguing that U.S. labor and employment law regimes constructed in the twentieth 
century are viable for the twenty-first century). 
8. See Weiler, supra note 7, at 1769-70; see also infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text. 
9. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 290 (2004); see also infra notes 132-159 and accompanying text. 
10. See JEFFERSON COWIE, CAPITAL MOVES: RCA’S SEVENTY-YEAR QUEST FOR CHEAP LABOR 2 
(1999) (detailing one company’s “continuous struggle to maintain the social conditions 
deemed necessary for profitability”); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK 
BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 10 (2014) (using the 
term “fissured” to describe the subcontracted economy in which employers shed business 
functions not central to their core and discussing multiple motivations for the corporate re-
structuring). 
11. See Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 1394, 1397 (1971); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive 
Character of American Labor Relations,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 1; see also infra notes 49-56 and 
accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 163-177, 401-420 and accompanying text. 
13. See Bok, supra note 11, at 1397; see also infra notes 49-56, 112-115 and accompanying text. In-
dustry-wide pattern bargaining is permitted, though not mandated. Although pattern bar-
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Some scholars have suggested ways to mend the old regime.
14
 But their 
proposals do not solve the basic problem: labor law, developed during and after 
the New Deal, has been rendered inapt by contemporary managerial strategies 
and fails to provide tools capable of redressing today’s inequities. Recognizing 
these limitations, many of labor’s proponents have abandoned the project of 




But the demise of the twentieth-century labor law regime is not the end of 
the road for the rights and interests of working people. Since 2012, over two 
dozen states and many more localities have raised their minimum wages.
16
 
Several of these, including California and New York, have enacted increases to 
$15 an hour—nearly $8 an hour more than the federal minimum—to be phased 
in over time.
17
 Just a few years ago, increases of this scope and magnitude 
would have been unthinkable.
18
 The wage laws have been accompanied by new 
regulations providing scheduling protection, sick time, and other benefits.
19
 
At first glance, these seem to be ordinary state and local employment stat-
utes, separate and apart from the law that governs collective activity by work-
 
gaining existed in certain sectors for a time, it largely collapsed in the face of deindustrializa-
tion and globalization. See infra notes 73, 79-82, 154-156 and accompanying text. 
14. Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 399-400 (2007). For a 
discussion of the numerous proposals, see infra Sections I.C.1, III.A. 
15. See infra Sections I.C.2, III.A. 
16. Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POL’Y INST.,  (2016), http://www.epi.org/minimum-wage 
-tracker [http://perma.cc/HTG4-QHZQ]; State Minimum Wages, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum 
-wage-chart.aspx [http://perma.cc/UQ4E-MYMC]; City Minimum Wage Laws: Recent 
Trends and Economic Evidence, NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT (Dec. 2015), http://www.nelp 
.org/content/uploads/City-Minimum-Wage-Laws-Recent-Trends-Economic-Evidence.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VS5C-D3AX]. But see Alan Blinder, When a State Balks at a City’s Minimum 
Wage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/alabama-moves
-to-halt-pay-law-in-birmingham.html [http://perma.cc/WV4R-DJ7E] (describing the Ala-
bama state legislature’s decision to overrule Birmingham’s local minimum wage). For fur-
ther discussion of minimum wage increases, see infra Section II.B. For further discussion of 
state efforts to limit local wages, see infra Section IV.B. 
17. See S.B. 3, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, supra note 16;  
Press Release, New York Governor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs $15  
Minimum Wage Plan and 12 Week Paid Family Leave Policy into Law (Apr.  
4, 2016), http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-15-minimum-wage 
-plan-and-12-week-paid-family-leave-policy-law [http://perma.cc/NYP6-UCQC]. 
18. See infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 288-295 and accompanying text. 




 But the sea change comes in response to a range of worker movements, 
especially the “Fight for $15,” a campaign of low-wage workers organized by 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU).
21
 The express goal of these 
campaigns is not just higher wages but also “a union.”
22
 And many of the new 
laws they have won are a product of bargaining, either formal or informal, 
among unions, employers, and the state.
23
 
From the efforts of these social movements, the outline of a new labor law 
is emerging. That outline is nascent and contested; chances of success are un-
certain at best, and the specifics of what success would look like are far from 
clear. But from the social movements’ efforts one can derive a path toward a 
new labor law regime that is distinct from, even oppositional to, the legal re-
gime that has governed since the New Deal. The new labor law would combine 
social bargaining—i.e., bargaining that occurs in the public arena on a sectoral 
and regional basis—with both old and new forms of worksite representation. It 
is a more inclusive and political model of labor relations, with parallels to re-
 
20. On the distinction between employment law and labor law, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Employ-
ment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2688-89 (2008), which describes the tra-
ditional view that labor and employment law constitute dichotomous regulatory regimes but 
notes critiques of that view. See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law in 
Two Transitional Decades, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 495, 526-27 (2004) (explaining that the preceding 
“two decades have continued the shift of emphasis from labor law to employment law—
from governmental regulation of union-management relations, with collective bargaining 
expected to set most of the substantive terms of employment, to the direct governmental 
regulation of more and more aspects of the employer-employee relationship” and expressing 
regret at the diminishment of “private initiative and the voluntary arrangements that have 
made collective bargaining such a uniquely valuable American institution”). For further dis-
cussion, see infra Section I.B. 
21. See Patrick McGeehan, Push To Lift Minimum Wage Is Now Serious Business, N.Y. TIMES  
(July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/nyregion/push-to-lift-hourly-pay-is 
-now-serious-business.html [http://perma.cc/S7M8-9VPH]; Jenny Brown, Fast Food 
Strikes: What’s Cooking?, LABORNOTES (June 24, 2013), http://www.labornotes.org/2013/06
/fast-food-strikes-whats-cooking [http://perma.cc/A739-Y6CQ]; see also infra Part II. 
22. More precisely, the campaign demands $15 an hour and the right to a union “free of intimi-
dation.” See Arun Gupta, Fight for 15 Confidential: How Did the Biggest-Ever Mobilization of 
Fast-Food Workers Come About, and What Is Its Endgame?, IN THESE TIMES, (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://inthesetimes.com/article/15826/fight_for_15_confidential [http://perma.cc/Y5V6 
-SNKS]; see also Lydia DePillis, It’s Not Just Fast Food: The Fight for $15 Is for Everyone  
Now, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline
/wp/2014/12/04/its-not-just-fast-food-the-fight-for-15-is-for-everyone-now [http://
perma.cc/Z7GV-GJ6M]; Josh Eidelson, Fast Food Strikes To Massively Expand, SALON  
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/14/fast_food_strikes_massively
_expanding_theyre_thinking_much_bigger [http://perma.cc/N9J2-6M3P]. 
23. See infra Section II.C. 
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gimes in Europe and elsewhere.
24
 And it has the potential to salvage and secure 
one of labor law’s most fundamental commitments: to help achieve greater 
economic and political equality in society.
25
 
The new labor law promises several important changes. First, it would re-
ject the old regime’s commitment to the employer-employee dyad.
26
 It would 
locate decisions about basic standards of employment at the sectoral, industrial, 
and regional levels, rather than at the level of the individual worksite or em-
ployer. Second, the new labor law would reject the principle of private ordering 
that was cemented in the years following the New Deal, under which labor ne-
gotiations are a private affair and the state plays a neutral and minimal role.
27 
 
24. See, e.g., KATHLEEN THELEN, VARIETIES OF LIBERALIZATION AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
SOLIDARITY (2014) (distinguishing forms of labor law regimes). Sociologists use “social 
movement unionism” and “social justice unionism” to refer to union campaigns that aspire 
to change underlying social conditions by emphasizing union democracy and alliances with 
other social movements. See, e.g., Cassandra Engeman, Social Movement Unionism in Practice: 
Organizational Dimensions of Union Mobilization in the Los Angeles Immigrant Rights Marches, 
29 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 444, 446-48 (2015); Peter Waterman, Social-Movement Unionism: A 
New Union Model for a New World Order?, 16 REVIEW (FERNAND BRAUDEL CTR.) 245, 266-67 
(1993); see also KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY (1997) (urging social movement unionism). While the efforts described in this 
Article may fall under such categories, the focus here is on the legal regime, not the internal 
workings of the unions. 
25. For examples of scholarship identifying these or closely related values as some of the prima-
ry goals of labor law, see Ruth Dukes, Hugo Sinzheimer and the Constitutional Function of La-
bour Law, in IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 7, at 57-60; and Manfred Weiss, Re-Inventing 
Labour Law?, in IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 7, at 43-45; cf. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra 
note 1, at 246-47 (concluding that unionism has a “voice/response face,” as well as a “mo-
nopoly face,” with effects on efficiency, distribution of income, and social organizations); 
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 990 (1984) (argu-
ing that labor law is “founded on a policy that is the opposite of the policies of competition 
and economic efficiency”). 
26. See Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law, in LABOUR LAW 
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 3, 23 (Joanne 
Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) (“[O]ne must wonder about the adequacy of a model of redis-
tribution classically wedded to the employer-employee dyad, when traditional workers and 
traditional employers are replaced by a complex variety of social actors in paid employ-
ment.”). 
27. For an analysis of how law encouraged the earlier American labor movement’s embrace of 
private ordering over statism, see William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor 
Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989) [hereinafter Forbath, The Shaping of the American 
Labor Movement] (arguing that while the nineteenth-century labor movement sought to 
pursue a radical vision of social and political reform, encounters with the legal system at the 
turn of the century led the labor movement to turn toward “voluntarism,” a commitment to 
the private ordering of industrial relations between unions and employers); accord WILLIAM 
E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991) [herein-
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Instead, the new labor law would position unions as political actors represent-
ing workers generally and would involve the state as an active participant in 
supporting collective bargaining—in a system I will term “social bargaining,” 
but which is also known as “tripartism” or “corporatism.”
28
 Third, and related 
to the first two moves, the new labor law would reject the bifurcation between 
employment law and labor law that has governed since the New Deal by ren-
dering the basic terms of employment for all workers subject to social bargain-
ing.
29
 Finally, the new labor law would maintain a role for worksite representa-
tion—but it would do so through a wider range of forms, not all of which 
would entail exclusive union representation. 
In an important sense, the new labor law is not, in fact, new. It is a reinter-
pretation of principles advanced by earlier incarnations of the American labor 
movement
30
 and embraced by systems abroad.
31
 But support for a system of 
labor law that empowers unions to bargain on behalf of all or most workers, 
with active support from the state, has long been considered to exist only in the 
“political ozone.”
32
 The goal of social bargaining, the conventional wisdom 
 
after FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT]. For a discus-
sion of how employer advocacy and court and congressional action helped push the system 
in the direction of private ordering in the years after the Wagner Act, see infra notes 61-77 
and accompanying text. 
28. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Demise of Tripartite Governance and the Rise of the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Regime, in ACHIEVING WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 95, 95 
(Richard P. Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 2016) (noting that the system was 
“often denominated as ‘corporatism’ in Europe, ‘tripartism’ in the United States”). 
29. The current phenomenon is markedly different from previous efforts to blur the distinction 
between employment law and labor law. Those tended to use employment law to achieve 
NLRA aims, see Sachs, supra note 20, at 2687 (documenting how “workers and their lawyers 
are turning to employment statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” to facilitate “their efforts to organize and act collectively”), 
or abandoned a system of unionization in favor of self-regulation with elements of worker 
voice, see CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO 
CO-REGULATION 52-74 (2010) (describing the fall of collective bargaining and the prolifera-
tion of substantive mandates). 
30. See, e.g., LEON FINK, THE LONG GILDED AGE: AMERICAN CAPITALISM AND THE LESSONS OF A 
NEW WORLD ORDER 96 (2015); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: 
THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925 (1987); CHRISTO-
PHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGA-
NIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985). For further discussion, see infra 
notes 51-53, 65-67, 445 and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., THELEN, supra note 24 (examining labor market institutions in the United States, 
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands). 
32. See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From 
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 961 (1994) (describing the pro-
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holds, is unmoored from reality
33
 and has no hope of passage.
34
 However, this 
Article shows that a nascent form of social bargaining is developing organically 
in the United States. 
The contribution of this Article is both descriptive and normative. I unearth 
the seeds of this new labor law and consider potential avenues for its growth, 
as well as likely hurdles.
35
 I also defend the nascent labor law as a partial solu-
tion to the problems of economic and political inequality facing the nation,
36
 as 
well as a way to protect workers’ fundamental associational rights.
37
 At the 
same time, I recognize the nascent regime’s limitations, including the inherent 
 
spects for a union default rule as in the “political ozone”). Recently, there has been rising in-
terest in social bargaining and a weakening of the consensus that it is an impossibility. See 
Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism Is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1624 
(2016) (arguing for a model of labor relations in which the federal government “would 
strongly encourage or even mandate collective bargaining at the occupational or sectoral lev-
el (as corporatism has historically required), while leaving workers nearly unfettered choice 
as to bargaining representatives and removing certain core legal constraints on workers’ 
concerted action”); David Rolf, Toward a 21st Century Labor Movement, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 
18, 2016) [hereinafter Rolf, Toward a 21st Century Labor Movement], http://prospect.org
/article/toward-21st-century-labor-movement [http://perma.cc/DFV5-RRMU] (offering 
sectoral bargaining as one of several models for how workers could wield greater power); 
accord DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN 253-58 (2016) [hereinafter ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR 
FIFTEEN]; Lawrence Mishel, Lawrence Mishel Testifies Before the Democratic Platform Commit-
tee 2016, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 9, 2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/testimony-raise 
-americas-pay [http://perma.cc/5R7V-NMP6] (arguing for a “wholesale revision of labor 
laws to establish sectoral and occupational bargaining”). 
33. See Compa, supra note 7, at 610 (arguing that a labor and employment law system cannot be 
“wrenched from its historical moorings”). 
34. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 7 (discussing obstacles to labor law reform). But see Matthew 
Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679 (2013) (emphasizing the importance 
of labor union structure to centralized bargaining and suggesting that unions can, on their 
own, move towards a more industrial system). 
35. Though this Article focuses on legal obstacles, the political obstacles are significant as well. 
See infra notes 127, 360-372 and accompanying text. 
36. To be sure, regulation of labor cannot, alone, remediate inequality; financial regulation, tax 
law, election law, and many other areas of law and policy are also essential, though beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
37. Numerous international law instruments recognize the right of workers to organize, bargain 
collectively, and strike as fundamental human rights. See, e.g., International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art. 22, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 23 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Labour 
Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (June 18, 1998). 
The United States has not ratified all of the relevant International Labour Organization 
Conventions. See Lance Compa, Trade Unions and Human Rights, in BRINGING HUMAN 
RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 351, 360 n.15 (Cynthia 
Soohoo et al. eds., 2007). 
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shortcomings of a domestic labor regime in an increasingly global economy
38 
and the challenge of maintaining worker voice and union funding in a system 
not based primarily on traditional exclusive bargaining agreements.
39 
Moreo-
ver, in a political environment hostile to reform, the new labor law is by no 
means certain, nor is it the only possible path forward. Some ongoing organiz-
ing efforts embrace certain of its principles—e.g., sectoral bargaining—but not 
others—e.g., its public or statist commitments; others experiment with differ-
ent forms of worker voice and ownership.
40
 The ambition of this project is not 
to prove that the nascent system of social bargaining is inevitable, nor to offer 
it as a complete solution to contemporary labor problems, but rather to docu-
ment, analyze, and defend this important development. 
A final caveat is in order: not everyone agrees that creating greater political 
and economic equality should be central functions of labor law.
41
 I embrace 
those goals, however, and this Article assumes their validity without engaging 
the first-order debates. It also prioritizes the concern with achieving greater 
equality and leaves for another day important questions about how the emerg-
ing law’s design could best accommodate other objectives, such as economic 
efficiency and productivity, internal union democracy, and industrial peace. Fi-
nally, the nascent labor law described in this Article raises numerous questions 
about the level of government at which labor law is and should be determined. 
The focus of this piece, however, is not on problems of federalism (or global-
ism), but rather on the substantive contours and structure of labor law. 
 
38. Notably, the Fight for $15 has an important global dimension and has used foreign and in-
ternational law instruments. See Gaspard Sebag, McDonald’s Faces Antitrust Attack as  
Unions Complain to EU, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/articles/2016-01-12/mcdonald-s-faces-antitrust-attack-as-trade-unions-complain-to 
-eu [http://perma.cc/66MX-BJCY]. These efforts are beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
discussion of some reform efforts focused on supply chain organizing and global labor law, 
see, for example, James Brudney, Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply Chains: The 
Immokalee Workers Model, in TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL ERA 351 (Joan-
na Owens & Rosemary Howe eds., 2016). 
39. For a discussion of these issues, see infra Section IV.B. 
40. See Rolf, Toward a 21st Century Labor Movement, supra note 32; infra notes 349-350 and ac-
companying text. 
41. For authors emphasizing these values, see supra note 25. Other scholars view protecting the 
efficiency of markets or the liberty of contract as law’s primary function and object to current 
labor law, and unions on that ground. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Labor Unions: Saviors or 
Scourges?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Posner, supra note 25, at 988; cf. Daniel DiSalvo, The 
Trouble with Public Sector Unions, 5 NAT’L AFF. 3, 17 (2010) (arguing that public sector unions 
“distort the labor market, weaken public finances, and diminish the responsiveness of gov-
ernment and the quality of public services”). These authors would likely object to the new 
labor law as well. 
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Part I describes the New Deal’s labor law regime, traces its commitments, 
and explains why it fails workers today—and why employment law does not 
solve the problem. It then recounts past efforts to respond to the deficiencies of 
labor law—either by resuscitating the NLRA model or by abandoning it alto-
gether. Part II furnishes a case study of the “Fight for $15” and related social 
movements and shows that, from close examination of their efforts, the outline 
of a coherent and fundamentally changed labor law emerges. I challenge exist-
ing accounts of these social movements, which describe them as “improvisa-
tional,” scattershot, or quixotic.
42
 
Part III evaluates the incipient labor law, contrasting it to the existing sys-
tem of firm-based collective bargaining, on the one hand, and a post-union 
regulatory or self-governance approach, on the other. In so doing, this Part 
draws on models of social bargaining from Europe and elsewhere. Part IV ana-
lyzes the legal innovations now underway within labor law as a result of the 
ongoing movements; offers some initial recommendations for further statutory 
and doctrinal changes; and considers possible legal hurdles. Ultimately, while 
more work is needed to fill in the new labor law’s contours and make its aspira-
tion a reality, social bargaining represents a promising strategy for building a 
more equitable, inclusive, and democratic future—not just for workers, but for 
the country generally. 
i .  labor law’s decline and failed revival 
A. The NLRA 
1. From Wagner to Taft-Hartley: The System of Decentralized, Private 
Representation and Bargaining 
The story of labor’s rise—and then its steady and relentless decline—is, in 
large part, a story about law. The logical place to begin is in 1935, during the 
throes of the Depression. In the face of rising labor unrest, Congress enacted 
 
42. See Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2016) (providing 
a detailed account of the Fight for $15 and describing it as “improvisational”); see also Mari-
on Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
561, 563-64, 582 (2014) (concluding that the movements have little answer to “how to lever-
age worker power to accomplish lasting change”); Nelson Lichtenstein, Two Roads Forward 
for Labor: The AFL-CIO’s New Agenda, DISSENT, Winter 2014, http://www.dissentmagazine
.org/article/two-roads-forward-for-labor-the-afl-cios-new-agenda [http://perma.cc/YCY5 
-JRMD] (describing the fast-food movement as eschewing unionization and a collective 
contract). 
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the Wagner Act, the original National Labor Relations Act.
43
 The NLRA rec-
ognized the right “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
44
 A sweepingly broad statute, the 
Act established the types of organizations workers could form, the procedures 
for doing so, and the subjects over which employers were required to negotiate, 
as well as an independent regulatory agency—the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB)—to enforce the regime.
45
 
Until this point, the Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted Congress’s 
power to legislate in the area of labor and employment: the Court had struck 
down numerous protective statutes on the grounds that they did not sufficient-
ly implicate interstate commerce
46
 or that they violated the liberty of contract.
47
 
But two years after the Wagner Act’s passage, the Court, in a surprising about- 
face from its earlier precedent, upheld the Act as a proper exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority.
48
 In so doing, the Court inaugurated both the 
modern era of federal legislative power and the modern era of American labor 
law. 
On one account, the NLRA was, from its inception, a relatively conservative 
statute.
49
 It represented an effort to deradicalize an increasingly powerful and 
 
43. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012); see Mark Barenberg, 
The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1379, 1389 (1993) (“[T]he opportunity for such a dramatic legislative initiative was 
generated by ‘mass politics’ in the form of popular electoral realignment, populist political 
organization, and mass labor unrest . . . . That opportunity was seized by loosely intercon-
nected networks of political-technocratic entrepreneurs driven by progressive ideological 
commitment and ambition.”). 
44. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 7. 
45. Sachs, supra note 20, at 2685. 
46. E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (striking down, as exceeding the 
Commerce Clause, a federal law prohibiting transportation of goods produced in factories 
employing children). 
47. E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (striking down, under a substantive 
due process liberty of contract theory, federal legislation forbidding employers from requir-
ing employees to agree not to join a union); cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) 
(holding that a state law imposing limits on working hours violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
48. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937). 
49. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came To Be: A Prospectus, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
2201, 2206 (1998) (reporting, based on interviews with the statute’s drafters that “[a]t no 
point was there any discussion that the statute would revolutionize American employer-
employee relations, beyond guaranteeing workers the right to organize and bargain collec-
 




 It also embodied the values of the more con-
servative elements of the American labor movement. That is, the statute re-
flected the early twentieth-century American Federation of Labor’s commit-
ment to private collective bargaining at the firm level instead of the class-based 
political or social bargaining that was advocated for by other strands of the 
American labor movement and that ultimately took hold in some European 
countries.
51
 Indeed, the NLRA represented a break from the nation’s previous, 
short-lived labor statute, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
52
 and 
other progressive and early New Deal era experiments, which invited trade as-
sociations and union leaders to establish wages and other working conditions 




tively”). The Court’s decision to uphold the Wagner Act as a matter of commerce, rather 
than as an exercise of civil rights power, some contend, cemented the statute’s more con-
servative dimensions. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce 
Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2002); see also James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997) 
(distinguishing unionists’ “constitution of freedom,” which promised fundamental labor 
rights, from the progressive constitutionalism that ultimately prevailed after the New Deal, 
as well as from the laissez-faire constitutionalism of the Lochner era). 
50. See St. Antoine, supra note 49, at 2202 n.10, 2206 (citing 4 SELIG PERLMAN & PHILIP TAFT, 
HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932: LABOR MOVEMENTS 609-14 (John R. 
Commons ed., 1935); PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 435-50 (1964)). 
51. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 27, at 128-
30; Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, supra note 27, at 1125. Forbath 
shows that, while the nineteenth-century labor movement sought to pursue a radical vision 
of social and political reform, encounters with the legal system at the turn of the century led 
dominant elements of the labor movement to demand private ordering of industrial rela-
tions between unions and employers. On social bargaining in Europe, see infra notes 172-
177, 401-420 and accompanying text. 
52. This early New Deal statute was ultimately struck down on separation-of-powers grounds 
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which held that the 
code-making authority conferred by NIRA impermissibly delegated legislative power. Id. at 
542. For a discussion of NIRA’s promise and problems, see JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT 
EXCEPTION 104-08 (2016). 
53. Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 581, 599-600 (2007); see also FINK, supra note 30, at 96, 102-08, 111-16 (noting that 
“as far back as the 1870s and continuing through the 1880s, the American labor movement 
imagined a positive role for government in buttressing workers’ power and adjudicating ma-
jor industrial disputes” and describing progressive era experiments with industrial commis-
sions and dispute resolution from 1880 to 1920). Notably, drafters of the NLRA and the So-
cial Security Act initially considered a tripartite form of oversight agency. And the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), in its early years, included a mechanism for tripartism: it established 
industry committees who had discretion to set minimum wages on an industry-by-industry 
basis. Amendments to the FLSA eliminated the committees in 1949. See Bruce E. Kaufman, 
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In contrast, the NLRA facilitated union representation and bargaining at 
the level of the individual worksite and the individual employer. In some in-
dustries, unions were able to achieve sufficient density to force industry-wide 
or pattern bargaining, but the legal regime did not require it.
54
 Moreover, un-
der this system, the union’s primary role was to represent the interests of its 
members through private collective bargaining, and the state’s role was to serve 
as administrator and supervisor, rather than co-negotiator.
55
 The NLRA also 
excluded millions of the most vulnerable workers—namely, domestic and agri-
cultural workers—from its coverage.
56
 
On another account, however, the Act was “perhaps the most radical piece 
of legislation ever enacted by the United States Congress.”
57
 It announced an 
affirmative national policy in favor of collective bargaining and economic redis-
tribution; worked a fundamental change in the common-law employment rela-
tionship; and promised a system of nationwide industrial democracy.
58
 Section 
7 was particularly revolutionary, as it protected not only the right of unionized 
workers to bargain, but also the right of all workers to engage in concerted ac-
tion for mutual aid or protection.
59
 Senator Wagner went so far as to assert that 
 
John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School on Industrial Relations Strategy and Policy, 57 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 23 (2003). 
54. See infra notes 79-82, 154-156 and accompanying text. 
55. For further discussion, see infra notes 112-115, 162-177 and accompanying text. 
56. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 2. The agency-imposed exemption for small busi-
nesses also had the effect of exempting vulnerable workers, particularly women and minori-
ties, from coverage, as did the statutory exemption for hospital workers, which was eventu-
ally limited. See CAROLINE FREDRICKSON, UNDER THE BUS: HOW WORKING WOMEN ARE 
BEING RUN OVER 29-31, 35-42 (2015). 
57. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Con-
sciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1978). 
58. Id. at 266; see also Barenberg, supra note 32, at 769 n.31 (arguing for reforms that would 
make labor law’s structures “more faithful to the pragmatic cooperationism” of Senator 
Wagner and his allies); Barenberg, supra note 43, at 1381 (examining Senator Wagner’s “cru-
sade to build a cooperative social democracy”); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: 
Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 496-97 (1993) 
(describing Senator Wagner’s characterization of the Act). 
59. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); see Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564-67 (1978) (emphasizing breadth of section 7’s protection); NLRB 
v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (extending section 7 rights to nonunion 
employees). The scope of section 7 remains contested today. Compare Lewis v. Epic Sys. 
Corp., No. 15-2997 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016) (emphasizing breadth of section 7 protection 
and concluding that an employer’s arbitration provision, requiring employees to bring any 
wage and hour claims through individual arbitration, violates section 7 of the NLRA) with 
Murphy Oil v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (concluding that employer’s individual 
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Whatever the Wagner Act’s initial promise, the years following the Act’s 
passage gave rise to fierce political and legal conflict over its construction and 
application. Unions experienced a period of rapid growth and wielded signifi-
cant economic and political power in the early New Deal state.
61
 But they were 
also met with significant resistance from the business community, including in 
the form of legal challenges.
62
 At the urging of employers, Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the NLRA soon began to curtail utopian aspirations for a radi-
cal restructuring of the workplace.
63
 The Court, among other things, undercut 
the Act’s protection of the right to strike, made it easier for employers to op-




Wartime mobilization temporarily strengthened labor’s position and 
moved the legal regime away from private bargaining at the firm level toward a 
more inclusive, political, and statist form of unionism.
65
 Under wartime pres-
sure, the federal government invited labor and corporations into tripartite bar-
gaining over national wage and economic policy.
66
 For a period, the United 
States seemed poised to move to the kind of labor-backed corporatism or tri-
 
arbitration agreements may prohibit class-wide claims, notwithstanding employee rights 
under section 7). 
60. 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT (WAGNER ACT) 1935, at 2321 (1959). 
61. See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the 
Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, su-
pra note 6, at 122, 122-23. 
62. Klare, supra note 57, at 286-87 (describing how “the business community embarked upon a 
path of deliberate and concerted disobedience to the Act” in the years following its enact-
ment). For a history of the early years of the internal workings of the NLRB, including the 
agency’s transformation from a tripartite body designed to conciliate disputes between em-
ployers and unions to a quasi-judicial entity, see 1 JAMES GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 1933-
1937 (1974). 
63. Klare, supra note 57, at 292-93, 301-10, 322-25, 327-34, 337. 
64. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 19 (1983) (citing 
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (holding that employees en-
gaged in an economic strike that is “protected” by section 7 are nonetheless subject to per-
manent replacement by their employer)); Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enerva-
tion of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 549-67 (describing changes in doctrine). 
65. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, A CONTEST OF IDEAS: CAPITAL, POLITICS, AND LABOR 80-84 (2013); 
Lichtenstein, supra note 61, at 124. 
66. Lichtenstein, supra note 61, at 124; Wachter, supra note 53, at 610-13. 
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partism that would later characterize social policy in much of Europe and 
Scandinavia.
67
 In the war’s aftermath, however, the trade union movement 
found its efforts to maintain influence over the shape of the political economy 
stymied.
68
 Trade unions faced a slew of hostile court decisions, a powerful re-
mobilization of business and conservative forces in the legislative arena, and 
the dismantling of state-sponsored bargaining.
69
 
In 1947, at the behest of business, and buoyed by popular concerns about 
rising labor militancy and union abuses, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act 
over President Truman’s veto.
70
 Taft-Hartley cemented labor law’s commitment 
to private, firm-based bargaining while reducing the government’s support for 
unionization.
71
 No longer did the Act favor concerted action and collective bar-
gaining; instead, it embraced employees’ “full freedom” to engage in or refrain 
from such activity.
72
 In addition, Taft-Hartley limited the ability of unions to 
exert economic pressure across employers: it prohibited secondary boycotts, 
wherein workers exert economic pressure by refusing to handle goods from 
another firm embroiled in a union dispute.
73
 The amendments also placed oth-
er restrictions on the kinds of strikes allowed. Meanwhile, Taft-Hartley permit-
ted states to enact “right-to-work” laws, which allow workers to opt out of pay-
ing union dues while maintaining a duty on the union to represent even non-
contributing workers.
74
 Finally, Taft-Hartley codified the Supreme Court’s pri-
or decisions allowing employers to campaign against unions as long as they did 
 
67. Lichtenstein, supra note 61, at 124-33. 
68. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 65, at 84-89; Lichtenstein, supra note 61, at 134. 
69. Lichtenstein, supra note 61, at 134; see JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937-1947 (1981) (de-
scribing conditions that gave rise to the enactment of Taft-Hartley); TOMLINS, supra note 30, 
at 148-50 (describing divisions within the labor movement, as well as opposition from the 
business community). 
70. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (amending the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935); see ARCHIBALD COX, The Evolution of Labor-Management 
Relations, in LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 13-14 (1960); KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISI-
BLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW DEAL 31-32 (2010). 
71. Labor historians disagree over whether Taft-Hartley was a codification and consolidation of 
preexisting legal restriction or a turning point. See TOMLINS, supra note 30, at 250-51 (dis-
cussing the extent to which reorientation was present in prior NLRB and Supreme Court 
decisions); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 
763-65 (1998) (reviewing the debate). 
72. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
73. Id. § 158(b)(4). 
74. Id. § 158(a)(3), 164(b). 
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not engage in threats of reprisals or promises of benefits;
75
 expressly excluded 
independent contractors and supervisors from the law’s protection;
76
 and re-




The passage of Taft-Hartley was widely viewed by the labor movement as a 
resounding defeat.
78
 Yet the extent to which the law would ultimately fail to 
protect workers’ rights to engage in concerted action and collective bargaining, 
even at a narrow firm-based level, would not become clear for some time. Ra-
ther, the postwar years were marked by relative prosperity among organized 
workers. 
Because unions in industries like auto and steel had already achieved sig-
nificant density, they were able to force employers to engage in pattern or in-
dustry-wide bargaining, despite the absence of any legal obligation to do so.
79
 
In exchange for assurances of industrial discipline and stability, unions won 
substantial wage increases with cost of living adjustments, pensions, and gen-
erous health benefits.
80
 The result was that workers in these highly organized, 
 
75. Id. § 158(c). 
76. Id. § 152(3). 
77. 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1958), repealed by Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
(Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959 § 201(d), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 525. The Taft-Hartley 
Act also made a number of changes in the administration of the Act. For a discussion of  
the Taft-Hartley Act’s changes and their effect on the contemporary labor  
movement, see Rich Yeselson, Fortress Unionism, 29 DEMOCRACY (Summer 2013), http://
democracyjournal.org/magazine/29/fortress-unionism [http://perma.cc/RP3P-HZ8Z]. 
78. Lichtenstein, supra note 71, at 766 (describing labor’s denunciation of the law as a “Slave-
Labor Act”). 
79. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 65, at 96-98 (describing union contract victories that covered 
multiple employers but noting that pattern bargaining never spread beyond core, highly or-
ganized manufacturing industries); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN 
DETROIT 271-98 (1995) [hereinafter LICHTENSTEIN, MOST DANGEROUS MAN] (describing 
“The Treaty of Detroit”); Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Learning from the Past: 
The Relevance of Twentieth-Century New York Jobbers’ Agreements for Twenty-First-Century 
Global Supply Chains, in ACHIEVING WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 239 (Rich-
ard P. Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 2013) (describing jobbers’ agreements negoti-
ated among workers, garment manufacturers, and purchasers in the U.S. garment sector in 
the early- and mid-twentieth century, negotiated at a time when the garment industry was 
less mobile). Industry-wide bargaining persists in some industries, including the arts and 
professional sports. See, e.g., CATHERINE FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, 
AND MADISON AVENUE (2016) (describing industry-wide bargaining in Hollywood). But 
while permitted, these arrangements are not required by law. 
80. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 65, at 96-98. For example, between 1947 and 1960, during the 
heyday of the United Automobile Workers, average wages in the automobile industry nearly 
doubled. LICHTENSTEIN, MOST DANGEROUS MAN, supra note 79, at 288. 
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oligopolistic industries—albeit largely white men—made significant gains, 
helping produce one of the most economically egalitarian periods in American 
history.
81
 During these decades, increases in productivity consistently led to 
wage and benefit increases for middle-income Americans.
82
 
At the same time, the 1950s and 60s were marked by complacency among 
many union leaders and members. Willing to settle for a private, depoliticized 
system of bargaining, many unions failed to organize new members;
83
 some 
actively resisted membership by non-white workers.
84
 Other unions sought to 
organize women and people of color, but they faced intense opposition from 
business, particularly in the South.
85
 Meanwhile, employers, even in highly or-
ganized industries, began to develop a range of new management strategies 





81. Union density and pattern bargaining were by no means the only drivers of this relative eco-
nomic equality. A range of other factors, including a growing economy, technological chang-
es, the enactment of the GI Bill, comparatively low executive pay, robust financial regulation, 
a progressive tax system, and the entrance of women into the workforce all contributed to 
the rise of the American middle class and the period of relative economic egalitarianism. See 
COWIE, supra note 52, at 153; JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLI-
TICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE 
CLASS 88-90 (2010); MICHAEL LIND, LAND OF PROMISE 329-62 (2012); SUZANNE METTLER, 
SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION 
(2007). 
82. ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 2. 
83. Steve Fraser, The ‘Labor Question,’ in RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, supra note 6, 
at 55 (arguing that workers came to seek personal satisfaction not in labor’s control of poli-
tics or the economy, but in access to the consumer marketplace); Lichtenstein, supra note 61, 
at 143-44 (describing a transformation in the 1940s from a social democratic insurgency to 
an interest group content with a private, depoliticized system of collective bargaining). 
84. For a discussion of the relationship of the white labor movement to black workers and the 
emerging civil rights movement, see SOPHIA Z. LEE, WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE 
NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); for a discussion of the labor movement’s relationship 
to immigrants, see Janice Fine & Daniel J. Tichenor, A Movement Wrestling: American Labor’s 
Enduring Struggle with Immigration, 1866-2007, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 84 (2009). 
85. See Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “Is Freedom of the Individual Un-American?” Right-to-Work 
Campaigns and Anti-Union Conservatism, 1943-1958, in THE RIGHT AND LABOR IN AMERICA: 
POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND IMAGINATION 114 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Elizabeth Tandy Shermer 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter THE RIGHT AND LABOR] (describing right-to-work referenda cam-
paigns in the South and Southwest during the post-war period). 
86. Tami J. Friedman, Capital Flight, “States’ Rights,” and the Anti-Labor Offensive After World War 
II, in THE RIGHT AND LABOR, supra note 85, at 81-83. 
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2. Economic Restructuring, Law, and Deunionization 
By the 1970s, unions had become more inclusive of minority and women 
workers and had organized large numbers of public-sector employees, as well 
as some key parts of the service sector.
87
 The growth of unions in the public 
sector in particular meant that labor still had significant membership and re-
sources.
88
 But, in the private sector, unions were on the verge of losing much of 
their economic power—and the law would prove to be little help. 
Over the course of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, American businesses, faced 
with increased domestic and international competition, as well as restive capital 
markets and a push for higher profits, reshaped themselves.
89
 Capital moved—
both down South and overseas.
90
 Manufacturing and industrial sectors of the 
economy shrank.
91
 And corporations “fissured.”
92
 They shed activities deemed 
peripheral to their core business models and contracted out work to domestic 
and foreign subcontractors.
93
 They also shrunk the portion of their labor force 
that enjoyed full-time work, vastly increasing their use of “contingent” work-
 
87. LEON FINK, UPHEAVAL IN THE QUIET ZONE (1989) (describing the history of the health care 
union and its connection to the civil rights movement); JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORK-
ERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 193-95 (2004) 
(documenting the creation of new state public sector bargaining laws and the rise of public 
sector unions). 
88. In more recent years, Republican governors and legislators in formerly pro-union states like 
Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Illinois have sought, and in most 
cases won, new legislation that reduces public employee pensions and benefits; defunds 
public sector unions by eliminating dues check-off and agency-fee payments; and narrows 
the scope of public sector bargaining. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A 
CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 286-89 (2013). 
89. WEIL, supra note 10, at 3, 11, 52. 
90. See generally JAMES C. COBB, THE SELLING OF THE SOUTH: THE SOUTHERN CRUSADE FOR IN-
DUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1936-1990, at 96-121, 209-28 (1993) (describing the shift of manu-
facturing from the unionized north to the nonunion and low-wage southern states); COWIE, 
supra note 10, at 127-51 (documenting the shift of the Radio Corporation of America’s pro-
duction from the Midwest to Mexico and its impact on U.S. workers). 
91. Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1527 & n.1 
(1996) (noting that by 1996 the service sector employed over three-quarters of the non-
agricultural workforce). 
92. WEIL, supra note 10, at 3-4 (describing fissuring as splitting off business and labor functions 
that were once managed internally). 
93. Id. at 25, 125, 172, 174, 191, 292. 
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Multiple factors drove the economic restructuring, including the desire to 
increase efficiency and reduce labor costs by focusing on core business compe-
tencies.
95
 Avoiding unionization became a primary goal for many businesses. 
Following the lead of President Reagan in his fight against the air traffic con-
trollers, employers began to retaliate aggressively against employees who exer-
cised their right to strike.
96
 Employers permanently replaced striking work-
ers.
97
 They also closed union plants and opened up low-wage nonunion plants 
in other locations; double breasting and subcontracting allowed employers to 
bypass existing collective bargaining arrangements.
98
 They developed sophisti-
cated campaigns to try to stop workers from organizing new unions.
99
 
The courts largely permitted these tactics, privileging employers’ manage-
rial and property rights over employees’ rights to organize, bargain, and strike. 
In a series of cases, for example, courts ruled that employers were not required 




94. Id. at 160; Becker, supra note 91, at 1528-30; Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise 
and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, at 3, 17 (Mar. 
29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/lkatz/files/katz
_krueger_cws_v3.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SBR-YCBG]. The use of contingent work ar-
rangements, such as freelance and contract work, is sometimes referred to as the “gig”  
economy. See Emily Hong, Making It Work: A Closer Look at the Gig Economy, PAC.  
STANDARD (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/making-it-work-a 
-closer-look-at-the-gig-economy [http://perma.cc/5JRJ-PJ3H]. 
95. WEIL, supra note 10, at 3-4, 10-12. 
96. See JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING CLASS 
362-64 (2010) (describing an “assault” against unions and other working class institutions 
after President Reagan’s crackdown on air traffic controllers); JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLI-
SION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT 
CHANGED AMERICA (2011) (analyzing President Reagan’s firing of air traffic controllers and 
its impact on the labor movement). 
97. ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 86-88. 
98. PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 70, at 89-90 (describing corporations’ decisions to move south to 
nonunionized areas); Becker, supra note 91, at 1528-30 (discussing the use of subcontracting 
to bypass collective bargaining arrangements). 
99. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract 
Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LA-
BOR LAW 75 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994); Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: 
The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing, E.P.I. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 235, 1, 10 
tbl.3 (2009) [hereinafter Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred]. 
100. See, e.g., First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that employers had 
no duty to bargain over decisions to terminate contracts); Textile Workers Union v. Darling-
ton Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (holding that an employer’s decision to close his entire 
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also permitted the use of permanent replacements, the National Guard, and 
state police against striking workers who sought to resist concessionary con-
tracts.
101
 Meanwhile, deregulation reduced barriers to entry by nonunion, low-
er-wage firms, particularly in industries like transportation and telecommuni-




The trends of deindustrialization, outsourcing, and antiunion campaigning 
continued during subsequent decades, resulting in a contemporary American 
economy almost unrecognizable from the one that defined the New Deal.
103
 
Business gained more flexibility and higher profits, although disintegration of 
the production process meant that firms often had less control over their labor 
forces and decreased ability to achieve brand consistency and market power. 
The effect on workers was substantial. New jobs were created, and prices on 
many consumer goods decreased. But wages stagnated.
104
 Workers increasing-
ly came to fill contingent, nontraditional positions.
105
 And as a proportion of 
the entire workforce, union membership declined from twenty-nine percent in 
 
business, even if due to antiunion animus, is not an unfair labor practice); see also Becker, 
supra note 91, at 1527 (arguing that legal doctrine “decisively promote[d] the[] deployment” 
of subcontracting and other strategies to fissure the employment relationship); Terry Col-
lingsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act—Plant Closings and Runaway Shops 
in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 72, 76, 101-04 (1993) (critiquing the Su-
preme Court’s decisions for allowing for the displacement of American workers); Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Pos-
sibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 90-91 (1988) (describing how the NLRB’s efforts to allow 
bargaining over capital decisions were undercut by the federal courts of appeals and eventu-
ally by the Supreme Court). 
101. See ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 96. The Hormel strike also illustrates the failure of some 
unions to mount a vigorous, effective, industry-wide response to demands for concessions. 
AMERICAN DREAM (Miramax Films 1990) (documenting the Hormel strike of 1985). 
102. See, e.g., Dale L. Belman & Kristen A. Monaco, The Effects of Deregulation, De-Unionization, 
Technology, and Human Capital on the Work and Work Lives of Truck Drivers, 54 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 502, 508 (2001) (concluding that deregulation accelerated the de-unionization of 
the trucking industry and contributed to a significant drop in earnings). 
103. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 9; WEIL, supra note 10, at 4; Mark Barenberg, Widening the  
Scope of Worker Organizing: Legal Reforms To Facilitate Multi-Employer Organizing,  
Bargaining, and Striking, ROOSEVELT INST. 1, 3 (Oct. 1 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Widening-the-Scope-of-Worker-Organizing.pdf [http://
perma.cc/JWN2-DS57]. 
104. Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON.  
POL’Y INST. (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnation-in-nine 
-charts.pdf [http://perma.cc/R2C5-QAH5]. 
105. Katz & Krueger, supra note 94, at 2-3. 
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1973 to about fifteen percent in the early 1990s, even though more than sixty 
percent of workers continued to report a desire for collective representation.
106
 
In the face of this transformation, the NLRB no longer could effectuate 
employees’ statutory rights to form and join labor organizations.
107
 Indeed, by 
1984 the House Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations released a re-
port announcing “The Failure of Labor Law.” The NLRA, the House committee 
concluded, “has ceased to accomplish its purpose.”
108
 Countless scholars and 
commissions subsequently echoed the assessment.
109
 Indeed, even those aca-
demics, judges, and politicians who celebrated the NLRA as a continued suc-
cess did so for its ability to further industrial peace—not for its ability to pro-




Notably, other industrialized countries experienced similar trends of glob-
alization, the fissuring of the traditional employment relationship, and the use 
of automation. But unions in these countries did not experience the same col-
lapse as American unions. In some countries, union density has remained 





106. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 41 (1999) (finding that over 
sixty percent of workers desired greater influence in the workplace); LICHTENSTEIN, supra 
note 88, at 213. The losses were concentrated in the manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
107. Julius G. Getman, Explaining the Fall of the Labor Movement, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 575, 578-84 
(1997); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unor-
ganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61-62 (1993); Weiler, supra note 7, at 1769-70, 
1774-1804. 
108. H. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MGMT. RELATIONS OF THE H. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 98TH 
CONG., THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW—A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS 1 (Comm. Print 
1984). 
109. Weiler, supra note 7, at 1770 (writing, in the early 1980s, that “[i]n the last decade or so, 
there has been an increasing appreciation that American labor law has failed to make good 
on its promise to employees that they are free to embrace collective bargaining if they 
choose”). For additional accounts by legal scholars, see sources cited supra notes 116-126; for 
human rights organizations’ and political accounts, see, for example, LANCE COMPA, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (2002); DUNLOP COMM’N ON 
THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REPORT (1995); 
for an historian’s perspective, see, for example, COWIE, supra note 52, at 25-26. 
110. See, e.g., Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 427 (Cynthia L. 
Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) (arguing that the NLRA has achieved its most 
important goal: industrial peace). 
111. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 81, at 57-58; THELEN, supra note 24, at 35-37; cf. Jonas Pon-
tusson et al., Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and 
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To understand how American labor law failed, one must first understand 
its basic structure. The NLRA is premised on a principle of majority rule at 
particular worksites. If a majority of workers in an “appropriate” bargaining 
unit selects representation by a union,
112
 that union becomes the exclusive col-
lective bargaining representative for all workers in the unit.
113
 Typically, selec-
tion occurs through a secret-ballot election, with the government agency serv-
ing as a neutral arbiter.
114
 Once a bargaining representative is elected, the em-
employer has an obligation to bargain in good faith.
115
 
A well-developed critique by labor scholars focuses on how the governing 
rules of union elections fail to protect workers’ statutory right to organize in 
the face of concerted management opposition.
116
 Among its many problems, 
the law provides employers with great latitude to dissuade employees from 
self-organization, while offering unions few rights to communicate with em-
ployees about unionization’s merits.
117
 Unions are denied physical access to the 
workplace during an organizing campaign, but employers are permitted to 
compel employee presence for antiunion communication.
118
 Meanwhile, the 
 
Labour Market Institutions, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 281, 307 (2002) (“While market forces have 
tended to generate more inequality, there is nonetheless no uniform or universal trend to-
wards more overall wage inequality among full-time employees across the OECD.”). 
112. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012). 
113. Id. 
114. See id. (establishing that recognition without an election, though not mandated, is permit-
ted). 
115. Id. § 158. 
116. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1563 (1996); Gottesman, supra note 107; Sachs, supra note 20, at 2694-2700; Weiler, 
supra note 7, at 1769-70; see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of  
Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing 43 (Cornell U. ILR Collection  
2000), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context 
=reports [http://perma.cc/74LQ-NQJ3] (noting that managerial opposition is “extremely 
effective in reducing union election win rates” and documenting the trends in such opposi-
tion). 
117. See Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Repre-
sentation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2433-44 (2003); see also Becker, supra note 58, at 516-23 
(1993) (describing employers’ influence on election timing as a tactic to deter unionization). 
118. Neither of these rules was foreordained by the statute’s text. The Act was initially interpret-
ed as affording union organizers access to nonwork areas of the employer’s facility; but that 
interpretation was reversed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 
105, 113-14 (1956). The Court has since reaffirmed its interpretation. See Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992). For further discussion, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, 
Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 311-25 (1994). For discussion 
of the doctrine that allows employers to compel employees to attend antiunion meetings, see 
Andrias, supra note 117, at 2439-41. 
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NLRB’s election machinery is extraordinarily slow; employers are able to defeat 
organizing drives through delay and attrition.
119
 
Perhaps most important, the NLRB’s remedial regime is too protracted and 
its penalties too meager to protect employees against employer retaliation.
120
 
One study found that about twenty-five percent of employers illegally dis-
charge workers for union activity; more than one-half make illegal threats to 
close all or part of a plant.
121
 When such illegal activity occurs, remedies are too 
little, too late. Employers who illegally terminate employees are liable only for 
backpay, minus any wages the worker has earned in the meantime—and the 
worker is obligated to mitigate any damages by looking for new employ-
ment.
122
 Further, the median length of time between the filing of an unfair la-




The statute’s goal of facilitating collective bargaining fares no better. The 
regime’s “good faith” bargaining obligation is undermined by the Board’s ina-
bility to impose contract terms as a remedy for a party’s failure to negotiate in 
good faith. Thus, an employer determined to resist collective bargaining can 
drag out negotiations for years, making plain its refusal to enter into an agree-
ment with the union.
124
 Employees have little recourse. Not only are the 
Board’s remedial powers limited, but the employer’s “right” to permanently re-
place striking workers—established in 1938 by the Supreme Court but little 
used until the 1980s—“has rendered the strike useless and virtually suicidal for 
many employees.”
125
 Further weakening unions’ bargaining position, the Court 
has strictly limited the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining, concluding 
that matters of entrepreneurial judgment need not be negotiated. For this rea-
son, the employer may avoid unionization by closing its operations, by subcon-
 
119. Weiler, supra note 7, at 1777 & n.24. 
120. See Gottesman, supra note 107, at 73. 
121. Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 99. 
122. See Weiler, supra note 7, at 1789-95 (describing the weaknesses of NLRA remedies). 
123. 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 152 (2009). 
124. Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice 
Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47, 56 (2009). 
125. Estlund, supra note 7, at 1538 (citing ATLESON, supra note 64, at 19-34). The federal courts 
and the Board have limited the right to strike in numerous other ways as well. See Craig 
Becker, “Better Than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 353 (1994). 
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Unions and their allies in Washington have repeatedly sought to reform the 
NLRA to reduce employer interference in organizing drives and to strengthen 
the bargaining obligation. The proposed reforms have all failed.
127
 The most 
recent bill, the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), would have required that 
the Board certify unions based on a showing that a majority of workers in a 
unit had signed cards indicating their desire for representation; the goal was to 
allow unions to avoid the NLRB’s dilatory election process.
128
 EFCA also 
would have mandated that parties unable to reach agreement on a first contract 
within four months submit to binding arbitration.
129
 
The failure to pass EFCA and its predecessor reform bills were significant 
losses for the labor movement.
130
 However, the import of the defeats may be 
overstated. It is not clear that any of the reform proposals would have done 
much to transform the American labor movement into an effective and power-
ful advocate for American workers in the contemporary political economy: the 
proposed reforms all centered on altering the existing mechanisms of organiz-
 
126. See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Textile Workers v. Darlington 
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Employer rights are particularly strong if the employer is 
making a change in the nature of its business or closing operations altogether. In such cases, 
employers typically need only bargain about the effect of the closure. Id.; see also sources cit-
ed supra note 100. 
127. For a summary of reform failures, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor 
Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1163-64 (2011); and Estlund, supra note 7, at 
1612. There was one significant reform in the post-Taft-Hartley era: The Landrum-Griffin 
Act of 1959 imposed a regime for the regulation of internal union affairs and union democ-
racy, while tinkering with some elements of Taft-Hartley. See Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
128. Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007). 
129. Id. Although the House of Representatives passed the Employee Free Choice Act in 2007, the 
bill died after a threatened senatorial filibuster. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Democrats  
Drop Key Part of Bill To Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/business/17union.html [http://perma.cc/6QAN-UWNT]; Alec  
MacGillis, Executives Lay Out Compromise to “Card Check” Labor Bill, WASH. POST  
(Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/21
/AR2009032101449.html [http://perma.cc/9S8Y-BM4K]. In 2007, the bill died in the Sen-
ate after a cloture vote failed 51-48. See 153 CONG. REC. S8398 (daily ed. June 26, 2007). 
130. Harold Meyerson, Under Obama, Labor Should Have Made More Progress, WASH.  
POST (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02
/09/AR2010020902465.html [http://perma.cc/M8T2-YAR2] (describing the Senate’s ina-
bility to pass EFCA as “devastating and galling” for the unions). 
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ing and bargaining to make them more amenable to unions.
131
 Yet, those 
mechanisms—geared toward worksite bargaining between single employers 
and their employees—are fundamentally mismatched with today’s economy.
132
 
Consider, for example, an auto manufacturer that once produced primary 
parts, assembled those parts into vehicles, and stored, transported, and distrib-
uted the vehicles to market.
133
 Now, that manufacturer is more likely to own 
only the assembly stage of production, relying on separate corporations—some 
foreign, some domestic—linked by exclusive or non-exclusive supplier-
purchaser contracts, to perform the remaining functions.
134
 Or consider the 
modern retailer, which obtains goods from a host of factories and ware-
houses.
135
 Those factories have long been staffed by workers who are employed 
by entities other than the retailer itself.
136
 But in the contemporary economy, 
several contractors likely stand between any given factory or warehouse worker 
and the retailer. And the workers themselves are as likely to be classified as 
temporary employees or independent contractors as they are full-fledged em-
ployees.
137
 Within the retail store, some of those who labor may be employ-
ees—many temporary or part-time. But those who clean, repair, and secure the 




131. For similar reasons, recent regulatory changes promulgated by the NLRB, which would 
shorten the election period and adjust other procedures, while important, are unlikely to be 
game changing. See Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74308 (Dec. 15, 2014) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101-03). These rules recently survived legal challenge in the 
Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia. Associated Builders & Contractors of Tex. v. NLRB, 
826 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2016); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 3d 171 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
132. See STONE, supra note 9; Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive 
Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5 n.5 (1993); Wachter, supra note 53, at 581. 
133. For a detailed description and analysis of the various ecosystems of disintegrated employers, 
see generally WEIL, supra note 10; and Barenberg, supra note 103. 
134. See WEIL, supra note 10, at 58-59, 68-69, 160; Barenberg, supra note 103. 
135. WEIL, supra note 10, at 26, 170. 
136. Id. 
137. See id. at 128, 159-68, 173-77 (discussing the pervasiveness of temporary workers and inde-
pendent contractors in various industries, including retail). 
138. Id. at 102. Moreover, the retailer’s supply chain is likely interwoven with others to form a 
complex production and distribution network. Goods sold by one big-box retailer may be 
produced in the same factories as those of other big-box retailers, transported by some of 
the same logistics companies to some of the same ports, unloaded by some of the same ste-
vedoring companies, transported by some of the same trucking companies, and stored in 
some of the same warehouses, before ultimately arriving to the stores. See Barenberg, supra 
note 103, at 3. 
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Similarly, a building owner in a major city is now unlikely to hire many 
employees directly, instead entering into contracts with cleaning companies, 
security companies, landscapers, insurers, tenants, and others. So, too, a fast-
food company may have a set of employees at its national headquarters, but it 
likely franchises with many small franchise owners, who in turn hire many 
part-time employees while contracting with cleaning companies, food suppli-
ers, security companies, and others.
139
 Or consider Uber, part of the new “plat-
form” economy,
140
 which has a team of lawyers, engineers, and high-tech 
workers at headquarters, but, it contends, only independent contractors 
providing the rides that make up the company’s core business.
141
 
Throughout these and other ecosystems of disintegrated or fissured em-
ployers, the NLRA has been of diminished relevance. Employers operate out-
side its reach for several reasons. First, the statute does not cover non-
traditional work relationships. Independent contractors are expressly exempt-
ed.
142
 Thus, if an entity like Uber is correct that its drivers are independent 
contractors—an issue now hotly contested—federal labor law would not pro-
tect them.
143
 In those circumstances, Uber could terminate drivers’ contracts in 
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RC-168855 (2016). State agencies are divided on the status of Uber divers. The California 
Labor Commissioner has ruled that they are employees. See Berwick, slip op. at 10. Authori-
ties in eight states have concluded that they are not employees. See Tom Risen,  
Employee or Contractor? Uber Ruling Could Affect Other Companies, U.S. NEWS (June  
18, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/18/employee-or-contractor-uber 
-ruling-could-affect-other-companies [http://perma.cc/JQ3E-2MSM] (“Labor authorities 
in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Texas, Colorado, Illinois and New York have upheld Uber’s classi-
fication that its drivers are independent contractors.”). Though Uber has settled several ma-
jor class actions without conceding that its drivers are employees, there are numerous addi-
tional lawsuits pending. See Mike Isaac & Noam Scheiber, Uber Settles Cases with Concessions, 
but Drivers Stay Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/20 
16/04/22/technology/uber-settles-cases-with-concessions-but-drivers-stay-freelancers.html 
[http://perma.cc/6RLL-X92X]; Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-Ending Stream of Law Suits,  
CNN MONEY (Aug. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/technology/uber 
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retaliation for concerted action and would be under no obligation to negotiate 
with a majority of drivers regarding the terms of their contract. FedEx, for ex-
ample, has been successful in some circuits in resisting unionization efforts on 
the ground that its drivers are independent contractors.
144
 To be sure, the clas-
sification of such workers as contractors, and therefore not covered by the stat-
ute, is contested. UPS workers perform work identical to that of FedEx em-
ployees and are classified as employees—and are unionized. But employers 
have actively exploited the exclusions in labor law when restructuring and re-
classifying their work relationships; meanwhile, faced with intense manage-
ment opposition and plagued by internal divisions, unions have historically 




Second, as Professor Mark Barenberg has recently detailed, the NLRA is 
designed to channel organizing drives between groups of employees and single 
employers—not to facilitate collective action across multiple employers.
146
 To 
win recognition, a worker organization must demonstrate majority support 
within one employer, and often within a subunit of that employer, within 
which workers share a “community of interest.”
147
 Moreover, only employers 
 
-lawsuits [http://perma.cc/8JR9-TBXZ]. In addition, the NLRB continues to investigate 
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without sufficient regard for all of the common law factors and holding FedEx drivers to  
be employees). In other circumstances, FedEx has successfully resisted efforts to  
have its workers covered under the NLRA instead of the Railway Labor Act. See  
Kevin Bogardus, FedEx Bests UPS in Lobbying Skirmish, THE HILL (Feb 2, 2011,  
11:24 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/141625-fedex-triumphs-over-ups-in 
-faa-labor-lobbying-skirmish# [http://perma.cc/2PN7-6283]. 
145. But see sources cited infra notes 211-217 (describing some exceptional organizing campaigns 
by unions and worker centers). 
146. Barenberg, supra note 103. 
147. See, e.g., National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 9(b). 
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The law does allow for “joint employers,” but from the 1980s until just re-
cently, employers had been successful in advancing a narrow interpretation of 
the term.
149
 For over thirty years, the Board required an entity to exercise di-
rect, immediate, and actual control over the terms and conditions of employ-
ment before the entity would be considered a joint employer.
150
 Under this in-
terpretation, it was exceedingly difficult for workers to hold liable an entity that 
retaliated against them for organizing, unless that entity was their immediate 
employer. As discussed further in Section II.C.1, in 2016 the NLRB returned to 
the prior, more expansive standard in a case called Browning-Ferris.
151
 The ma-
jority held that “two or more statutory employers are joint employers of the 
same statutory employees if they ‘share or codetermine those matters govern-
ing the essential terms and conditions of employment.’”
152
 Several months lat-
er, in Miller & Anderson, the Board went a step further, holding that unions can 
seek representation elections in units that combine workers of one company 




These new developments are important attempts by the agency to respond 
to the realities of the contemporary fissured and contingent workforce, and, as 
discussed in Part IV, are an important step toward a new labor law regime—but 
they are still limited by the NLRA’s enterprise-focus. They do not reach com-
panies that participate in a supply chain or economic network, without sharing 
 
148. For example, the NLRB lacks authority to sanction or punish lawmakers or business-funded 
antiunion organizations for retaliating against workers for organizing. See Amanda Becker, 
Legal Challenge to VW Union Election Could Be “Uncharted Territory,” REUTERS (Feb.  
14, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/autos-vw-legal-idUKL2N0LJ1IT20140214 [http://
perma.cc/J8RT-A7KZ] (describing efforts of Tennessee elected officials to dissuade 
Volkswagen workers from unionizing, including by threatening retaliation). 
149. The Board’s position changed with Browning-Ferris Indus. of California, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 186, at 2 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
150. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), overruled by Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186; 
Laerco Transp., 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984), overruled by Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
186. 
151. Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186. For additional analysis, see infra notes 302-317 and 
accompanying text. 
152. Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 2, 15 (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
153. Miller & Anderson, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (July 11, 2016) (overruling H.S. Care, L.L.C., 
343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004)). 
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control over terms and conditions of employment, nor do they reach separate 
employers in a single industry.
154
 
Third, even if a worker organization were to succeed in organizing several 
units across multiple employers, the NLRA does not require the merger of the 
different units for purposes of bargaining.
155
 Multiunit bargaining is permitted 
and has been used in various industries where employers have agreed to it.
156
 
But it is not required. The legal obligation to bargain rests only with the “em-
ployer,” and that employer is obligated to bargain only with its own “employ-
ees.” Indeed, from the 1980s until the recent Browning-Ferris decision, only di-
rect employers, not employers sharing control over employment, would have 
been under an obligation to bargain with downstream employees. 
Fourth, the law significantly limits the ability to engage in cross-employer 
economic action. When seeking to win improvements in wages, benefits, or 
working conditions, the worker organization is not permitted to exercise eco-
nomic pressure over a “secondary” employer to put pressure on another em-
ployer, even when their businesses are intertwined, as long as they are not for-
mally joint employers.
157
 A picket at corporate headquarters designed to coerce 
franchisees to negotiate a contract (assuming no joint-employment status) is 
thus illegal.
158
 Nor may a worker organization sign an agreement that commits 
an employer to contract exclusively with unionized suppliers or buyers.
159
 
3. Labor Law and Politics 
The above features of labor law all make it exceedingly difficult for unions 
to exercise economic power on behalf of workers in the contemporary, fissured 
economy. The law is structured around an ideal—or imagined—labor-
 
154. See id. at 6-7 (emphasizing the limits of the Board’s holding). 
155. The formation of a multi-employer bargaining unit must be entirely voluntary; the Board 
will not approve the creation of such a unit over the objection of any party. Artcraft Displays, 
Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1233 (1982), clarified by, 263 N.L.R.B. 804 (1982); see Barenberg, supra 
note 103, at 11. 
156. See sources cited supra note 79. 
157. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2012). 
158. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982); NLRB v. Retail 
Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980). 
159. See, e.g., National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(e) (prohibiting so-called “hot cargo” 
agreements except in the garment and construction industries); Gimrock Constr., Inc., 344 
N.L.R.B. 934 (2005). For further discussion, see Barenberg, supra note 103, at 21. As a result 
of these restrictions, some successful tactics used by agricultural employees, like the Coali-
tion of Immokalee Workers, are off limits to most private-sector workers. 
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management relationship that, for the most part, no longer exists. The statuto-
ry decision to privilege firm-based contracts and to penalize cross-employer 
economic strategies thus leaves workers with little private, economic power in 
the modern economy. 
At the same time, unions’ political power has declined.
160
 The most obvious 
reason for the diminished political influence of labor is that, as union member-
ship has plummeted, unions have had fewer workers to mobilize in politics and 
fewer resources to deploy on behalf of workers’ goals.
161
 
But the problem is more fundamental than the decline in union member-
ship. The existing labor law regime does not grant unions a significant degree 
of public, political power. Indeed, the law encourages unions to focus their en-
ergy at the firm level and not at the social or political level. As discussed in Sec-
tion I.B, the law facilitates organization and bargaining at the individual firm, 
not across a sector, and workers are restricted in their ability to engage in cross-
employer collective action. Moreover, under the statute, unions have a legal du-
ty to bargain and represent workers at the workplace,
162
 not to serve as a voice 
for workers in politics and governance more generally.
163
 If unions fail to dis-
charge their duty at the firm level, they are subject both to administrative pro-
ceedings and to suit in federal court.
164
 
The local, firm-based structure of American labor law brings advantages,
165
 
but it also leaves unions weakened in their ability to mount a powerful political 
defense of workers on a national or regional level. Unions must develop exten-
sive bureaucracies to provide representational services, diminishing resources 
 
160. See ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 159-81. 
161. See ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 168-73, 180-81; Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: 
Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 153-54, 178-79 (2013). 
162. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 64, 66 (1991) (applying a duty of fair rep-
resentation to contract negotiations); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1957) (holding 
that the duty of fair representation requires unions to pursue grievances in good faith). 
163. See Sachs, supra note 161, at 155 (noting the worksite collective-bargaining focus of labor law 
and proposing an alternative that would bifurcate unions’ political function and their eco-
nomic function, allowing workers at a worksite to form a “political union” instead of a col-
lective bargaining union); cf. Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Di-
lemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1981) (critiquing the effort of labor law to 
distinguish between the economic and the political functions of unions). 
164. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The duty runs to non-members who decline to pay full 
union dues, as well as to dues-paying members. 
165. For example, the duty of fair representation has played an important role in eliminating dis-
crimination by unions, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), while 
the enterprise focus of labor law has helped create well-funded workplace organizations and 
facilitated workplace voice, see infra Sections III.A, IV.B. 
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available for broader organizing and political work; this structure also provides 
an incentive to engage in political work that benefits existing members, as op-
posed to workers generally.
166
 While many unions have been powerful advo-
cates for legislation and regulation that benefit all workers—including health 
care, workplace safety, antidiscrimination, and wage and hour laws
167
—others 
have focused almost entirely on contract administration or on legislation that 




Indeed, it is in part because the law conceives of unions as private, firm-
based representatives that the Supreme Court has limited the ability of em-
ployers and unions to use union dues for political purposes. The Court has 
held that workers who object to union membership may be required to fund 
the costs of representation, but may not be required to contribute to union ex-
penses regarding matters of public concern.
169
 According to the Court, work on 
matters of politics and public concern is not germane to unions’ core function 
and therefore cannot justify any burden on an individual worker’s speech.
170
 
Notably, the Court does not apply similar reasoning to corporations. Although 
campaign finance law regulates political spending by corporations and unions 
 
166. The nation’s history of privately provided health and pension benefits and the two-party po-
litical system, with no tradition of a labor party, also help explain, and are in part explained 
by, the comparatively apolitical orientation of labor unions. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 
88, at 126, 143-44, 146. 
167. See id. at 185-86. 
168. See id. at 187-88. 
169. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738-42 (1988) (interpreting the NLRA 
not to allow compulsory payment of the portion of union fees used for matters of public 
concern); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (finding a First 
Amendment right of public-sector workers not to pay for the portion of union fees used for 
matters of public concern); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 762 (1961) 
(reaching the same result under the Railway Labor Act). The Supreme Court recently ex-
panded the rights of objecting workers by prohibiting unions from collecting funds even for 
collective bargaining purposes from “quasi” public employees. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 
2618, 2644 (2014). The Court was widely expected to extend Harris’s holding to all public 
sector employees in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, but instead, after the death of Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court divided evenly on the question and existing precedent stands. 136 S. 
Ct. 1083 (2016). 
170. Cf. Street, 367 U.S. at 801 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “what is loosely called 
political activity of American trade unions . . . [is] activity indissolubly relating to the imme-
diate economic and social concerns that are the raison d’etre of unions”). 
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identically, the Court has not found that shareholders have a First Amendment 
right to object to corporations’ political spending.
171
 
Finally, the law gives unions no formal role in negotiating generally appli-
cable wages or workplace standards—or other social benefits. This is a sharp 
difference from the short-lived “corporatist” or “tripartite” model of NIRA and 
from many European systems.
172
 For example, in Germany, the union federa-
tions participate in basic decisions concerning national wage policy and policies 
relating to employment, economic growth, and social insurance.
173
 Meanwhile, 
collective bargaining occurs on a regional basis, with unions and employers re-
sponsible for negotiating wage scales that cover all workers, at least in manu-
facturing sectors; those agreements then provide a floor above which local bar-
gaining may occur.
174
 In Denmark, unions have played an even more active role 
in negotiating social policy.
175
 Unions and employers have, for example, collec-
tively negotiated national policies on worker training and parental leave.
176
 
Throughout many other European countries, the law provides for various 
forms of “contract extension,” where collective bargaining agreements are ex-
tended to apply to workers throughout a region or sector, effectively forming 
the basis for employment policy in those sectors.
177
 
To be sure, the NLRA does protect, to some extent, workers’ political ac-
tivity. Section 7 has been interpreted to extend to workers’ concerted activity 
that occurs through political channels—as long as such activity relates to em-
ployment issues.
178
 In addition, unions, like other organizations, may engage 
 
171. Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 802-03 (2012) (objecting to the asymmetry). 
172. Wachter, supra note 53, at 598, 606; see also supra notes 52-56, 66-69 and accompanying text. 
173. See STEVEN J. SILVIA, HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER 38-41 (2013) (discussing the involve-
ment of German trade unions in managing all important aspects of the welfare state); Clyde 
W. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from 
an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 385-88 (1980) (critiquing both American 
and German unions for obstructing union member participation in union decision making 
but concluding that American unions are comparatively more democratic). 
174. THELEN, supra note 24, at 58. 
175. Id. at 65-67. 
176. Id. at 67. 
177. Franz Traxler & Martin Behrens, Collective Bargaining Coverage and  
Extension Procedures, EURWORK (Dec. 17, 2002), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu 
/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/collective-bargaining-coverage-and-exten 
sion-procedures [http://perma.cc/2PWM-4HHP]; see also SILVIA, supra note 173, at 27-28 
(discussing the German system of contract extension and its limitations). 
178. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); see also Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, 
Gen. Counsel, NLRB to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memo-
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in electoral politics and lobby government officials.
179
 In some circumstances, 
they may also use political pressure to bring about concessions from employers 
regarding organization and collective bargaining.
180
 In practice, many unions 
spend a great deal of energy and money on political activity with significant 
effect.
181
 But while the law permits political action, it fails to empower unions 
at the political level, and it incentivizes a bureaucratic focus. 
These features of American labor law matter not only for how unions spend 
their time and resources, but also for society more generally. When unions 
were large and strong, they helped engage workers in the political process and 
helped ensure that the government was responsive to the actual preferences of 
working people.
182
 When particular unions moved beyond a focus on work-
place representation of existing members and pursued a broader social justice 
mission at the sectoral, national, and political level, they helped bring about 
significant improvements in the lives of all working Americans.
183
 Conversely, 
the decline in unionization rates and the failure of American law to structure 
unions in ways that facilitate workers’ collective political power has contributed 




randum GC 08-10 (July 22, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg] 
(providing guidelines for how to handle unfair labor practice charges involving political ac-
tivity arising out of immigration rallies). As discussed previously, however, penalties for vio-
lations of section 7 are minimal, and the law imposes a host of restrictions on the kinds of 
concerted activity in which workers can engage. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying 
text. 
179. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (declaring unconstitutional restrictions on 
independent corporate and union political expenditures). 
180. But see James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union 
Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731 (2010) (describing how unions’ ability to 
pressure employers to enter organizing framework agreements through the use of political 
pressure has been somewhat chilled by RICO suits brought by employers). 
181. See ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 170-73; Sachs, supra note 161, at 152, 168-71 (describing 
some successful political efforts of unions). 
182. See ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 159-81; Sachs, supra note 161, at 152-54. 
183. See, e.g., LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 58-59, 76-85, 262-64. But see ALICE KESSLER-
HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY 17-18, 100-11, 141-43, 171-77 (2001) (detailing how a deeply 
embedded set of gender beliefs shaped even seemingly neutral social legislation to limit the 
freedom and equality of women). 
184. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 186 (describing the structure of unions and its relation-
ship to their political activity); Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion 
of Checks and Balances, 18 J. CONST. L. 419, 436-56 (2015) (summarizing research on gov-
ernment’s responsiveness to the wealthy’s interests); Sachs, supra note 161, at 153-54 (em-
phasizing how the decline in union membership reduces workers’ influence in politics). 
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B. Employment Law: Distinct and Insufficient 
Of course, labor law, which aims to protect collective action among work-
ers, represents only one facet of American workplace law. Another is employ-
ment law, which offers “rights and protections to employees on an individual—
and individually enforceable—basis.”
185
 Yet employment law suffers from as 
many limitations as labor law in the contemporary political economy. 
Employment law comprises a wide range of federal laws, including Title 
VII and other antidiscrimination statutes,
186
 the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
187
 It also includes numerous state statutes and 
state common law doctrines.
188
 The state and federal laws operate largely inde-
pendently of any collectivization in the workplace.
189
 They prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, and national origin, as well as other protected 
characteristics; and they guarantee minimum standards and fair treatment, in-
cluding minimum wages, maximum hours, safe working conditions, and a 
modicum of family leave. 
As labor law became ossified and decreased in relevance over the last few 
decades, employment law grew increasingly important.
190
 In particular, the an-
tidiscrimination statutes—the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act—worked an important transformation in the American workplace. Togeth-
 
185. Brudney, supra note 116, at 1570. For an account of how the division between labor law and 
employment law breaks down, see Estlund, supra note 118, at 329; and Sachs, supra note 20, 
at 2688-89. 
186. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012); Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). 
187. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012); Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012); Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 
U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
188. For one synthesis of employment law, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social 
Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225 (2013). 
189. See Sachs, supra note 20, at 2688. 
190. As one treatise declared in 1994, “a mere thirty years ago, there was no such thing as em-
ployment law.” ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW, at v (1994); see also ESTLUND, supra 
note 29, at 52-74 (describing the fall of collective bargaining and the proliferation of substan-
tive mandates); St. Antoine, supra note 20, at 526-27 (explaining, in 2004, that the preceding 
“two decades have continued the shift of emphasis from labor law to employment law” and 
expressing regret at the diminishment of “private initiative and the voluntary arrangements 
that have made collective bargaining such a uniquely valuable American institution”). 
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er, they opened up employment opportunities for millions of Americans.
191
 
More recently, the FMLA and the Affordable Care Act provided important new 
guarantees of economic benefits: unpaid family leave and the right to purchase 
medical insurance. 
To great extent, the expansion of employment law is compatible with labor 
law. Like labor law, much employment law aims to improve workers’ economic 
and social position to create greater societal equality.
192
 Rather than displacing 
collective bargaining, most employment law statutes set a floor in the work-
place above which unions can negotiate. As such, employment law functions to 
fulfill the substantive goals of unions and to extend the benefits won by union-
ized employees to a broader set of workers. Certain employment law statutes 




At the same time, scholars have documented tensions between the two re-
gimes.
194
 Employment law and labor law embrace fundamentally different ap-
proaches to protecting workers: bestowing individual rights in the case of em-
ployment law; facilitating collective power in the case of labor law.
195
 Though 
these two approaches can be—and have been—mutually reinforcing, they can 
also conflict. Historians have documented how the rise of rights-conscious lib-
 
191. See NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORK-
PLACE 67-113 (2006) (tracing the struggle to pass and implement Title VII and analyzing the 
statute’s impact). 
192. See Bagenstos, supra note 188, at 230 & nn.18-21, 231 nn.22-24 (arguing that social equality is 
the normative justification for employment law and collecting similar arguments for labor 
law). Indeed, employment law and labor law were not always treated as distinctly as they are 
today. For example, a leading labor law casebook published in 1968 identified the wide 
range of new social legislation and the 1964 Civil Rights Act as areas of increasing interest 
and significance to labor relations law, without positing them as in conflict with the NLRA. 
See RUSSELL A. SMITH ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (4th ed. 
1968); see also MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 2-4, 18-22, 513-16 (2d ed. 
1965) (arguing that economic and social security is the key to labor law and treating mini-
mum standards legislation as well as collective bargaining law as part of the subject). 
193. See generally Sachs, supra note 20, at 2687-93 (showing how the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and Title VII can provide a legal architecture to facilitate organizational and collective activi-
ty). 
194. For leading accounts of the tension between collective and individual rights, see, for exam-
ple, LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 141, 171; Brudney, supra note 116; Cynthia Estlund, Re-
building the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); 
Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Law, Liberalism, and the 
Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (1999); and Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment 
Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992).  
195. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1319 (2012). 
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eralism undermined trade unionism in particular ways.
196
 For example, con-
servative antiunion lawyers successfully adopted the arguments of the civil 
rights movement to advance their vision of a “right to work” free from union 
dues.
197
 And in some circumstances, courts applied a broad labor preemption 




Not only did tensions emerge between the NLRA and individual rights re-
gimes, but employment law was unable to fill the void left by a weakened labor 
movement and a labor law that failed to protect workers’ ability to organize 
and bargain.
199
 Enforcement of employment law is lax and violations are ram-
pant, particularly in the fissured workplace.
200
 Moreover, as with labor law, 
when employment is contracted out, fewer rights attach.
201
 And court remedies 
are often unavailable because of mandatory arbitration clauses.
202
 Finally, the 
 
196. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 88, at x (arguing that as the concept of rights became “a near heg-
emonic way of evaluating the quality of American citizenship,” the concept of solidarity “at-
rophied”); see also id. at 171 (“By advocating state protection as opposed to collective action, 
liberals implicitly endorsed the idea, long associated with antiunion conservatism, that the 
labor movement could not be trusted to protect the individual rights of its members.”); 
REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW AND THE COLLAPSE OF POST WAR LIB-
ERALISM 3, 5, 12 (2015) (arguing that labor law and fair employment law contradicted one 
another in ways that helped facilitate the demise of liberalism). Other historians trace the 
conflict between individual rights and collectivism to an earlier point. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, 
THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 244 
(1996) (describing the American political philosophy that emerged after the Civil War as 
one emphasizing “individual freedoms and personal autonomy rather than the duties in-
cumbent upon members of organized and regulated communities” and “the common 
good”). 
197. See LEE, supra note 84, at 5-6, 73-75 (describing how the national right-to-work movement 
sought to align itself with the civil rights movement). 
198. See Stone, supra note 194, at 577-78, 593-605. 
199. For a contrary perspective, see Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Rela-
tions: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 
1040 (1984) (arguing that employment law better serves workers than labor law). 
200. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 50 (2009); KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN 
AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 6-22 (rev. ed. 2011); WEIL, supra note 10, at 214-22. 
201. See WEIL, supra note 10, at 190-201. 
202. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the 
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); 
see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard 
Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007) (describing employer-imposed 
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substantive rights provided by employment law, even when enforceable, are 
paltry compared to those in other industrialized countries and to those guaran-
teed by most collective bargaining agreements. Most nonunion workers are 
employed “at will” with few protections against termination;
203
 federal law and 
most state laws lack guarantees of paid family leave, vacation, or sick time; and 
statutory minimums do not provide the wages or benefits necessary to keep 
workers out of poverty.
204
 Despite the existence of a wide range of employment 
law statutes, in practice, many workers enjoy few rights at work. Workers’ real 
incomes have barely increased during recent decades, even though total work-
ing hours are longer and educational attainment is greater.
205
 
C. Efforts at Renewal 
1. Resuscitation 
For the past twenty years, against the background of the inadequate labor 
and employment law regimes, the labor movement has been trying to rejuve-
nate itself. 1995 was a turning point. Following years of globalization and out-
sourcing, unions at the time represented just over ten percent of private-sector 
workers, down from one-third in the 1950s.
206
 Promising to usher in a new era 
of organizing, John Sweeney ran an insurgent campaign for the presidency of 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
 
arbitration and noncompete agreements, both of which require the employee to give up crit-
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REV. 6, 8 (2002) (“[A]bsent a contractual provision for job security or a prohibited discrim-
inatory or retaliatory motive, it remains true in every American jurisdiction, except Mon-
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the Current Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349, 352 tbl.1 (2003). 




 The AFL-CIO turned to the NLRB election process 
with renewed vigor—but met with little success. First, there was the problem 
of capacity. Fewer than five percent of affiliate unions maintained a department 
capable of organizing new workers.
208
 But even among local and national un-
ions committed to organizing, and even in sectors where workers overwhelm-
ingly reported their desire for unions, the legal roadblocks discussed above 
rendered the traditional NLRA electoral mechanisms inadequate. 
Unions thus pushed for amendments to the NLRA that would make organ-
izing and bargaining easier.
209
 At the same time, they attempted to work 
around the existing law. They sought to develop alternative mechanisms to ob-
tain traditional recognition and collective bargaining arrangements.
210
 One ap-
proach was to engage in private ordering by seeking private agreements with 
employers in order to alter the ground rules for union organizing and first con-
tract bargaining. In such agreements, employers typically pledge to remain 
neutral with respect to whether their employees organize; they also may allow 
unions access to employer property, recognize the union when a majority of 
workers sign cards requesting representation, or agree to some form of expe-
dited election or first contract arbitration.
211
 As Professor Benjamin Sachs has 
shown, some such agreements were the product of state and local interven-
tions. Through a system of tripartite bargaining, unions have reached agree-
ments with employers and local governments that result in card check recogni-
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210. See Sachs, supra note 127 (describing “tripartite lawmaking” strategies); Sachs, supra note 14, 
at 376 (locating labor law’s “new dynamism” in private agreements, state government action, 
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national Framework Agreements: An Exploratory Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 725, 770-71 
(2014) (examining the use of privately negotiated “International Framework Agreements” 
that commit employers to neutrality concerning unionization across multiple countries). 
Unions’ ability to pressure employers to enter neutrality agreements has been chilled some-
what by employers’ use of RICO suits. See Brudney, supra note 180. 
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tion, limits on employer involvement in union campaigns, union access to em-
ployer property, and more effective enforcement of the duty to bargain.
212
 
Another approach was to create pathways to organization for workers ex-
empted from federal law. For example, unions used innovative lawyering and 
legislative strategies to transform state-funded home-care workers into state 
employees, or quasi-state employees, in numerous jurisdictions. After doing so, 
they won the right to hold representational election for these workers.
213
 The 
organization of home care and childcare workers thus added to labor’s ranks in 
the public sector, using a model that tracked the NLRA. 
Finally, while unions sought to bring new workers under the NLRA’s basic 
framework, other worker advocates attempted different forms of collective ac-
tion. One important innovation to that end was the emergence of organizations 
known as worker centers.
214
 Worker centers, which became increasingly preva-
lent in the 1990s and 2000s, are community-based, non-profit organizations 
that provide legal and social services to low-wage, often immigrant workers.
215
 
They also engage in advocacy work, leadership development, and collective ac-
tion in order to improve working conditions in the lowest wage industries.
216
 
The worker center campaigns filled an important void in vulnerable com-
munities, while the innovative union campaigns brought tens of thousands of 
new workers—largely women, immigrants, and people of color—into the labor 
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movement. Yet, for the most part, neither produced any fundamental change in 
labor law or the structure of labor relations. With a few notable exceptions, 
most worker centers expressly rejected the goal of collective bargaining and 
remained local in structure, without substantial power to affect the national 
economy or politics.
217
 Meanwhile, the union campaigns did not aim to trans-
form the basic system of labor law established by the NLRA. As Professor Cyn-
thia Estlund remarked in 2006, unions engaged in trying to revitalize labor law 
were “largely committed to a more or less recognizable regime of union organi-
zation and collective bargaining.”
218
 Their innovations did not so much “trans-
form the nature of labor relations—of unionization, majority rule, and collec-
tive bargaining—as they [sought] to smooth the path that leads there.”
219
 
Most scholars urging labor law reform have operated in this vein as well. 
For example, they have argued in favor of amending the NLRA’s election ma-
chinery to remove the obstacles to unionization;
220
 for more frequent elections 
to facilitate workers’ entry and exit from unions;
221
 and for a private cause of 
action to enforce NLRA rights.
222
 They have also explained why judicial and 
agency opinions that narrowly interpret the NLRA ought to be reversed.
223
 For 
example, scholars have critiqued precedent that limits union access to employer 
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 that permits employees in right-to-work states not to pay for le-
gally mandated representation;
225
 and that forecloses the possibility of minori-
ty or members-only unions
226
 and “company unions.”
227
 Supporting these 
efforts is the work of scholars who seek to rewrite First Amendment doctrine to 
better protect ongoing collective action among workers, again within the cur-
rent statutory framework.
228
 As with the unions’ earlier organizing efforts, 
these scholarly arguments largely operate within labor law’s basic framework of 
non-statist, decentralized, firm-based bargaining. 
2. Abandonment 
While unions and many academic supporters sought to invent new ways to 
bring workers under the NLRA’s basic framework, others abandoned the pro-
ject of labor law, asserting the need for a post-union approach. Indeed, some 
abandoned the idea of traditional labor law. Most notably, since the 1970s, a 
movement has emerged in support of corporate self-governance. That is, mul-
tinational corporations, whether on their own or when pushed by human 
rights groups, unions, and NGOs, have adopted corporate codes of conduct 
and agreed to let outside groups monitor their compliance with these codes.
229
 
For businesses, these voluntary codes of conduct are a tool to enhance brand 
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reputation and to achieve regulatory forbearance.
230
 For NGOs and worker ad-
vocates, they are a way to improve labor standards when domestic and interna-
tional law fail. 
Scholars, including some labor and employment law experts, have celebrat-
ed the turn toward self-regulation as a way to create more flexible and modern 
governance systems.
231
 For example, Cynthia Estlund has argued in support of 
self-regulation, while urging changes to its operation in order to give workers a 
genuine collective voice.
232
 On this account, self-regulation can help fill the 
void left by the decline of unions and the weakness of employment law. Indeed, 
where strong worker organizations are present, as in the case of the Coalition 




But for the most part, corporate social responsibility efforts are character-
ized by profound weaknesses.
234
 The programs suffer from low levels of trans-
parency; effective sanctions are rare; and, without strong regulatory systems or 
unions, workers are typically unwilling to report problems to private monitors, 
even when the monitors operate in good faith.
235
 Even the most aggressive self-
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monitoring programs have had mixed success at best, with studies document-
ing pervasive code violations.
236
 
* * * 
In short, by the metrics of protecting workers’ associational rights and fa-
cilitating greater economic and political equality, the innovations of the past 
decades have all failed. Since the early 2000s, when scholars began exploring a 
revitalized labor law and reporting the rise of both worker centers and self-
regulation, economic inequality has increased;
237
 union density has declined;
238
 
most workers still lack a meaningful voice in their place of employment; and 
working people’s influence in politics remains feeble.
239
 
No doubt, there are numerous explanations for the failure of labor law’s re-
vitalization and the continued weakness of employment law. The extraordinary 
opposition to reform mounted by conservative groups and business interests 
cannot be overstated, nor can the efforts to weaken the existing regimes.
240
 But 
even if the reforms identified thus far had been achieved, and the innovative 
strategies more fully realized, they would have done little to ameliorate the fail-
ure of labor law to provide workers significant power in the contemporary po-
litical economy. 
i i .  the contours of a new legal framework 
The incipient labor law being forged by today’s social movements offers a 
more promising path. Like many earlier efforts, the Fight for $15 and other 
contemporary low-wage worker movements operate outside of traditional la-
bor law and focus on the lowest paid workers in the economy. But the new 
movements, more so than their predecessors, are refusing labor law’s orienta-
tion around the employer-employee relationship. By demanding $15 an hour 
and the right to a union for all workers, they are seeking to bargain at the sec-
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toral and regional level, rather than at the firm level. In this way, they are ex-
tending and augmenting the work of earlier campaigns, like SEIU’s Justice for 
Janitors campaign, which sought to organize entire industries in particular lo-
calities, while learning from less successful campaigns that focused on single 
firms, like the multi-year effort to organize Walmart. 
In addition, and in a more notable break from the past, the Fight for $15 
and other contemporary low-wage worker movements are rejecting the notion 
that unions’ primary role is to negotiate traditional private collective bargaining 
agreements, with the state playing a neutral mediating and enforcing role. In-
stead, the movements are seeking to bargain in the public arena: they are en-
gaging in social bargaining with the state on behalf of all workers. In so doing, 
they are collapsing the distinction between employment law and labor law and 
rendering the basic terms of employment for all workers subject to social bar-
gaining. Finally, although they are embracing sectoral, social bargaining, the 
new movements are not abandoning worksite organization. To the contrary, 
they are using social bargaining to strengthen and supplement traditional col-
lective bargaining, while beginning to experiment with new forms of work-
place organization. 
This Part undertakes a case study of the Fight for $15, contextualized 
among similar ongoing movements, to show how the outline of a new labor 
law is beginning to emerge. 
A. Evolution of the Movement: From McDonald’s, to Fast Food, to Low-Wage 
Now known as the “Fight for $15,” the campaign among low-wage workers 
began to make headlines in 2012 under banners ranging from “Fast Food For-
ward” in New York to “Raise up MKE” in Milwaukee to “Fight for $15” in Chi-
cago.
241
 Though some media accounts described the early efforts as spontane-
ous, the campaign, from the beginning, was funded and organized by SEIU, 
one of the nation’s largest unions.
242
 In some localities, SEIU provided funding 
and training to grassroots community organizations already working with fast-
food workers; in others, the union itself initiated contacts with workers and 
built new local organizations.
243
 In both cases, organizers funded by SEIU met 
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with workers, built committees of workers, and eventually, after months of 
work, helped workers launch small-scale demonstrations and strikes, demand-
ing $15 an hour and the right to form unions free from intimidation.
244
 
The first actions were in New York. On November 29, 2012, several hun-
dred workers at McDonald’s, Burger King, Domino’s, KFC, Taco Bell, Wendy’s, 
and Papa John’s walked off the job.
245
 The strikes did not fit the typical NLRA 
model. Although they were organized by SEIU, they occurred among employ-
ees who had not yet won union recognition or certification at their particular 
worksites.
246
 In addition, the strikes, for the most part, did not reflect majority 
participation at any given facility; they were not a response to a breakdown in 
collective bargaining; they were short in duration and without an expectation 
of management concessions.
247
 Moreover, although the campaign focused 
much of its public criticism and protest on one company—McDonald’s
248
—the 




The actions spread over the course of the next year, primarily among fast-
food workers. In December, several hundred fast-food workers in Chicago 
went on strike; in April and May of 2013, fast-food employees went on strike in 
seven cities; and in August, workers staged strikes in sixty cities.
250
 By 2014, 
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however, the movement had expanded beyond fast food.
251
 Home health aides, 
federal contract workers, childcare workers, and airport workers, all of whom 
had already been involved in SEIU organizing campaigns, began to frame their 
struggles as part of the Fight for $15. They joined the day-long strikes and pro-
tests held in 190 cities on December 4, 2014. More surprisingly, workers who 
were not involved in existing official union campaigns joined as well. Employ-
ees at gas stations, discount outfits, and convenience stores—including BP, 
Shell, Speedway, Family Dollar, Dollar Tree, and Dollar General—participated 
in strikes and protests, after having attended meetings and followed social me-
dia campaigns over the prior months.
252
 
By the spring and summer of 2015, the campaign had definitively altered its 
message. Without backing away from the demand for “$15 and a union” for 
fast-food workers, and while continuing to put pressure on McDonald’s in par-
ticular, the campaign now identified itself as building a “broad national move-
ment of all low-wage workers.”
253
 A March Atlanta organizing meeting featured 
not only fast-food and home care workers, but also activists from Black Lives 
Matter and civil rights movement veterans.
254
 The inclusion of activists from 
other movements reflected not only the campaign’s adept use of social media 
and its effective networking, but also its commitment to a social and inclusive 
form of unionism. By expressly embracing Black Lives Matter, the campaign 
again asserted that its goals were not limited to achieving gains at any particu-
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The next mass action was even larger than the previous one. On April 15, 
2015, “tens of thousands of low-wage workers, students and activists in more 
than 200 American cities” participated in protests and strikes.
256
 Since then, the 
campaign has held a series of mass protests, often focused specifically on na-
tional political events, such as presidential debates,
257
 but also on local labor 
disputes involving a range of different workers, including airport workers and 
adjunct faculty members at universities.
258
 Meanwhile, other unions and work-
er organizations, including Our Walmart, the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and the Communication 
Workers of America (CWA), which were already engaging in similar struggles, 
have begun to associate themselves under the Fight for $15 banner.
259
 
Throughout, social media has played an important role, allowing SEIU and 
the other unions to involve more workers and reach more members of the pub-
lic than they otherwise would have.
260
 The union has used web sign ups, text 
messages, and Twitter to involve workers who have never had personal contact 
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provides workers with an instruction manual for how to engage in one-day 
strikes and allows them to download a “strike letter” that they can give to their 
managers explaining that they are asserting rights under section 7.
261
 
B. The Standard Account: Minimum Wages and Employment Standards 
Though the Fight for $15 has, from the beginning, framed its demands as 
“$15 and a union,” the wage plea has captured far more attention than the call 
for union rights. News coverage often depicts the movement as exclusively 
about wages. As Professor Michael Oswalt observes, this portrayal is unsur-
prising. The wage demand “is provocative, easy to explain, and plays to a poli-
cy change that the public and progressive politicians generally support.”
262
 
And, indeed, the campaign, working alongside community groups, has had 
great success in shifting the terms of debate around the minimum wage and in 
bringing about policy change.
263
 Cities across the country—including Seattle, 
Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Kan-
sas City (Missouri), Chicago, Louisville (Kentucky), and Portland (Maine)—




The first victories predictably occurred in liberal cities and states. For ex-
ample, in 2013, after the initial wave of protests, the New York legislature 
agreed to increase the state minimum wage slowly from $7.25 to $9 by 2016.
265
 
Mayor Bill de Blasio argued that the amount was insufficient in New York City, 
urging an increase to $15 by 2019.
266
 In Seattle, the initial victory was less am-
biguous.
267
 There, fast-food strikes were timed to coincide with the 2013 
mayoral runoff elections. Ed Murray, then a state senator, endorsed a $15 min-
imum wage. On May 1, 2014, following Murray’s election as mayor, a task force 
he appointed proposed to raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour over four 
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years for businesses with more than five hundred employees, and over seven 
years for smaller businesses.
268
 
In the November 2014 elections, minimum wage victories spread beyond 
traditionally “blue” localities. Voters in Republican strongholds like Arkansas, 
Nebraska, and South Dakota all passed, by significant margins, referenda to 
raise their minimum wages, albeit to levels lower than $15.
269
 These measures 
passed notwithstanding significant victories by Republican candidates in the 
same jurisdictions.
270
 Meanwhile, voters in Oakland approved a thirty-six per-




By the spring of 2015, private employers were beginning to respond as well. 
McDonald’s and Walmart announced that they would raise minimum pay for 
employees to $8.25 and $9 an hour, respectively, more than a dollar above the 
wage they had been paying in many locations. Facebook went so far as to raise 
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Then, on July 22, 2015, after Fight for $15 workers spent months organiz-
ing, demonstrating, speaking with the press, and testifying, the Wage Board of 
the State of New York announced that it was recommending a pay raise for 
most of the state’s fast-food workers to $15 an hour—an increase of more than 
six dollars per hour, to be implemented over the course of several years.
273
 The 
same day, the University of California system announced it would raise the 
minimum wage for all of its employees and contract workers to $15 an hour.
274
 
In subsequent months, lawmakers in Oregon, New York, and California ap-
proved legislation that substantially raises those states’ minimum wages—to 
$15 in New York and California.
275
 Several cities, including Washington, D.C., 
have since followed suit.
276
 
Wage increases of this magnitude and scope would have been unthinkable 
just a few years ago. Democrats and liberal economists who bemoaned the in-
adequacy of existing minimum wages tended to advocate for nine, or maybe 
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ten, dollars an hour—certainly nothing close to $15.
277
 Moreover, support for 
minimum wage hikes in Republican-leaning states seemed unthinkable.
278
 
While the Fight for $15 is not the only explanation for the sea change—
continued economic growth and low unemployment are contributing factors—
observers agree that the Fight for $15 has been instrumental.
279
 
The movement has also helped shift debate at the federal level.
280
 Whether 
to raise the minimum wage, and how high, became an issue in the 2016 presi-
dential campaign, and a $15 minimum wage has won the endorsement of the 
New York Times Editorial Board
281
 and the Democratic Party.
282
 And although 
federal minimum wage legislation has stalled,
283
 the Obama Administration 
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has moved forward with executive action. One subgroup of the Fight for $15, 
identifying itself as “Good Jobs Nation,” successfully pressed for an executive 
order that raises wages for individuals working on new federal service con-
tracts. The executive order provides only $10.10 an hour; the federal contract 
workers continue to seek $15 and have engaged in numerous one-day strikes to 
support their demands.
284
 Meanwhile, a recently promulgated Department of 
Labor regulation, long demanded by unions and allied policy organizations,
285
 
will raise the wages of millions of additional workers by raising the threshold 
below which salaried workers are entitled to overtime.
286
 
In addition, the Fight for $15, with help from other worker organizations 
and community groups, has successfully pushed for new legislation guarantee-
ing other minimum labor standards. For example, the movement has provided 
a boost to longstanding efforts of family and women’s organizations to pass 
laws mandating paid sick time. In numerous protests and press events, workers 
participating in Fight for $15 actions have highlighted the risks posed to work-
ers and customers by the absence of paid sick leave among low-wage work-
ers.
287
 Under this new pressure, in the period since 2013, cities including Port-
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land, Maine; New York City; Eugene, Oregon; San Diego; Oakland, Califor-
nia; Jersey City; Montclair, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey; and Philadelph-
ia, along with the States of Massachusetts and California, have responded with 
new laws mandating paid sick time.
288
 The Department of Labor also recently 
proposed a rule that would mandate paid sick time for federal contractors.
289
 
The movement—the Fight for $15 along with a host of other worker organ-
izations and community groups—has also pressed for legislation to change 
scheduling practices in the retail and fast-food industries.
290
 In particular, 
workers object to being kept on part-time status even when additional hours 
are available and to having their shifts continually change.
291
 Vermont and San 
Francisco have responded with laws that give workers the right to request flex-
ible or predictable schedules, and officials in New York City are considering 
similar legislation.
292
 Voters in SeaTac, Washington approved a measure that 
“bars employers from hiring additional part-time workers if their existing part-
timers want more hours.”
293
 Similar bills have been introduced in California 
and New York,
294
 as well as in Congress.
295
 Several private employers, includ-
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ing Gap, Abercrombie & Fitch, Starbucks, and Victoria’s Secret have also an-
nounced that they will change their on-call scheduling practices.
296
 
C. A New Unionism 
While commentators have celebrated the Fight for $15’s victories, they have 
largely failed to recognize its broader implications for labor law. In fact, much 
of the media and scholarly coverage of the Fight for $15 emphasizes that the 
effort is not unionism. One journalist wrote, “the effort seems aimed at organ-
izing low-wage workers not into a union but into a force that could extract 
changes from local government.”
297
 Another commented, “[t]he campaign is 
more about public relations than actual economic coercion.”
298
 Academic ex-
perts have similarly observed that “the unions have no strategy for building a 
real organization sustained by actual dues-paying members.”
299
 
It is true that the Fight for $15’s leaders admit that they are aware of no 
clear path to unionization in its traditional sense.
300
 But the workers and staff 
interviewed by these same journalists emphasize that they are building a labor 
organization, not merely generating political pressure to enact new employ-
ment law. Even journalists who frame the campaign as centered on public rela-
tions have acknowledged that “those who participate do in fact seem interested 
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Ultimately, although the path to unionization is unclear, from close exami-
nation of the movements’ efforts, a coherent vision of unionism—and of a legal 
framework to support it—emerges. That emerging framework rejects the old 
regime’s commitment to the employer-employee dyad and to a system of pri-
vate ordering. Instead, it locates decisions about basic standards of employ-
ment at the sectoral level and positions unions as social actors empowered to 
advance the interests of workers generally. 
1. From Workplace to Sector 
From the outset, the Fight for $15 rejected the NLRA’s premise that organ-
izing and bargaining occur at individual worksites between the formal employ-
er and its employees. A consistent argument of the campaign has been that 
corporate entities with effective power over workers—not only immediate em-
ployers—have a responsibility to negotiate. 
Consider the campaign’s efforts with respect to McDonald’s. Recognizing 
the futility of holding elections at McDonald’s franchise stores on a one-off ba-
sis, the Fight for $15 has sought to define McDonald’s as the joint employer of 
all McDonald’s employees. SEIU set forth its legal arguments in response to 
the NLRB’s request for views in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc.
302
 
That case, in which the union position ultimately proved victorious, involved a 
Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) recycling plant in California. The plant’s 
drivers and loaders were employed directly by BFI and were represented by the 
Teamsters. Several hundred sorters, screen cleaners, and housekeepers who al-
so worked at the facility wished to join the union. The problem: they were em-
ployed not by BFI but by Leadpoint, a subcontractor.
303
 
The relationship between BFI and Leadpoint was a conventional labor sup-
ply contract, similar to those used throughout the janitorial, security, mainte-
nance, warehouse, and other sectors.
304
 Under the BFI-Leadpoint arrangement, 
BFI and Leadpoint jointly decided many of the terms and conditions of the 
Leadpoint workers, but only Leadpoint exercised direct and immediate con-
trol.
305
 Thus, applying the definition of joint employer that had governed since 
 
302. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015); see Brief of the 
Service Employees International Union as Amicus Curiae, Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 186 (No. 32-RC-109684). 
303. See Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 2-6. 
304. Id. at 18-20; see also supra Section I.A.2. 
305. Under the agreement, many employment responsibilities are shared: both companies em-
ploy supervisors and lead workers at the facility. Leadpoint does the hiring, firing, and pay-
roll of its own workers, while BFI exercises control over whom Leadpoint can hire, by set-
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the mid-1980s, the Regional Director issued a decision finding that Leadpoint 
was the sole employer of the employees seeking to unionize.
306
 
In its amicus brief, SEIU, joining the Teamsters and other unions, urged 
the Board not to require an entity to exercise direct and immediate control over 
a worker in order to be considered a joint employer under section 2(2) of the 
Act.
307
 Instead, SEIU argued, the Board ought to return to the standard set 
forth in the 1980s by the Third Circuit in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of 
Pennsylvania, Inc.
308
 That standard asks whether the alleged joint employer 
“has retained for itself sufficient control o[ver] the terms and conditions of 
employment of the [affected] employees” to enable that entity to “share or co-




To support the union position, SEIU and fellow amici emphasized that a 
sizeable proportion of the labor force now works in contingent employment re-
lationships involving subcontractors, staffing agencies, and franchisees. In par-
ticular, the SEIU brief detailed how fast-food brands have imposed compre-
hensive regimes of operational uniformity and monitoring systems on their 
franchisees, thereby significantly affecting the working conditions of all fran-
chise employees. It also described how brands “control the economics of each 
franchise owner’s business,” effectively “stripping the franchisees of any mean-
ingful opportunity to determine the terms and conditions of their workers’ 
employment, except at the margins.”
310
 
SEIU and other unions admitted that their desired standard would require 
significant changes in the way corporations conceive of their employment rela-
tionships in the modern, fissured economy—and would significantly alter legal 
entitlements and liabilities, returning the legal standard to the one in place pri-
or to the 1980s. Amicus briefs filed in opposition by the Chamber of Com-
 
ting employment standards and reserving the right to reject any personnel. BFI establishes 
the facility’s work plan, its stream of work, the schedule of working hours, and the number 
of workers to be assigned to a particular task, while Leadpoint chooses the individual work-
ers. The two companies share in training, though Leadpoint takes the lead. While the con-
tract specifically provides that Leadpoint determines pay rates, it also prevents Leadpoint 
from paying employees more than comparable BFI employees. Browning-Ferris, 362 
N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 18-20. 
306. Id. at 6. 
307. Brief of the Service Employees International Union as Amicus Curiae, supra note 302, at 1, 
18-20. 
308. See id. (citing 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982), enforcing 259 N.L.R.B. 148 (1981)). The standard 
was adopted by the Board in Laerco Transportation & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984). 
309. 691 F.2d at 1123 (emphasis omitted). 
310. Brief of the Service Employees International Union as Amicus Curiae, supra note 302, at 18. 
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merce and others made this point as well, as did Republican presidential can-
didates and members of Congress.
311
 According to the industry and its sup-
porters, the joint-employment legal theory advanced by the Teamsters, SEIU, 
and other unions would upend the franchise industry, reducing its profitability 
and flexibility.
312
 They argued that the union-urged standard would both de-
stabilize existing contracting relationships and widen the scope of labor dis-
putes, forcing firms to participate in bargaining even where they lack authority 
to control all terms and conditions of employment.
313
 
While the legal arguments were still pending before the NLRB in Wash-
ington, organizers and workers pressed their claims on the ground. They filed 
numerous unfair labor practice charges against both McDonald’s and franchise 
owners, claiming that workers faced retaliation for participating in Fight for 
$15 activity.
314
 In these cases, SEIU took the position that McDonald’s was a 
joint employer even under the more restrictive standard. The effort has been 
successful, at least in the initial phases. On December 19, 2014, the NLRB an-
nounced that it was issuing complaints against McDonald’s franchisees and 
their franchisor, McDonald’s USA, LLC, as joint employers.
315
 Then, on Au-
gust 27, 2015, in a split decision, a majority of the Board ruled in favor of the 
unions in Browning-Ferris.
316
 Joint employment, the Board concluded, exists 
 
311. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus  
Curiae, Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (No. 32-RC-109684), http://www 
.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/2014/U.S.%20Chamber%20Amicus%2 
0Brief%20--%20Browning%20Ferris%20Industries%20of%20California%20%28NLRB%29
.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PM9-GQBR]; Brian Mahoney, Rubio Slams “Joint Employer,” POLIT-
ICO: MORNING SHIFT (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning 
-shift/2015/08/nlrb-speaks-on-bargaining-units-bellhops-rubio-slams-joint-employer-seius 
-air-traffic-controllers-moment-019723 [http://perma.cc/YJ8Q-A2T5] (describing remarks 
by Marco Rubio). 
312. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra 
note 311, at 9-10. 
313. See Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 8 (summarizing the parties’ arguments).  
314. McDonald’s USA, LLC v. Fast Food Workers Comm., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (Mar. 17, 2016); 
see also McDonald’s Fact Sheet, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/news 
-outreach/fact-sheets/mcdonalds-fact-sheet [http://perma.cc/2TE3-P9D7]. 
315. McDonald’s Fact Sheet, supra note 314. In early August, the NLRB denied McDonald’s request 
for a more detailed explanation of the NLRB’s new definition of what it means to be a joint 
employer or to dismiss the case. Two members of the Board dissented, arguing that McDon-
ald’s was being denied due process. 
316. Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186. The Board criticized the earlier restrictive approach, 
writing that it “has resulted in findings that an entity is not a joint employer even where it 
indirectly exercised control that significantly affected employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment” or where it directly exercised control over employees in ways deemed “limited 
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whenever two or more employers “share or codetermine those matters govern-
ing the essential terms and conditions of employment.”
317
 As Part IV explains, 
that decision, along with subsequent developments in NLRB proceedings in-
volving McDonald’s and other employers, opens the door to a change in the 
way organizing and bargaining occurs under the NLRA.
318
 
SEIU’s Fight for $15 campaign is by no means the first effort to organize 
fissured employers by pressuring the entities that exercise actual control over 
the conditions of employment, even if there is no immediate, formal employer 
relationship.
319
 But the Fight for $15 suggests the possibility of a more funda-
mental shift away from the employer-employee dyad. The movement’s initial 
conceit may have been to build a union of a particular brand’s fast-food work-
ers by focusing on an entire company, like McDonald’s, instead of particular 
franchisees. The Browning-Ferris decision advances this more modest goal. Yet, 
as discussed above, over time, the campaign expanded to embrace all fast-food 
workers and then even broader swaths of low-wage and gig economy work-
 
and routine.” Id. at 10-11. It noted that millions of American workers work in contingent 
employment relationships and concluded that, “to the extent permitted by the common 
law,” the statute should be read to “encompass the full range of employment relationships 
wherein meaningful collective bargaining is, in fact, possible.” Id. at 13; see also id. at 21 (“It is 
not the goal of joint-employer law,” the Board concluded, “to guarantee the freedom of em-
ployers to insulate themselves from their legal responsibility to workers, while maintaining 
control of the workplace. Such an approach has no basis in the Act or in federal labor poli-
cy.”); supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text; infra notes 425-432 and accompanying 
text. 
317.  Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 15. Essential terms include not only wages and 
hours, but also the number of workers to be supplied, scheduling, seniority and overtime, 
work assignments, and the manner and method of work performance. Id. Joint employment 
may exist when an entity reserves the right to exercise control over such details of work, 
even if control is not in fact exercised. Joint employment also may exist when an entity con-
trols such terms in a way that is indirect or attenuated. Id. 
318. See infra notes 425-432 and accompanying text. 
319. SEIU’s successful Justice for Janitors movement of the 1990s employed a similar strategy, 
focusing on building owners as well as the janitorial contractors who employed the workers. 
See Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in Southern California: 
Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN 
CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199, 199 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000). UNITE HERE has used 
similar tactics in the hospitality industry, as have former UNITE HERE and allied worker 
centers against garment sweatshops. See Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed in: Legal Mobilization 
in the Los Angeles Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 17 (2009) (dis-
cussing how the anti-sweatshop movement in Los Angeles sought “to make legal responsi-
bility follow economic power by rupturing the legal fiction that protected profitable manu-
facturers and retailers from the labor abuses committed by their contractors”). 




 As such, the campaign is making clear its aspiration to negotiate em-
ployment standards on industrial, sectoral, and regional levels, rather than at 
the level of the individual employer or even the individual supply chain.
321
 As 
the next Section elaborates, to advance this goal, the campaign is using strate-
gies that push beyond even Browning-Ferris. 
Ironically, the NLRB’s recent ruling in the case involving college football 
players, though a defeat for the petitioning workers, resonates with the Fight 
for $15’s arguments about sectoral bargaining.
322
 There, the Board dismissed a 
petition by Northwestern University’s college football players who were seek-
ing to unionize.
323
 Rather than considering the merits of the players’ claims 
that they should qualify as workers under the Act, the Board declined jurisdic-
tion.
324
 The reason: most National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
teams were at public universities not subject to the NLRA and having a “single 
institution” organized into a union within an integrated economy of unor-
ganized institutions would make little sense.
325
 Yet it is precisely a workplace-
 
320. The Fight for $15’s efforts to shift responsibility higher up the fissured employment chain 
has also led it to support organizing efforts of franchisees themselves. On April 30, 2015, 
SEIU launched a website designed to build a national network of fast 
-food franchisees that want stronger protections for their businesses against franchisors. 
Candace Choi, Labor Organizers Seek Unusual Ally in Fast-Food Franchisees, CHI. TRIB.  
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-fast-food-franchisees-0501 
-biz-20150430-story.html [http://perma.cc/U74J-J9V5]. The union has supported legisla-
tive efforts of franchise owners designed to protect them from retaliation by brands. For ex-
ample, a California bill passed by the legislature but vetoed by Governor Brown would have 
made it harder for franchisors to terminate contracts with franchise owners. Kate Taylor, 
California Governor Vetoes Bill That Would Expand Franchisee Rights, ENTREPRENEUR  
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237951 [http://perma.cc/D4A8 
-3NP6] (describing SEIU’s support for the California bill). At the behest of parent compa-
nies, Governor Brown vetoed the bill and urged franchise owners and parent companies to 
come up with a solution both sides could agree on. Jeremy B. White, Gov. Jerry Brown Vetoes 
Franchise Bill, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics 
-government/capitol-alert/article2615644.html [http://perma.cc/7L6E-XJ74]. A similar bill 
was under consideration in Pennsylvania and has been referred to committee. See H.R. 1346, 
2014-2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015). 
321. Part IV, infra, discusses possible legal frameworks that could support this broader ambition. 
322. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. at 3. 
325. Id. at 6; see also id. at 3 (explaining that a bargaining unit of a single team’s players “would 
not promote stability in labor relations”). No doubt the novelty of the football players’ ar-
guments and the ramifications of intervention for college sports played a role in the Board’s 
decision—indeed, the Board so acknowledged. Id. at 3 (“We emphasize that this case in-
volves novel and unique circumstances.”). 
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by-workplace, employer-by-employer system of organization and bargaining—
with individual units organized amidst seas of unorganized workers—that has 
governed since the New Deal. 
2. From Private to Social 
While working to move bargaining to a more industrial scale, the Fight for 
$15 has also embraced a form of state-backed social bargaining. These two 
moves are related. In order to move bargaining beyond the single employer to 
the industrial, sectoral, and regional level, the Fight for $15 has sought to en-
gage the state directly in bargaining over workers’ conditions. In so doing, the 
campaign is transforming the post-New Deal conception of labor disputes as 
private affairs, largely beyond the reach of the state; it is changing the role of 
the union from the representative of particular members to an advocate for 
workers generally; and it is weakening the divide between employment law 
and collective bargaining. 
The move to social bargaining by the Fight for $15 has been less explicit 
than the move away from the formal employer-employee relationship. Tradi-
tional corporate-focused tactics, including protests, strikes, and media cam-
paigning, remain a centerpiece of the campaign. But far more than predecessor 
efforts, the campaign has explicitly addressed its demands to government ac-
tors. It has sought $15 an hour, rules requiring reliable schedules, and man-
dates for sick leave simultaneously from government and companies. Indeed, 
the union’s demands on state, local, and federal government actors to directly 
impose minimum labor standards have garnered as much media attention and 
more concrete successes than the employer-focused tactics.
326
 
To some extent, these efforts look like familiar legislative campaigns for 
employment regulation. The labor movement has long been involved in push-
ing legislation relevant to workers’ rights. For example, unions were instru-
mental in helping pass the Civil Rights Acts, OSHA,  the FMLA, and, most re-
cently, health care reform.
327
 But although these bills were a political priority 
for the labor movement, union-organizing campaigns operated separately from 




326. See supra Sections II.A-B. 
327. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 185-86. 
328. Id. at 186 (noting that although unions supported the enactment of the civil rights bills, 
Medicare and Medicaid, and OSHA, the 1960s and 1970s “were barren of virtually any legis-
lative or ideological payoff for organized labor as an institution or . . . as a social movement 
with the kind of aura necessary to set the political and social agenda”). 
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The current local legislative efforts, in contrast, are deeply integrated into 
ongoing workplace campaigns and the demands are consonant.
329
 Indeed, the 
one-day strikes—occurring in a range of workplaces and industries, and with 
only a minority of employees at a given worksite participating—are as much as 
a form of social protest in support of public demands as an attempt to exercise 
coercive economic power over any particular employer. These efforts exploit 
the capacious nature of section 7 of the NLRA, which has been interpreted to 
protect concerted action by workers even when they are not union members 
and even when the target of such action is not the employer, as long as there is 
a clear nexus to employment issues.
330
 Throughout, the campaign has posi-
tioned workers as active participants in determining new state and local stand-
ards. In interviews with the press, workers-leaders have articulated their goals 
as improving conditions through their collective power. These activists have 
also emphasized their own role in determining the new policies.
331
 
From these fledgling and evolving efforts, one can derive a glimmer of tri-
partism in labor relations largely abandoned since the New Deal: triangle bar-
gaining among workers, employers, and the state over wages and benefits.
332
 
The recent experience with the New York Wage Board provides the most con-
crete example. On May 6, 2015, after growing protests and strikes in New York 
organized by the Fight for $15, Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that he 
would take executive action to raise wages.
333
 As Cuomo explained, New York 
State law permitted the labor commissioner to investigate whether wages paid 
in a specific industry or job classification are sufficient to provide for the life 
 
329. See supra Sections II.A-B. 
330. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
331. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 247 (quoting an activist’s belief that “[t]he way to achieve 
[the $15 hourly wage] is to get all types of low-wage workers involved”); Ned  
Resnikoff, Fast Food Convention Portends Escalation in Strikes, MSNBC (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/fast-food-convention-portends-escalation-strikes [http://
perma.cc/JWA6-LRVM] (noting fast-food convention organizers’ openness to more radical 
methods in response to popular desire for such methods). 
332. This is labor tripartism in the traditional sense, where unions, the state, and business work 
together to set wages and other conditions for the labor market. It is distinct from the form 
of tripartism Benjamin Sachs describes, in which unions use tripartite bargaining to achieve 
alternate mechanisms to replace the NLRA’s process. See generally Sachs, supra note 127 (de-
scribing how government actions in areas unrelated to labor but of importance to employers 
are traded for private agreements between unions and employers that reorder the rules of 
organizing and bargaining). 
333. Andrew M. Cuomo, Opinion, Fast Food Workers Deserve a Raise, N.Y. TIMES  
(May 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/opinion/andrew-m-cuomo-fast-food 
-workers-deserve-a-raise.html [http://perma.cc/DD3Q-53CZ]. As Cuomo noted, the New 
York Legislature had rejected his proposal to raise the minimum wage statutorily. Id. 
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and health of those workers, and, if not, to impanel a wage board to recom-
mend what adequate wages should be.
334
 Invoking Franklin Roosevelt’s ag-
gressive use of executive power against moneyed interests, Cuomo directed the 
Commissioner to exercise such authority.
335
 The next day, New York’s Acting 
Commissioner for Labor issued a memorandum providing data to show that “a 
substantial number of fast-food workers in the hospitality industry are receiv-
ing wages insufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect their 
health” and began the wage board process.
336
 
Critically, New York law did not simply permit the executive to establish a 
wage board; it required that the board be comprised of equal numbers of rep-
resentatives from labor, management, and the public.
337
 For its board, New 
York chose one representative from each group: Byron Brown, Mayor of Buffa-
lo, representing the public; Kevin Ryan, Chairman and Founder of the online 
retailer Gilt, representing businesses; and Mike Fishman, Secretary-Treasurer 
of SEIU, representing labor.
338
 The Board Members held hearings across the 
state over the next forty-five days. Workers, organized by the Fight for $15, 
participated in great numbers at these hearings. They reported “the impact of 
low pay on their health and emotional well-being and reported myriad hard-
ships,” and they told personal stories about their inability to afford food, cloth-
ing, and other basic needs on their current wages, and about the health and 
safety risks to which they were exposed at work.
339
 Many academic observers 
and some employers agreed that wages were inadequate.
340
 In response, restau-
rant operators and business activists warned of negative economic consequenc-
es; and economists tried to predict the effects of an increase.
341
 On July 21, the 
 
334. Id.; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 654 (McKinney 2016). 
335. Cuomo, supra note 333. Cuomo noted that the average fast-food CEO earned $23.8 million 
in 2013, while entry-level fast-food workers earned only $16,920 a year, qualifying many for 
public assistance. Id. 
336. Mario J. Musolino, Acting Comm’r of Labor, Determination Regarding Adequacy of Wages, 
N.Y. DEP’T LAB. (May 7, 2015), http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files
/atoms/files/Determination_wages_050715.pdf [http://perma.cc/8QRV-VYGT]. 
337. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 655(1) (McKinney 2016) (“A wage board shall be composed of not more 
than three representatives of employers, an equal number of representatives of employees 
and an equal number of persons selected from the general public.”). 
338. Fast Food Wage Board, N.Y. DEP’T LAB., http://labor.ny.gov/workerprotection
/laborstandards/wageboard2015.shtm [http://perma.cc/5JGM-9PTU]. 
339. FAST FOOD WAGE BD., N.Y. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE FAST FOOD WAGE BOARD TO 
THE NYS COMMISSIONER OF LABOR 10-11 (2015). 
340. Id. at 11. 
341. See, e.g., Rick Karlin, New York Fast Food Wage Board Hears Testimony About  
Potential Mandate of Higher Minimum Wage, ALB. TIMES UNION (June 22,  
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Board announced its decision: $15 for fast-food restaurants that are part of 
chains with at least thirty outlets, to be phased in over the course of six years, 
with a faster phase-in for New York City.
342
 
Though the Fight for $15 did not initially describe its efforts with local gov-
ernments as bargaining, it came to do so over time. In a rare media interview 
published on August 30, 2015, the Fight for $15 campaign director Scott Court-
ney reflected: “I would call what happened [in New York] collective bargain-




To be sure, as an example of tripartism, the New York wage board is par-
tial. There was no restaurant representation on the Board; no comprehensive 
bargaining occurred; and the Board’s mandate was limited to wages.
344
 How-
ever, other localities have convened wage boards or task forces that have broad-
er formal participation and more expansive mandates. For example, Sacramen-
to’s new wage task force includes the heads of major business groups, including 
the local Chamber of Commerce and the California Restaurant Employers, as 
well as the heads of major unions and community organizations.
345
 Seattle and 
Tacoma have also used business-labor boards or task forces to set their new 
minimum wages and employment standards.
346
 The Mayor of Chicago has ap-






342. McGeehan, supra note 273. 
343. Steven Greenhouse, Fight for $15: The Strategist Going to War to Make McDonald’s Pay,  
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/30/fight 
-for-15-strategist-mcdonalds-unions [http://perma.cc/WYP5-S7BW]. 
344. Notably, the wage board’s wage powers were suspended under the new state-wide law rais-
ing the minimum wage to $15. See infra Section IV.B. 
345. Allen Young, Here’s the List of Who’s on the Mayor’s Minimum Wage Task Force, SACRAMENTO 
BUS. J. (June 25, 2015, 2:34 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2015/06 
/25/heres-the-list-of-whos-on-the-mayors-minimum-wage.html [http://perma.cc/3WEN 
-C5HK] (describing the Sacramento mayoral task force with representatives from  
business, labor, and non-profits); Mayor Johnson Convenes Task Force To Make  
Recommendation on Potential Minimum Wage Increase, CITY OF SACRAMENTO  
(July 25, 2015), http://www.cityofsacramento.org/City-Manager/Media-Releases/Mayor 
-convenes-Income-Inequality-Task-Force [http://perma.cc/UDW8-VL9X]. 
346. See Josh Feit, What Do We Want? $15! When Do We Want It? In a Little While!, SEATTLE 
METROPOLITAN (July 30, 2014), http://www.seattlemet.com/articles/2014/7/30/history 
-of-seattles-minimum-wage-law-august-2014 [http://perma.cc/K28B-WWFB] (describing 
Seattle’s minimum wage fight and the work of the Mayoral Income Inequality Advisory 
Committee, which included leading business and labor leaders); Kate Martin, Tacoma Mayor 
Picks Minimum Wage Task Force Members, NEWS TRIB. (May 12, 2015), http:// 
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The extent to which these committees actually engage in tripartite negotia-
tions with the ability to make binding recommendations varies. Many provide 
only advice or recommendations that must still be enacted through ordinary 
legislative processes, and some have been unable to reach consensus, offering 
multiple proposals from different constituents. Still, occurring in the context of 
the broader Fight for $15 campaign, the use of these tripartite structures repre-
sents an important shift. So too the Department of Labor’s new overtime rule 
can be viewed as the product of social bargaining. The regulation was stalled 
for years within the Executive Branch until the public debate around wages be-
gan to shift. The unions and their allies drove the Administration to make the 
rule change a priority, and they and business counterparts commented exten-
sively on the proposed rule, helping influence its final shape.
348
 
The move toward state-backed social bargaining sets the Fight for $15 apart 
from several other innovative and important worker campaigns, like SEIU’s 
own Justice for Janitors campaign or the work of the Coalition of Immokalee 
Workers.
349
 Those efforts are similarly sectoral, but they are rooted in private 
ordering. For example, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, which is an or-
ganization of tomato workers in southwest Florida, has brought to bear worker 
and consumer pressure on national and international retail brands. The pres-
sure campaigns—not subject to the NLRA’s prohibition on secondary boycotts 
because of agriculture’s exemption from the statute—have resulted in private 
 
www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/politics-government/article26288548.html [http://
perma.cc/QS59-6QGD] (describing the composition of Tacoma’s new minimum wage task 
force, which includes representation from labor, business, grassroots activist groups, and 
clergy). 
347. Chicago’s new Working Families Task Force has a broad mandate and significant business 
representation, but minimal representation from unions. See Thomas A.  
Corfman, Emanuel Takes Step Toward Paid Leave for Sickness, Childbirth, CRAIN’S (June 23,  
2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150623/NEWS02/150629968/emanuel 
-takes-step-toward-paid-leave-for-sickness-childbirth [http://perma.cc/QR4R-JG24]. 
348. See Jana Kasperkevic, Good News: Overtime Pay May Finally Be Coming to a  
Paycheck near You, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/busi 
ness/2016/mar/15/overtime-pay-labor-department-threshold-rule [http://perma.cc/D74Y 
-MZJL] (reporting that the proposed rule was “a long time coming”). The DOL received 
over 270,000 comments in response to its notice of proposed rulemaking. Wage & Hour 
Div., Final Rule: Overtime: Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administra-
tive, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees under the Fair Labor Standards  
Act, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/final2016 [http://perma.cc/JF7M 
-ZFFJ]. 
349. See About CIW, COALITION IMMOKALEE WORKERS (2012), http://www.ciw-online.org/about 
[http://perma.cc/LZY9-WVXY]. 
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agreements that implement wage increases and improve worker conditions. 
These agreements are monitored and enforced through private programs.
350
 
In contrast, the Fight for $15 is making demands on state actors, as well as 
employers. It has systematically engaged regulatory and legislative structures, 
through testimony, strikes, and protests. In so doing, the campaign has posi-
tioned government as a co-negotiator in determining workers’ material condi-
tions; it has pushed government actors away from the role they have occupied 
since Taft-Hartley, while moving labor unions more squarely into the public 
policy space. 
3. Conclusion: Blurring the Employment/Labor Distinction; the Broader 
Social Movement; and the Uncertain Future of Worksite Representation 
By positioning unions as political actors with authority to negotiate the 
basic terms of employment for workers generally, the Fight for $15 is embrac-
ing a more social form of labor law. It is also eroding the distinction between 
labor law and employment law. Under the emerging model, employment law is 
no longer just a collection of individual rights to be bestowed by the state. In-
stead, it is a collective project to be jointly determined and enforced by workers, 
in conjunction with employers and the public. 
Though the Fight for $15 is the most prominent and largest movement em-
bracing this approach, it is not alone. As is evident from the discussion above, 
its work has been supplemented by a host of other organizations, ranging from 
think tanks to community based groups—and the movement itself is made up 
of a range of different unions, organizing in different industries, from OUR 
Walmart to more traditional unions like CWA and AFSCME.
351
 In addition, 
other organizations, which initially started as worker centers not committed to 
collective bargaining, have independently begun demanding a more sectoral 
and public form of labor law. Groups like National Domestic Workers Alliance 
(NDWA), for example, are organizing among workers long excluded from la-
bor law.
352
 Some of the NDWA affiliates have combined efforts to pass new 




350. See Brudney, supra note 38. 
351. See supra notes 253-259 and accompanying text. 
352. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN THE 
SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE (2012); David Bornstein, A Living Wage for Caregivers, N.Y. 
TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July 10, 2015), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/10
/organizing-for-the-right-to-care/ [http://perma.cc/2L4M-GJQL]. 
353. See History & Mission, DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED (Apr. 20, 2016) http://www
.domesticworkersunited.org/index.php/en/about [http://perma.cc/Z7T6-ACMZ]. For ex-
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the Fight for $15, NDWA seeks industry-wide standards, public bargaining, 
and a political role for the worker-organization. The Taxi Worker Alliance is 
another example of a worker organization attempting to build a national pres-
ence and engage in sectoral, social bargaining.
354
 
While the Fight for $15 and these other campaigns have directed their de-
mands to government, they also maintain a commitment to worker voice, un-
ionism, and collective action—their goals are not purely regulatory. Public 
statements by campaign leaders evidence this continued commitment to 
worksite organization and representation. The union leaders admit they do not 
know precisely what such an organization will look like—but they are nonethe-
less committed to it.
355
 
As discussed further in Section IV.B, existing efforts suggest two, not mu-
tually exclusive, possibilities. First, social bargaining could serve as a floor 
above which traditional firm-based collective bargaining will occur. Indeed, so-
cial bargaining appears to be strengthening unions’ ability to engage in tradi-
tional collective bargaining.
356
 Second, the efforts of the Fight for $15 and other 
worker organizations suggest the possibility of new forms of union funding 
and worksite organization that could accompany social bargaining and tradi-
tional unions. Specifically, the Fight for $15’s minority strikes and self-
organized worker actions point toward organizations that would not depend 
on majority status at a given facility, on a system of exclusive representation, or 
on traditional collective bargaining agreements.
357
 Meanwhile, other move-





amples of new laws urged by DWA, see Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, ch. 481, 2010 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws 1315 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292, 296-b (McKinney 2014)); 
for new federal regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 552 (2015). For a history of this movement, see, 
for example, BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 352; and Hina Shah & Marci Seville, Domestic Worker 
Organizing: Building a Contemporary Movement for Dignity and Power, 75 ALB. L. REV. 413, 
413-14 (2012). 
354. Jacqueline Leavitt & Gary Blasi, The Los Angeles Taxi Worker Alliance, in WORKING FOR JUS-
TICE, supra note 214, at 109-24; see also Fine, supra note 215, at 615 (describing efforts of taxi 
worker organizations to create a federated structure); Milkman, supra note 214, at 17 (de-
scribing taxi workers’ efforts as a mix between worker center and union approaches). 
355. See supra notes 300-301 and accompanying text. 
356. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
357. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
358. See infra Section IV.B.3. 
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i i i . the case for the new labor law 
The rough outline of an aspirational new labor regime emerges from the 
Fight for $15 and similar movements. The regime makes fundamental changes 
to the traditional NLRA approach. While retaining a role for traditional collec-
tive bargaining and allowing for new forms of voluntary worksite organization, 
the new regime positions unions as political actors with authority to negotiate 
basic terms of employment on a sectoral and regional basis; these negotiations 
occur with state actors as well as with employers. The new, still embryonic, la-
bor law thus embraces a more public and social approach, while eroding the 
distinction between labor law and employment law. At the same time, it is not 
traditional employment law: it rests on a commitment to collective power ra-
ther than individual rights. 
Given the extent to which this nascent regime departs from existing mod-
els, criticisms of the move come easily. This Part considers those criticisms—
focusing on the extent to which the new labor law is contested even within the 
labor movement and by those who share its normative commitments. It then 
provides an affirmative case for the ability of the aspirational framework to ad-




A. Weaknesses of the Emerging Regime 
Significant divisions have emerged within the labor movement about the 
strategy of bargaining outside the employer-employee relationship in partner-
ship with the state. The fault lines can be seen most clearly in the debate about 
whether newly enacted labor and employment standards should exempt union-
ized shops. At least six of the twenty U.S. cities and counties that have set min-
imum wages above state and federal levels include a provision allowing unions 
to waive the wage mandate as part of a collective bargaining agreement.
360
 
These exemptions are no accident. SEIU and the Fight for $15 have supported 
 
359. As previously noted, this Article assumes that realizing greater societal equality, both eco-
nomic and political, is an important goal of law generally, and of labor law in particular.  Ac-
cordingly, this Part does not take on critics who object to using labor law as a tool to achieve 
greater equality or, relatedly, as a tool to augment the political and economic power of work-
ers. It also leaves for another day important design concerns relating to efficiency, union 
democracy, and industrial peace. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
360. Eric Morath & Alejandro Lazo, Minimum-Wage Waivers for Union Members Stir Standoff, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/minimum-wage-waivers-for 
-union-members-stir-standoff-1439857915 [http://perma.cc/LQ77-HBEH]. 
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universal minimum labor standards and have opposed exemptions. But some 
other segments of the labor movement have vigorously sought exemptions that 
allow union shops to negotiate below minimums, as a tool to support tradi-
tional shop-by-shop organizing. 
Debate erupted last year in Los Angeles.
361
 Days before the Los Angeles 
City Council approved the new minimum wage of $15 an hour, several promi-
nent labor leaders, including those from the County Federation and UNITE 
HERE, advocated for inclusion of a waiver for unionized workplaces. In their 
view, an exemption would provide labor and management with the flexibility 
to negotiate better benefits for all union members or to allocate greater raises to 
more senior workers.
362
 The head of the Los Angeles County Federation of La-
bor, Rusty Hicks, emphasized the importance of “freedom” in negotiations.
363
 
Other members of the labor movement disagreed. California SEIU leaders 
denounced the exemption, as did some rank-and-file activists and allies of the 
labor movement in local government, for undermining worker rights.
364
 When 
asked about the Los Angeles debate, a prominent SEIU official from Seattle, 
Washington, said: “At this point in our history, we have to be very careful to 
send the message that we stand up for all workers . . . . A wage is a wage is a 
wage . . . . It’s very hard to justify why you’d want any worker to make less than 
the minimum wage.”
365
 Though the exemption did not make the final statute 
in Los Angeles, the debate is not over; the City Council is expected to revisit 
the possibility.
366




361. Peter Jamison et al., L.A. Labor Leaders Seek Minimum Wage Exemption for Firms with Union 
Workers, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-los 
-angeles-minimum-wage-unions-20150526-story.html [http://perma.cc/E9EA-DJ6Z]. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. Notably, while some economists believe that an increased minimum wage would result in 
job loss among low-wage workers, see David Neumark et al., More on Recent Evidence on the 
Effects of Minimum Wages in the United States, 3 IZA J. LAB. POL’Y 1 (2014) (discussing studies 
which reach conflicting conclusions about the effects of a minimum wage on job loss), labor 
leaders have not voiced this concern. 
364. David Zahniser & Emily Alpert Reyes, Labor Leaders’ Credibility Slips in Minimum-Wage  
Debate, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-wage 
-exemption-20150615-story.html [http://perma.cc/GJW6-VUK6]. 
365. Peter Jamison, Why Union Leaders Want L.A. To Give Them a Minimum Wage Loophole,  
L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-union-exemption 
-20150726-story.html [http://perma.cc/5AGP-495N]. 
366. Id. (“‘Unions in America, obviously we’re in decline,’ said Dave Regan, president of SEIU-
UHW, the union that represents home healthcare workers and is leading the campaign for a 
California ballot measure to raise the statewide minimum wage to $15. ‘I don’t think we help 
ourselves by taking positions where we don’t hold ourselves to the same standards as every-
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ployers charge that the unions supporting exemptions do so in order to coerce 
employers to agree to unionization.
368
 They argue that the exemptions disturb 
the balance of power that Congress imposed with the NLRA and therefore are 
preempted by federal law under the Machinists doctrine.
369
 
Division within the labor movement extends beyond the question of ex-
emptions from local legislation. Some labor leaders and union allies have raised 
concerns about the shift away from worksite-based bargaining toward indus-
trial and social bargaining. For example, SEIU faces criticism from some of its 
own members who wonder whether a campaign to raise minimum wages is a 
good way to spend their dues money.
370
 Meanwhile, some labor experts have 
urged SEIU to turn back to NLRB elections or other more traditional union 
campaigns that are more likely to produce dues-paying members.
371
 Taking the 
critique further, a few leaders within the labor movement have openly objected 
to the new social welfare legislation, arguing that wages, benefits, and sick time 





body else.’”); see also Morath & Lazo, supra note 360 (describing rank-and-file opposition to 
the exemption). 
367. See Morath & Lazo, supra note 360 (“Behind the scenes, labor leaders who worked with 
lawmakers on the provision were divided [on whether to include a waiver for unionized 
shops], said Pat ‘Duke’ Dujakovich, president of Greater Kansas City AFL-CIO.”). 
368. Id.; Sean Hackbarth, Where Have Unions Gotten Minimum Wage ‘Escape Clauses?’, U.S. 
CHAMBER COM.: ABOVE THE FOLD (June 3, 2015), http://www.uschamber.com/above-the 
-fold/where-have-unions-gotten-minimum-wage-escape-clauses [http://perma.cc/7UYF 
-ZFZA]. 
369. See, e.g., Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n. v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1179 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015) (denying a motion for a preliminary injunction against a Los Angeles hotel wage 
statute exempting unionized hotels), aff ’d, No. 15-55909, 2016 WL 4437618 (9th Cir. Aug. 
23, 2016). In Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Supreme Court held that states may not regulate con-
duct if it is within a zone of activity that Congress intended to leave open to the free play of 
economic forces. For further discussion of preemption law, see infra Section IV.A.2. 
370. Greenhouse, supra note 246. This criticism has abated somewhat with the campaign’s suc-
cess. 
371. Id. (quoting a former NLRB official for the proposition that “[i]f you want to start organiz-
ing, you can start methodically at corporate-owned stores in big cities like New York, Chica-
go, and L.A.”). 
372. Bob Kastigar, Comment to Emanuel To Launch Task Force on Paid Leave, Worker Issues,  
PROGRESS ILL. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.progressillinois.com/news/content/2015/03
/16/emanuel-launch-task-force-paid-leave-worker-issues [http://perma.cc/BDD4-UGR3]. 
These arguments echo the early twentieth century AFL position. See TAIT, supra note 208, at 
5 (describing the early AFL-CIO strategy of favoring internal, contractual means of resolving 
disputes). 
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The division within the labor movement could be seen as a debate about 
whether to prioritize, over all else, the organization of new dues-paying mem-
bers at a time when organizing is essential to unions’ viability. But more fun-
damentally, the divide is over whether to hold fast to the system of privatized, 
firm-based collective bargaining with exclusive representation that has defined 
American labor relations since the New Deal—or to embrace a fundamentally 
different model of unionism in which social bargaining plays a key role.
373
 
The impetus to reject social bargaining and hold fast to the current collec-
tive bargaining model is understandable. First, the commitment to private or-
dering over state engagement is a rational reaction to the particular historical 
experience of the American labor movement. Nineteenth and early twentieth 
century unions in the United States frequently confronted court injunctions 
and state repression.
374
 In response, the labor movement—or significant por-
tions of it—sought to achieve a laissez-faire state policy toward collective ac-
tion.
375
 The hope was that unions, free from state intervention, could facilitate 
a system of genuine reciprocal solidarity and workplace democracy.
376
 Though 
that goal was never fully achieved, voluntarism—the aspiration of private or-
dering—remains central to many unions’ cultures.
377
 The possibility of true 
self-help still holds allure, which is heightened by continued hostility toward 
collective action on the part of many courts and state actors.
378
 Moreover, the 
attraction of private self-help is deeply rooted in U.S. culture and law more 
generally.
379
 This is not only a libertarian impulse. A danger arises when the 
state colonizes and manages social movements and civil society. In achieving 
state-supported social bargaining, one may worry, the labor movement may 
lose its independence and autonomy. 
Second, a system of privatized, firm-level collective bargaining is familiar, 
and given substantial political obstacles, revitalization is easier to envision than 
any fundamental reform. As Professor Lance Compa recently wrote, “a labor 
 
373. See Harold Meyerson, The Seeds of a New Labor Movement, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://prospect.org/article/labor-crossroads-seeds-new-movement [http://perma.cc/AP2Y 
-FHU9]. 
374. See FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 27, at 
128-66. 
375. Id.; TOMLINS, supra note 30. 
376. Cf. Barenberg, supra note 43, at 1427-28 (describing Wagner’s vision of labor relations). 
377. For an analysis of how the framework of labor relations has encouraged unions to hold fast 
to strategies of self-help, see Rogers, supra note 11, at 6, 9. 
378. See Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1611 (2016) (describing 
court rulings against collective action by workers and the labor movement’s response). 
379. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 22-23 (1996). 
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and employment system cannot be wrenched from its historical moorings.”
380
 
It is important “not to be so frustrated with problems and so enamored of nov-
elty that we undermine hard-won foundations in our labor law system.”
381
 To 
some extent, this is an argument about political feasibility. Defenders of the ex-
isting system emphasize that decisive change favoring unions is not likely, giv-
en the political environment.
382
 Rather, “we are stuck with the infrastructure of 
the current labor and employment law system.”
383
 
Relatedly, fundamental reform could undermine the interests of existing 
labor organizations.
384
 Indeed, the emerging legal model threatens the exist-
ence of unions as they are traditionally constructed. The problem is not only 
that existing union officials have an interest in resisting reform that could un-
dermine their employment, but also that the lack of an obvious funding mech-
anism for the emerging forms of bargaining could undermine workers’ power 




Finally, a move toward social bargaining diminishes the emphasis on 
worksite organization. The current regime’s emphasis on the workplace has 
value. It offers the possibility of genuinely democratic struggle and economic 
power.
386
 Compa offers a variant of this argument: “Our[] [system] correctly 
places the inherent conflict between workers and owners in a capitalist econo-
my at the heart of the labor-management relationship.”
387
 On this account, the 
New Deal’s embrace of private, firm-based bargaining produced tangible gains 
 
380. Compa, supra note 7, at 610. 
381. Id. at 612. 
382. Id. at 611 (listing the various reforms unions hope for but cannot enact); cf. Estlund, supra 
note 7, at 1531 (detailing the extent to which “American labor law has been . . . insulated 
from both internal and external sources of renovation”). 
383. Compa, supra note 7, at 612. 
384. Cf. DiSalvo, supra note 41, at 3, 13 (arguing that existing dues mechanisms give unions a 
“privileged position” compared to other interest groups). 
385. See infra Section IV.B for further discussion of this problem. 
386. For emphasizing this point, I thank Bob Master, Communication Workers of America. Cf. 
Clyde Summers, Worker Participation in Sweden and the United States: Some Comparisons from 
an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175, 215-17 (1984) (comparing Swedish and U.S. 
regimes and concluding that because of the firm-based system of bargaining in the United 
States, “the union member’s voice in . . . union decisions and policies on economic issues is 
much more direct and effective in the United States than in Sweden”); Summers, supra note 
173 (comparing American and German unions). 
387. Compa, supra note 7, at 610. 
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at the place of production that workers had been unable to achieve through 
earlier efforts at social and industrial bargaining.
388
 
All of the above objections are likely to be levied by those who support the 
existing system of collective bargaining.
389
 Another category of critique comes 
from those who have given up on collective bargaining altogether in favor of a 
regulatory or self-governance approach.
390
 As previously noted, some who urge 
this position oppose unions in principle, as inefficient and self-dealing.
391
 But 
even some labor officials have adopted a post-union approach, urging a turn 
away from collective bargaining toward ordinary regulation and employer self-
governance.
392
 For example, one prominent union official involved in the Fight 
for $15 has advocated a new social contract that would create no new protec-
tions for bargaining.
393
 Other union organizations have switched to engaging 




388. Id. (citing IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 
1920-1933 (1960) (describing the weakness of the American labor movement in the 1920s); 
and IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-
1941 (1970) (highlighting the labor movement’s eventual gains under the New Deal)). 
389. For a discussion of how to mitigate these concerns, see infra Section IV.B. 
390. See supra Section I.C.2. 
391. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Notably, those opposing the move toward more 
sectoral bargaining, including in the modest form embraced by Browning-Ferris, include 
some supporters of corporate social responsibility. These corporations argue that an expand-
ed bargaining obligation on employers who influence terms and conditions of employment 
would disincentivize companies from requiring subcontractors to adopt good labor practic-
es. See Brief for Microsoft Corp. & HR Policy Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
27, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 16-1028 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2016). The 
argument, however, is premised on the resistance of the company at the top of the supply 
chain to collective bargaining. 
392. See Meyerson, supra note 373; GROWTH2, http://www.growth2llc.com [http://perma.cc
/L4MU-8XMR] (describing the group, a partnership of Andrew Stern, former SEIU presi-
dent, and Chris Chafe, former labor organizer and political and legislative director, as “un-
lock[ing] value by creating new relationships between capital, labor, and entrepreneurs, to 
deliver shared success for workers, investors, companies, and customers”). 
393. See Nick Hanauer & David Rolf, Shared Security, Shared Growth, DEMOCRACY (Summer 
2015), http://www.democracyjournal.org/37/shared-security-shared-growth.php [http://
perma.cc/S9ET-WSA3] (urging the adoption of “a twenty-first-century social contract” that 
endows every American worker with a new “Shared Security Account,” accompanied by a 
new set of “Shared Security Standards,” without mention of new forms of unions or new 
collective labor guarantees); see also Meyerson, supra note 373 (reporting that Rolf argues 
that “labor should focus its remaining energies on bequeathing its resources to start-up pro-
jects that may find more effective ways to advance workers’ interests than today’s embattled 
unions can”). 
394. Lichtenstein, supra note 42 (discussing union efforts at political coalition building in place of 
worker organizing); see also Meyerson, supra note 373 (describing AFL-CIO’s Working 
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grounds for this post-union approach are pragmatic. Given that unions have 
declined significantly in the modern economy and that political opposition to 
unionism is so extensive, it makes sense to look elsewhere—to employment 
law, to self-governance, to technological innovation—to address problems in 
the workplace.
395
 On this account, collective bargaining, whether at the firm 
level or at the sectoral and political level, is a relic. 
B. A Qualified Defense 
The foregoing critiques have merit. But they pose a challenge for the design 
and enactment of the new labor law, rather than a reason to resist its develop-
ment. 
Consider, first, the post-union approach, i.e., exclusive reliance on em-
ployment regulation or corporate self-governance. This may be the path of 
least resistance, but for several reasons, regulation and self-governance, with-
out the existence of strong worker organizations, are unlikely to achieve many 
of the most important aims of labor law. 
First, an employment-law or governance approach does nothing to facili-
tate worker voice or to protect the right to associate—to organize, bargain, and 




Second, an employment-law or governance approach does little to shift 
how power is distributed in society. Strong worker organizations, in contrast, 
help redistribute power, which, over time, helps maintain a measure of political 
and economic equality.
397
 Unions help shift the balance of power through sev-
eral mechanisms. Most obviously, organized labor exercises collective bargain-
 
America as “a community-based campaign that until recently hadn’t dealt with its members’ 
workplace concerns or had a presence in those workplaces”). 
395. See Meyerson, supra note 373; see also supra notes 392-394 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the post-union approach). 
396. See sources cited supra note 37. 
397. See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 1; ROSENFELD, supra note 1; WHAT DO UNIONS 
DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007); 
Hacker & Pierson, supra note 3, at 186; see also Judith A. Scott, Why a Union Voice Makes a 
Real Difference for Women Workers: Then and Now, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 233 (2009) (dis-
cussing the role of unions in advancing gender equality); David Vogel, The “New” Social 
Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTOR-
ICAL ESSAYS 182 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981) (noting that in nations with strong trade 
unions, occupational safety and health standards tend to be stringent). 
the new labor law 
77 
ing power that affects wage rates.
398
 But unions also have the capacity to affect 
corporate governance decisions, such as executive compensation.
399
 In addi-
tion, they can push policymakers to address issues relating to workers, to en-
sure enforcement of statutory standards, and to “resist policy changes that fur-
ther inequality.”
400
 Comparative studies support the conclusions that strong 
unions are associated with reduced wage dispersion,
401
 enhanced welfare state 
generosity,
402
 and increased electoral participation among low income groups. 
They also play a networking and informational function by making working-
class voters aware of partisan differences and their implications for policy.
403
 
Finally, effective and democratic worker organizations bring other im-
portant benefits over a purely regulatory approach: they have the potential to 
create workplace democracy
404
 and thus serve as an important training ground 
for political democracy.
405
 Unions can also improve workplace outcomes by fa-
cilitating voices of affected participants.
406
 Indeed, even leading scholars urging 
a governance approach recognize the necessity of facilitating worker voice in 




398. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 3, at 186 (citing PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, 




401. Pontusson et al., supra note 111, at 282 (discussing the ways in which different labor market 
institutions, including centralized wage bargaining, affect the distribution of income in a 
country and concluding that unions promote the relative wages of poorly paid workers); 
Michael Wallerstein, Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Socie-
ties, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 669 (1999).  
402. EVELYNE HUBER & JOHN D. STEPHENS, DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE 1, 
104, 115-16 (2001); Kathleen Thelen, Critical Dialogue: What Unions No Longer Do, 13 PERSP. 
ON POL. 155, 155 (2015) (reviewing ROSENFELD, supra note 1). 
403. See Jonas Pontusson, Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution, 51 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 797, 
807-08 (2013); Thelen, supra note 402, at 155; see also Harold Meyerson, Get Out the Union 
Vote, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 9, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/get-out-union-vote [http://
perma.cc/NA3N-EXHV] (documenting voting patterns in the 2012 election). 
404. See Barenberg, supra note 43, at 1422-27 (describing the aspiration that unions serve as vehi-
cles for democratic consent and cooperation in the workplace and in the polity). 
405. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE 
DEMOCRACY (2003); FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 1, at 7-11. 
406. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 1, at 7-11; Barenberg, supra note 43, at 1493 n.482 (collecting 
literature suggesting that unions can increase productivity by giving employees a voice). 
The data supporting this point are somewhat dated, but the theoretical case remains strong. 
407. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 405, at 162-81. 
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Why not, then, try to revive the existing system of firm-based bargaining? 
Because as earlier parts of this Article demonstrated, traditional NLRA collec-
tive bargaining is profoundly mismatched with the contemporary economy in 
which employers are fissured and work is increasingly global, contingent, 
shared, and automated.
408
 Moreover, the existing system of firm-based collec-
tive bargaining largely removes unions from the spaces of politics and govern-




The new labor law regime emerging from the efforts of the Fight for $15 
and similar social movements is thus far more promising than either the purely 
regulatory approach or the traditional NLRA approach. To be sure, its merits 
depend in large part on the details. To that end, in Part IV, I consider how, con-
cretely, the new labor law might continue to develop in the United States. But 
at the level of principle, the arguments in favor of a more sectoral and social 
form of labor law are significant. 
Perhaps the most straightforward reason to embrace the new labor law is 
that it would enable unions to negotiate in ways that respond to the problem of 
the fissured employer. Under the emerging system, no longer would the bar-
gaining relationship be structured around the outmoded employer-employee 
dyad. Workers throughout an economic sector would bargain together, wheth-
er employed by the lead firm, one of the contracted firms, or any particular 
plant. This would avoid protracted legal battles about the identity of the em-
ployer while strengthening unions’ ability to implement their goal of raising 
worker wages. 
For several reasons, sectoral bargaining, which is common throughout Eu-
rope,
410
 better serves labor law’s goal of increasing workers’ bargaining power 
so as to reduce economic and political inequality.
411
 Researchers have shown 
that firm-based bargaining has some impact on income inequality, but the im-
pact is primarily felt within firms; bargaining compresses wages within the 
firm at which it occurs.
412
 The existing model of firm-based bargaining thus 
tends to raise wages throughout an industry only if there is enough union pres-
ence in the industry or geographic area to pose a threat to nonunionized firms; 
 
408. See supra Section I.A.2. 
409. See supra Section I.A.3. 
410. See Traxler & Behrens, supra note 177. 
411. Dimick, supra note 34, at 699 (“Overall, centralized bargaining reduces income inequality to 
a dramatically greater extent than decentralized bargaining.”). 
412. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 1, at 79-82. 
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employers raise wages to stave off unionization or to compete for labor.
413
 This 
rarely occurs under our current regime in which sectoral bargaining, though 
permissible, is not required. In contrast, mandatory sectoral bargaining directly 
impacts wages throughout the labor market; agreements apply to all employers 
in the industry or region, helping create more wage compression overall.
414
 
Unions empowered to bargain sectorally also tend to be more effective at shap-
ing public policy and democratic decision making.
415
 Their more expansive 
mandate enhances their incentive and ability to serve as a counterweight to or-
ganized business interests in the political sphere.
416
 
The U.S. experience demonstrates, however, that simply allowing unions to 
bargain sectorally is unlikely to accomplish much—the NLRA already permits 
multi-employer bargaining to the extent employers and unions agree to it.
417
 
Nor would the voluntary centralization of union organizations necessarily pro-
duce sectoral bargaining.
418
 A critical addition is active support from the state: 
for sectoral bargaining effectively to reduce wage inequality, employers must be 
required to engage in it, and its fruits must be extended throughout the labor 
market.
419
 Such state-supported sectoral bargaining—social bargaining—also 
provides workers greater influence in politics, over a host of policy decisions 
that affect workers’ daily lives. Indeed, comparative studies suggest that, from 
the perspective of creating egalitarian outcomes at the societal level, the two 
most important factors in a labor law regime are the establishment of broadly 
 
413. Dimick, supra note 34, at 699. 
414. See Pontusson et al., supra note 111, at 289-90, 301 (concluding that bargaining centraliza-
tion has an egalitarian effect on overall distribution of wages); Wallerstein, supra note 401, 
at 649, 669, 672-76 (concluding that an important factor in explaining pay dispersion is 
whether wage-setting occurs at an individual, plant, industrial, or sectoral level). For further 
discussion, see Dimick, supra note 34. 
415. Rogers, supra note 11, at 40-43. 
416. Id. Indeed, as Matthew Dimick has argued, moving to a more centralized bargaining system 
could shift incentives for unions in ways that address many efficiency-based objections to 
collective bargaining as well. Dimick, supra note 34, at 692. When union structures are high-
ly decentralized and firm-based, the rational response of unions is to advocate for “seniority-
based layoff policies, job definitions and demarcations, internal labor markets, rules limiting 
employer discretion over technology, manning and staffing requirements, and so forth.” Id. 
417. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
418. THELEN, supra note 24 (examining contemporary changes in labor market institutions in the 
United States, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands); Wolfgang Streeck & 
Anke Hassel, Trade Unions as Political Actors, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UN-
IONS 335 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003) (discussing the importance of cen-
tralized or industrial bargaining and affirmative state support for unions); cf. Dimick, supra 
note 34 (arguing for centralization). 
419. THELEN, supra note 24, at 5, 9-10, 194, 203-07. 
the yale law journal 126:2  2016 
80 
inclusive union organizations and the capacity of the state actively to broker 
deals between employer and union organizations.
420
 
Governmental support for bargaining need not be accompanied by gov-
ernmental control of labor organizations or restrictions on their freedoms—just 
as the absence of state support for bargaining under the current system does 
not ensure protection from state interference. Indeed, the American system in-
cludes significant governmental control over labor organizations, and signifi-
cant court sanction of labor protest, despite the ideal of a voluntaristic, private 
system of labor relations.
421
 In contrast, numerous European systems grant un-
ions significant political power but leave them much less fettered in their inter-
nal operations and in their ability to exercise economic power.
422
 In short, the 
extent of state intervention in unions is highly contingent, the product of mul-
tiple policy choices, and does not necessarily follow from giving unions more 
power to bargain at the social level. 
The case for social bargaining as a means to enhance the economic and po-
litical power of workers is thus compelling. But the argument fails to respond 
to one of the critiques launched by proponents of the existing system: that the 
new labor law may well undervalue vibrant workplace organizations and may 
minimize the extent of worker voice at the place of employment. Our current 
system places the workplace at the heart of the labor-management relationship 
and seeks to increase worker voice and dignity at that location. Local unions, 
organized at the firm level, can have a significant impact on the daily work ex-
 
420. Comparing the Nordic countries, Germany, and the United States, Thelen concludes that a 
range of market economies and labor law systems can produce egalitarian results. The key 
factors are encompassing unions and a strong, active state. Id. at 204-05. The organization of 
employers is also key but tends to follow from the power and organization of labor, sup-
ported by the state. Id. at 207; see also SILVIA, supra note 173, at 41 (emphasizing the central 
role that the law and state institutions play in sustaining the German industrial relations 
system). 
421. See Andrias, supra note 378, at 1610-11 (summarizing court interventions); Cynthia Estlund, 
Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 174 (2015) (exploring how 
“[l]abor law both restricts and empowers labor unions”). 
422. See Federico Fabbrini, Europe in Need of a New Deal: On Federalism, Free Market, and the 
Right To Strike, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1175, 1185-89 (2012) (describing the more extensive rights 
of unions to engage in strikes in France, Italy, and the Nordic countries, all of which vest un-
ions with significant power to engage in sectoral bargaining); Clyde Summers, Comparisons 
in Labor Law: Sweden and the United States, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 17-22 (1985) (comparing the 
United States, where “legal intervention in internal union processes is substantial,” to Swe-
den, where there is almost a “total void of legal rules concerning the internal process of un-
ions”). But cf. Fabbrini, supra, at 1195-1236 (exploring how EU law is beginning to erode the 
nationally protected rights to sectoral bargaining). 
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perience of individual workers and can shift their relationships with immediate 
supervisors in ways that enhance workers’ dignity.
423
 
But the nascent labor law does not, and need not, eschew a system of 
workplace organizations altogether. Indeed, the Fight for $15 and other new 
campaigns suggest the possibility of a hybrid in which sectoral social bargain-
ing would accompany either the existing system of exclusive representation at 
individual shops, or a new, developing system of non-exclusive representation, 
under which members-only worker organizations, or perhaps even works 
councils, would exist at individual worksites to supplement social bargaining. 
iv. developing the new labor law 
In the end, for those committed to achieving greater economic and political 
equality, the strongest objection to the emerging labor law regime is not that it 
would be ineffective but that it is unlikely to be achieved. Commentators have 
described earlier proposals for mandatory sectoral bargaining as fanciful and 
from the “political ozone.”
424
 But as Part II demonstrated, social bargaining is 
already nascent through the efforts of the Fight for $15 and other social move-
ments. This Part elaborates on the existing legal footholds that could be deep-
ened to facilitate the new labor law in the United States and considers potential 
obstacles. 
A. A Legal Framework for Social Bargaining 
The NLRB took a critical step toward more centralized bargaining with its 
recent Browning-Ferris decision.
425
 Returning to the broader, common law joint 
employment test in use before the mid-1980s, the Board emphasized its re-
sponsibility to adapt the NLRA to “changing patterns of industrial life.”
426
 
Whether the Board’s standard will survive court review, hostile congressional 
oversight, or reconsideration by a different Board are open questions.
427
 But if 
 
423. See supra notes 386-388 and accompanying text. 
424. Barenberg, supra note 32, at 961. 
425. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 7 (Aug. 27, 2015); see supra 
notes 149-152, 302-318 and accompanying text. 
426. Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 11 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 
251, 266 (1975)). The Board also criticized its predecessors for narrowing the joint employ-
ment standard beyond what was statutorily necessary. Id. at 10. 
427. The case is on appeal. Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, appeal filed, No. 16-1064 (D.C. 
Cir. Feb. 17, 2016). Republican lawmakers, joined by a few Democrats, have introduced leg-
islation to reverse the Board’s decision, see Protecting Local Business Opportunity Act, H.R. 
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the standard endures, it will further the goal of sectoral unionism advanced by 
the Fight for $15—to a point. As a result of the Browning-Ferris decision, em-
ployer responsibility for bargaining, as well as employer liability for violations 
of organizing rights, will move higher up the supply chain.
428
 This is true for 
labor contracts between companies and their subcontractors, for franchise 
agreements and other supply-chain employment relationships,
429
 and also for 
companies that contract with temp agencies. Indeed, the Board followed its 
Browning-Ferris decision with Miller & Anderson, Inc., holding that unions can 
seek to represent temp-agency workers combined with the employees at the 
firm where the temps are stationed.
430
 These decisions also effectively expand 
the permissible targets for unions’ economic activity, by limiting the effect of 
the prohibitions on secondary boycotts.
431
 And, along with other recent Board 
decisions, the new standards narrow the ability of employers to classify work-
ers as independent contractors.
432
 
That said, the reinstated joint employment standard does not require mul-
ti-employer bargaining. It supports firm-wide and perhaps supply-chain-wide 
 
3459, 114th Cong. (2015), and have held oversight hearings, see, e.g., Who’s the Boss? The 
“Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015), http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/whos 
-the-bossd-the-joint-employer-standard-and-business-ownership [http://perma.cc/5ETZ 
-5ZEZ]. The House Appropriations Committee also has advanced a bill that would block 
spending on many of the NLRB’s initiatives. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 
114TH CONG., MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HU-
MAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPT. 
30, 2017 (Comm. Print 2016), http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-114hr-fc 
-ap-fy2017-ap00-laborhhsed.pdf [http://perma.cc/GT3W-P7EJ]. 
428. See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text (explaining the law on employer liability for 
unfair labor practices and the law on multi-employer bargaining). 
429. An administrative law judge is now considering the application of Browning-Ferris to 
McDonald’s. See McDonald’s USA, LLC v. Fast Food Workers Comm., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 144 
(Mar. 17, 2016); John Herzfeld, Sides Clash at McDonald’s Joint Employer Hearing, DAILY  
LAB. REP. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.bna.com/sides-clash-mcdonalds-n57982068447 
[http://perma.cc/U3Z9-QL62]. 
430. Miller & Anderson, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (July 11, 2016) (overruling H.S. Care L.L.C., 
343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004)). 
431. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text (explaining law on secondary boycotts and 
strikes). 
432. See supra notes 311-313; see also FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at 10, 16 (Sept. 
30, 2014) (declining to adopt the D.C. Circuit’s holding insofar as it treats entrepreneurial 
opportunity as the primary inquiry without sufficient regard for all of the common law fac-
tors and holding FedEx drivers to be employees). 
the new labor law 
83 
bargaining, but not sectoral or regional bargaining.
433
 Without more substan-
tial reform, these doctrinal developments are merely another tweak, albeit a 
positive one, on the existing system. Unions could gain new members from 
employers previously thought unorganizable—McDonald’s, Uber, and others—
through traditional organizing methods and firm-based collective bargaining 
agreements. Much commentary surrounding Browning-Ferris seems to assume 
this path. Indeed, while pursuing a sectoral strategy, SEIU also appears to be 
following a traditional path of corporate pressure against McDonald’s, with 
some success.
434
 Some of the recent efforts to organize Uber drivers through 
NLRA processes fall in this category as well.
435
 
How, then, to create the legal infrastructure to enable sectoral bargaining? 
In public statements, Scott Courtney, the Fight for $15’s campaign director, has 
expressed a commitment to this path, expressly rejecting a traditional firm-
based union as the campaign’s goal. Instead, according to journalist Steven 
Greenhouse, Courtney “envisions a giant, nationwide organization of low-
wage workers that would be financially sustainable” and would continually en-
gage in systematic and broad-based tripartite bargaining.
436
 The Fight for $15 
offers McDonald’s and other companies the opportunity to engage in a conver-
sation on those terms.
437
 
One could imagine a new federal law that would require bargaining on a 
sectoral basis. Such a statute could draw on successful elements from regimes 
elsewhere in the world,
438
 or from our own history.
439
 A proposal for wholesale 
 
433. Professor Mark Barenberg, in a recent paper published with the Roosevelt Institute, argues 
for more fundamental statutory reform of the definition of “employer” and the existing con-
cept of bargaining units in order to enable industrial bargaining within the existing NLRA 
framework. His proposals would allow workers to define the scope of their bargaining unit 
across employers, though they would not mandate sectoral bargaining or provide a mecha-
nism for extending the fruits of collective bargaining throughout an industry. See Barenberg, 
supra note 103. 
434. For example, “as a result of the Fight for $15’s prodding, Brazilian prosecutors are investigat-
ing alleged wage theft, child labor and unsafe conditions at McDonald’s franchised opera-
tions, while the European Union is investigating it for more than $1bn in alleged tax eva-
sion.” Greenhouse, supra note 343. 
435. See supra note 143. But cf. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 (Dec. 23, 2015) (allowing drivers 
to unionize and adopting a local rate-setting mechanism). 
436. Greenhouse, supra note 343. Courtney further stated, “If we had a vehicle or mechanism 
where people could join the organization and fund those fights, I think many people would 
happily join.” Id. 
437. Id. 
438. For a discussion of such regimes, see, for example, THELEN, supra note 24, at 24; Estreicher, 
supra note 132, at 27-33 (evaluating German and Canadian styles of labor law reform); 
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federal law reform would, of course, require sensitivity to American particulari-
ties and governmental structure, as well as to constitutional constraints includ-
ing limits on private delegation.
440
 This is a worthwhile long-term project. But 
design of such a statute, at this juncture, is premature. Critics are correct that 
comprehensive federal labor law reform is wholly unrealistic in our contempo-
rary political climate. Indeed, far more modest labor law reform has repeatedly 
failed in Congress, even under periods of unified Democratic governments.
441
 
Tellingly, the Fight for $15 has made comparatively little progress on the federal 
level even on its wage demands.
442
 
A more realistic route is to expand the use of social bargaining at the local 
and state level. Much of this can be done within the confines of federal law—
though legal challenges exist. 
1. Expanding Local and State Sectoral Bargaining 
At the outset, tripartite, sectoral bargaining can be expanded at the local 
and state level using existing mechanisms. In New York, the tripartite wage 
board is no longer in operation. As part of the compromise bill to raise the 
state-wide minimum wage to $15, employers successfully mobilized to strip the 
Commissioner’s authority to establish higher minimums for particular occupa-
tions.
443
 But several states other than New York grant executive branch actors 
 
Streeck & Hassel, supra note 418 (analyzing the role of modern trade unions in a variety of 
countries); and supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text. 
439. See supra notes 52-53, 172 and accompanying text. 
440. For example, any federal law would need to contain statutory standards that limit executive 
discretion and do not excessively delegate legislative power to private groups. See Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 238-42 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935 in part because it unconstitutionally delegated public power to private 
groups); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 541-42 (1935) 
(striking down the NIRA on the ground that the unbound code-making authority given to 
the President, with input from trade and industry groups, impermissibly delegated legisla-
tive power). The validity of these cases has been questioned, but the Court has had few op-
portunities to revisit the private nondelegation doctrine in recent years. See, e.g., Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 (2015) (holding that Amtrak is a govern-
mental entity, rather than an autonomous private entity, and therefore not reaching the pri-
vate nondelegation question). 
441. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. 
442. See supra notes 280-284 and accompanying text. 
443. S. 6406C, 239th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016). Existing wage orders remain in effect and 
New York law still allows the Commission to act regarding hours. See id. § 5; Nat’l Rest. As-
soc. v. Comm’r of Labor, 34 N.Y.S.3d 232, 235-36 (App. Div. 2016) (discussing the legislative 
history surrounding the enactment of the law). 
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the power to raise wages or regulate hours in particular sectors of the econo-
my.
444
 Many require or encourage public hearings as part of the process.
445
 
Several of these statutes, including those in California, Colorado, and New Jer-
sey, expressly provide for tripartite commissions: wage boards with representa-
tion from employee groups, industry groups, and the public.
446
 
For example, California law provides for an Industrial Welfare Commission 
(IWC) composed of two union representatives, two employer representatives, 
and one representative from the general public, all appointed by the governor, 
with the consent of the California State Senate.
447
 The IWC’s authority goes 
beyond creating a basic minimum wage: it has authority to evaluate wages in 
“an occupation, trade, or industry” to ensure they are adequate “to supply the 
cost of proper living.” It also can consider whether “the hours or conditions of 
 
444. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151 § 7 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 34-06-01 to 
-08 (West 2014); see also sources cited infra note 446 (describing statutes creating tripartite 
commissions). 
445. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1178.5 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-6-108 to -109 (2013); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-08-01 (West 2014). 
446. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 70-74, 1173, 1178 (West 2011) (authorizing an Industrial Welfare 
Commission, appointed by the Governor, and composed of two representatives of employ-
ers, two from recognized labor organizations, and one from the general public; requiring 
commission to review adequacy of minimum wage every two years; and providing for in-
dustry-specific wage boards); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-6-109 (2011) (authorizing a wage board 
comprised of an equal number of employer, employee, and public representatives); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7 (West 2011) (establishing the “New Jersey Minimum Wage Advi-
sory Commission” with “five members as follows: the Commissioner of Labor and Work-
force Development, ex officio, who shall serve as chair of the commission, and four mem-
bers appointed by the Governor as follows: two persons who shall be nominated by 
organizations who represent the interests of the business community in this State and two 
persons who shall be nominated by the New Jersey State AFL-CIO); id. § 34:11-56a8, a9 
(providing that the Commissioner may establish a wage board to set minimum rates for 
employees in particular occupations; such boards shall be composed of equal numbers of 
employer, employee, and public representatives). Arizona law also permits the establishment 
of a tripartite wage board, but only to address wages of minors. AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-
314 (2012). Meanwhile, reflecting the approach when wage boards were first enacted, Illinois 
law authorizes boards to address the wages of women and children. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT 
125/5.1 (2011) (allowing wage boards “composed of not more than 2 representatives of the 
employers in any occupation or occupations, an equal number of representatives of the em-
ployees in such occupation or occupations and of one disinterested person representing the 
public, who shall be designated as chairman”). Other states previously had wage boards but 
have since repealed them. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 279:5 (1987) (repealed 1995) 
(authorizing a wage board). 
447. CAL. LAB. CODE. § 70.1 (West 2011). The labor representatives must be drawn from “mem-
bers of recognized labor organizations.” Id. IWC dates to 1913, but until the 1970s applied to 
women and child workers only. See Indus. Welfare Comm’n v. Superior Court, 613 P.2d 579, 
583-84 (Cal. 1980). 
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labor” are “prejudicial to the health, moral, or welfare of employees.”
448
 If the 
IWC determines that wages, hours, or conditions are inadequate, it selects a 
wage board—again composed of two labor and two employer representatives, 
along with a neutral representative—to investigate and make recommenda-
tions.
449
 Recommendations that receive the support of two-thirds of the wage 
board’s members are incorporated into IWC proposed regulations, which are 
then subject to public hearings.
450
 The IWC has been used repeatedly in the 
past to set wages, overtime, and other standards in over sixteen industries.
451
 
New Jersey law provides for a Minimum Wage Advisory Commission 
(WAC or Commission).
452
 The Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Devel-
opment serves as chair. As in California, the Commission’s members are ap-
pointed by the Governor and include representatives from business and labor. 
New Jersey law further specifies that the business representatives “shall be 
nominated by organizations who represent the interests of the business com-
munity in this State” and the labor representatives “shall be nominated by the 
New Jersey State AFL-CIO.”
453
 The WAC is charged with evaluating the mini-
mum wage annually.
454
 The law also allows the Commissioner to establish sec-
toral wage boards, composed of labor and business representatives, which then 
recommend minimum wages in particulars sectors. Wage boards can be estab-
lished if the Commissioner believes “that a substantial number of employees in 
 
448. CAL. LAB. CODE. § 1178.5 (West 2011). 
449. Id. §§ 1178, 1178.5. 
450. Id. § 1178.5(c). 
451. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 11000-11170 (2016); Indus. Welfare Comm’n, Wage Orders, 
CAL. DEP’T INDUS. REL. (July 2014), http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/WageOrderIndustries
.htm [http://perma.cc/RU26-PQDP] (listing a series of minimum wage and industry wage 
orders); see also Tiffanny Brosnan, California’s Wage Orders: Landmines and Goldmines, OR-
ANGE COUNTY L., June 2012, at 12 (reporting that “[a]ll California employers must comply 
with a multitude of wage and hour laws that go well beyond setting minimum wages and 
calculating overtime pay” and describing the IWC’s seventeen different Wage Orders, “each 
one applicable to a particular industry” ranging from “Manufacturing to Mercantile” with 
“fine distinctions made between them”); Shah & Seville, supra note 353, at 425-28 (discuss-
ing the history of the IWC’s role in regulating domestic work). Although the IWC is not in 
operation now, its existing orders are still enforced. See Industrial Welfare  
Commission (IWC), CAL. DEP’T INDUS. REL., http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/iwc.html [http://
perma.cc/8RHP-RQ2Y]. 
452. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:11-56a4.7 et seq. (West 2016). 
453. Id. § 34:11-56a4.7. 
454. Id. § 34:11-56a4.8(a); see also Minimum Wage Advisory Commission, N.J., DEP’T LAB. & 
WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lwdhome/MinWageCommission.html 
[http://perma.cc/S8PR-8DZT] (describing the mission of the Commission and collecting 
annual reports). 
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any occupation or occupations are receiving less than a fair wage.”
455
 The law 
also provides for a public hearing process after which the Commissioner de-
cides whether to approve or reject the report.
456
 
To date, the experience with these tripartite commissions has been mixed. 
In California, as well as recently in New York, wage boards have successfully 
established wage and hour protections above federal minimums in particular 
sectors of the economy. But most wage boards have been moribund for years, 
while others have been abandoned.
457
 Moreover, even where the wage board 
process has been used, the potential for social bargaining has been under-
realized. Unions have not frequently engaged the commissions through wide-
spread mobilization, testimony, and collective action.
458
 The boards also have 
structural limitations. The ability of workers to use wage boards to their benefit 
depends in large part on the identity of the Governor in the state; he or she in-
fluences when such boards act and who constitutes them. Furthermore, the 
neutral representatives on the commissions effectively decide disagreements. 
These individuals, selected by the partisan governors, serve as the swing votes 
and thereby minimize the extent to which true bargaining occurs. This weak-
ness is pronounced when there is no broader worker mobilization exerting 
pressure on the commissions. 
Nonetheless, more could be done to use existing wage boards aggressively, 
as was done by the Fight for $15 in New York. In jurisdictions where worker 
organizations have significant political influence, and where the executive 
branch is amenable, unions can petition wage boards to act. Where statutes 
permit, they can demand sector-by-sector wage and benefit improvements, be-
yond minimum wage increases. They can also engage workers in collective ac-
tion designed to achieve such gains, as the Fight for $15 did in New York. In-




Progressive states and localities could also enact new, stronger sectoral bar-
gaining statutes. A range of possibilities are worth exploring. For example, 
state or local laws could give tripartite commissions broader mandates on a sec-
 
455. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a8 (West 2016). 
456. Id. § 34:11-56a16 (West 2016). 
457. See supra note 446. 
458. But see supra Section II.C.2 (describing recent New York activity). 
459. Max Zahn, Can the Fight for $15 Replicate Its New York Wage Board Victory Around the Coun-
try?, IN THESE TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18516/fight 
-for-15-wage-board-minimum-wage [http://perma.cc/6CD7-5E4X] (quoting Mary Kay 
Henry, President of SEIU, stating that the movement would seek “to set up wage boards 
everywhere in the country”). 
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tor-by-sector basis, making clear the authority is not limited to setting bare 
minimums, nor to wages. Wage scales, benefits, working conditions, leave pol-
icies, and scheduling rights could all be subject to bargaining. Such laws could 
also require commissions to act periodically rather than only upon executive 
branch request or public petition. The laws could further provide, building on 
the New Jersey model, that the composition of the commissions include the 
elected leadership of NLRB-certified unions in the particular sector, as well as 
leaders of the relevant industry groups and firms. And the laws could facilitate 
real bargaining by diminishing the power of the neutral representatives, per-
haps by creating evenly split commissions or by incorporating an arbitration 
process in the event of a stalemate, while maintaining ultimate state supervi-
sion. 
Whether through existing or improved statutes, collective action by work-
ers is an essential component of effective social bargaining. As previously dis-
cussed, the law already offers some protection for collective action through po-
litical channels.
460
 Thus, workers could, as they did in New York, testify before 
wage boards, demonstrate in favor of certain results, and organize their co-
workers. Section 7 of the NLRA would protect such activity even if the workers 
are not union members—as long as they do not violate a collective bargaining 
agreement or engage in other unprotected or illegal activity.
461
 The statute 
would also protect concerted political organizing in the workplace, as long as it 
occurs off duty, in a nondisruptive manner, or otherwise in accordance with 
nondiscriminatory work rules. 
However, as Section I.A.2 documented, existing penalties for employer vio-
lations of section 7 are weak.
462
 Moreover, the current interpretation of section 
7 does not permit workers to withhold their labor in support of their wage and 
benefit demands unless those demands are directed at their employer.
463
 Nor 
does it permit them to engage in partial strikes, planned intermittent work 
stoppages, or secondary economic activity to advance their demands.
464
 This 
doctrine is ripe for Board and Court reinterpretation—a subject for another pa-
 
460. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
461. Id. 
462. See supra notes 116-125 and accompanying text. 
463. See Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, supra note 178, at 10-11 (citing Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 n.18 (1978) (stating, in dicta, that “[t]he argument that the em-
ployer’s lack of interest or control affords a legitimate basis for holding that a subject does 
not come within ‘mutual aid or protection’ is unconvincing. The argument that economic 
pressure should be unprotected in such cases is more convincing.”)). 
464. Id. at 12; cf. Oswalt, supra note 42, at 658-69 (describing the law on intermittent strikes and 
arguing that the Fight for $15 strikes do not qualify). 




 In the meantime, unions can organize their actions so that they fall 
within existing law’s protection.
466
 
2. The Problems of Home Rule and Preemption 
More expansive use of sectoral bargaining would undoubtedly come under 
legal challenge. To date, arguments that sectoral wage commissions violate the 
Equal Protection and Dormant Commerce Clauses have been easily dismissed: 
the statutes have a rational basis and do not discriminate between in-state and 
out-of-state businesses.
467
 So too, courts have rejected separation of powers 
and administrative law challenges: the statutes set forth a clear legislative poli-
cy position and then vest more specific decision-making authority in an expert 
body, without excessively delegating to private parties.
468
 Any expansion of so-
 
465. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 125, at 377-78 (critiquing the doctrine on collective labor action 
and intermittent strikes for failing to “set forth any . . . standard by which to judge whether 
particular strikes are indefensible”); Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Demo-
cratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685, 752 (1985) (arguing that both the NLRA and the Constitu-
tion afford greater protection for political strikes). For recent scholarship arguing that work-
ers’ collective activity deserves greater protection than it currently receives, either under the 
NLRA or under the Constitution, see, for example, Crain & Inazu, supra note 228; Catherine 
Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 277 (2015); and Rogers, supra note 32. 
466. Oswalt, supra note 42, at 658-69. 
467. As the New York Appellate Division recently explained, the Dormant Commerce Clause is 
not violated when “‘there is no differential treatment of identifiable, similarly situated in-
[s]tate and out-of-[s]tate interests’ on the face of the wage order” and there is no evidence 
that “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the pu-
tative local benefits.” Nat’l Rest. Ass’n v. Comm’r of Labor, 34 N.Y.S.3d 232, 239-40 (App. 
Div. 2016) (quoting Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Trib. of N.Y., 695 N.E.2d 1125, 1133 (N.Y. 
1998)). Equal protection challenges have been dismissed as the employers have failed to 
show the legislatures acted without a rational basis. See, e.g., Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. 
City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding, with respect to the Seattle $15 
minimum wage law, that “[t]he district court did not clearly err in finding a legitimate pur-
pose in the classification and a rational relationship between franchisees and their classifica-
tion as large employers;” a “reasonably conceivable state of facts” could support the classifi-
cation based on “the economic benefits flowing to franchisees” and franchisees’ ability to 
“handle the faster phase-in schedule”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016). 
468. Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, 34 N.Y.S.3d at 238 (noting that “the Commissioner is tasked with making 
complex economic assessments in issuing a wage order, but has special expertise to do so in 
the form of investigative powers in the area of wages and leadership of an agency capable of 
providing expert guidance” and that “the basic policy decisions underlying wage orders were 
made and articulated by the Legislature” (internal citations omitted)). 
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cial bargaining at the state or local level would have to maintain these basic 
characteristics, while attending to other constitutional constraints.
469
 
Local law reform would face additional obstacles. Municipal corporations 
are subdivisions of the state and only have authority to enact laws if the state 
has granted them such powers.
470
 As a result, state governments can deny lo-
calities authority to engage in social bargaining or can overrule particular social 
bargaining that occurs at the local level. In circumstances where state govern-
ment is more conservative than city or county government, elimination of 
home rule powers or rejection of particular regulations is a real danger.
 471
 The 
threat may be particularly salient where the locality is governed by a racial mi-
nority who lacks effective representation at the state level.
472
 For example, the 
Alabama legislature just voted to nullify a City of Birmingham law that would 
have set the city’s minimum wage at $10.10.
473
 
Another risk is that employers or other aggrieved parties could challenge 
both state and local legislation on federal NLRA preemption grounds. The 
FLSA does not preempt state and local wage legislation, as long as the non-
federal benefits exceed the floors set by federal statutes.
474
 States can pass, for 
example, higher minimum wages, more protective scheduling laws, and paid 
 
469. The analysis for each locality and state would vary; for a brief review of some of the relevant 
federal law on private delegations, see supra note 440. 
470. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corporations are po-
litical subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them . . . in the absolute discretion 
of the State.”); RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW 278-79 (2009). 
471. See ZACHARY ROTH, THE GREAT SUPPRESSION 73-87 (2016) (describing how conservative 
state governments, often at the behest of industry groups, have enacted state laws to block 
progressive local legislation, but acknowledging that preemption can cut in favor or against 
progressive goals). 
472. Cf. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1908-09 (1994) (“A centralized regional authority that encompasses 
several localities leaves little opportunity for politically empowered cultural communities to 
form and thrive.”). 
473. See Teresa Tritch, The Backlash in Birmingham, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE  
(Feb. 29, 2016, 1:23 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/the-backlash-in 
-birmingham [http://perma.cc/6FWA-VMWK]. Notably, the legislature in Alabama is ma-
jority white; Birmingham is majority African-American. Id. Alabama is one of five states 
with no state minimum wage. Id. Workers in Birmingham, represented by the NAACP, filed 
suit challenging the Alabama law, arguing that the state effort to nullify the local wage vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. According to the complaint, the 
decision was “racially motivated” and “disproportionately impacts African-American resi-
dents.” Complaint at 3, Lewis v. Bentley, No. 16-CV-00690 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 28, 2016). 
474. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2012). 
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sick time provisions; so too can localities, as long as their home rule provisions 
permit them to do so. But opponents of social bargaining could potentially ar-
gue that once states or localities allow extensive social bargaining over wages 
and other terms or conditions in particular industries, they have entered the 
field of labor-management relations and are therefore subject to NLRA 
preemption. 
In contrast to the FLSA, the NLRA’s preemption regime is extremely 
broad.
475
 There are two seminal cases. First, the Court concluded in San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Garmon that Congress intended to prohibit states 
from regulating activity that is even “arguably” protected or prohibited by fed-
eral law.
476
 Second, the Court held in Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
477
 that Congress’s decision to 
leave certain activity unregulated by the NLRA implied Congress’s intent that 
these forms of union and employer conduct be left completely unregulated.
478
 
Where Congress left conduct “to be controlled by the free play of economic 
forces,” 
479
 the states, like the NLRB, cannot regulate it.
480
 
Here, it is the latter doctrine that poses a threat. Machinists could be in-
voked in opposition to local or state tripartite wage and benefit laws on the 
ground that this kind of legislation is not an ordinary wage and hour law, but is 
rather a form of collective bargaining. And, the argument would run, the NLRA 
clearly leaves the substantive outcome of bargaining “to be controlled by the 
free play of economic forces.”
481
 
Though plausible, adopting this position would require a significant expan-
sion of preemption law.
482
 The Court has repeatedly emphasized the prohibi-
tion against state actors shifting the balance of power in privately negotiated 
 
475. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unioniza-
tion, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 374-94 (1990). For a summary of labor preemption doctrine and 
its origins, see Sachs, supra note 127, at 1164-69. 
476. 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959). 
477. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
478. Id. at 141 (citing NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960); and Hanna 
Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 382 U.S. 181, 187 (1965)). 
479. Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). 
480. Id. at 149. 
481. Id. at 144, 149-50. 
482. The question of the proper scope of federal preemption doctrine in the labor context, which 
has cut both for and against unions, is the subject of much scholarly attention. See, e.g., 
Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine To 
Allow the States To Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 163-88 (2009); 
Estlund, supra note 7, at 1530-31, 1569-79; Gottesman, supra note 475; Sachs, supra note 127. 




 but it has never curtailed the ability of states and local govern-
ments to pass universally applicable employment legislation. Indeed, the Court 
has held that laws of general applicability are not preempted even when they 
“alter[] the economic balance between labor and management.”
484
 Here, unions 
would not be obtaining exclusive bargaining agreements as the result of tripar-
tite negotiations, strengthening the case that the laws are truly of general ap-




483. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 618 (1986) 
(preempting Los Angeles’s decision to condition the award of a taxi franchise on the taxi 
company’s agreement to settle a strike). 
484. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 532 (1979) (plurality opinion); see 
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (“It would turn the poli-
cy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who 
have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations 
imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers.”). The California Supreme Court has 
rejected a labor law preemption challenge to its state’s wage commission. Indus. Welfare 
Comm’n v. Superior Court, 613 P.2d 579, 600-01 (Cal. 1980) (emphasizing states’ authority 
to go beyond the federal legislation in adopting more protective regulations for the benefit 
of employees). For similar reasons, under current doctrine, a First Amendment challenge 
should fail. Any effect on the expressive interests of employers or objecting workers would 
be indirect. See Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 360-61 (1988) (holding that a stat-
ute denying food stamps to striking workers does not directly and substantially interfere 
with First Amendment rights). 
485. Cf. Sachs, supra note 127 (discussing preemption arguments with respect to tripartite nego-
tiations that result in privately negotiated agreements). 
    In addition to the legal challenges discussed above, to the extent local law permits in-
dependent contractors to engage in bargaining, antitrust law could also pose an obstacle. 
The antitrust laws contain a labor exemption, see Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012) 
(making clear that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade 
within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)); Clayton Act § 20, 
29 U.S.C. § 52 (2012) (restricting the use of injunctions against union activity); Connell 
Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-26 (1975) (discussing the 
origins and scope of the “nonstatutory” labor exemption that extends to concerted activities 
and agreements between labor and non-labor parties), but many commentators believe that 
the labor exemption, at least under current doctrine, would not apply to concerted action 
among low-wage independent contractors, see, e.g., Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambigu-
ities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 977-79 (2016); 
Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights for 
“Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 168-74 (2005). But cf. id. (ex-
plaining that when independent contractors engage in concerted action in conjunction with 
an employee labor union, in order to eliminate unfair competition between themselves and 
regular employees, the exemption may apply). 
    Seattle Ordinance 124968, which provides for collective bargaining and rate setting for 
drivers of hired cars, including Uber cars, has been challenged on antitrust grounds, as well 
as labor preemption grounds. See Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. C16-
0322RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2016) (unpublished order) (dismissing suit for lack of stand-
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B. Building Sustainable Worksite Organization 
While the absence of exclusive bargaining agreements may help safeguard 
the fruits of social bargaining from legal challenge, this feature of the new labor 
law is also a limitation. Exclusive bargaining relationships tend to result in pro-
cedures that ensure that workers have a voice in specific workplace issues, 
through grievance procedures and local negotiation. They also tend to involve 
contractual provisions that require employers to collect dues from workers and 
remit them to the union. Without this form of “dues check-off ” it is not clear 
how tripartite social bargaining would result in financially sustainable worker 
organizations. SEIU, for example, has spent vast amounts of money organizing 
the grassroots Fight for $15.
486
 Lacking the promise of membership dues via 
exclusive bargaining agreements with particular employers, or another source 
of funding, the union cannot sustain its efforts indefinitely, even if it continues 




Yet the nascent labor law regime emerging from the Fight for $15 should 
not lead one to conclude that exclusive bargaining agreements are relics—or 
that mechanisms for worker voice and union funding will fall by the wayside. 
 
ing). Assuming the drivers are independent contractors who do not qualify for the labor ex-
emption, a likely issue will be whether the ordinance qualifies for Parker immunity, which 
allows states to enact anticompetitive regulation when acting in their sovereign capacities. 
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker immunity does not apply directly to local 
and municipal governments, but local law can be immune if it restricts competition in a 
manner authorized by state law. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 
U.S. 365, 370 (1991). In order for Parker immunity to apply, the regulatory restraint of trade 
must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and the scheme must 
be “‘actively supervised’ by the State.” Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 
U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). Any social bargaining statutes that apply to independent contractors 
would have to be designed with these requirements in mind. 
486. Alejandra Cancino, Union Spent at Least $2 Million Last Year on Fight for $15 Movement,  
CHI. TRIB. (May 29, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-union-spending 
-fight-for-15-20140529-story.html [http://perma.cc/5KK9-S3MC]. 
487. The immediacy of unions’ loss of funding has receded. Prior to Justice Scalia’s death, the 
Supreme Court was widely anticipated to rule in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, No. 
14-915 (argued Jan. 11, 2016), that mandatory agency fees in the public sector are unconsti-
tutional, or that workers must affirmatively opt-in to paying fees. Unions like SEIU would 
likely have faced a substantial decline in their revenue. On March 29, 2016, however, the Su-
preme Court issued a one sentence four-four per curiam opinion affirming the lower court 
and maintaining the existing doctrine. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.); see also supra note 169 
(detailing the Supreme Court’s restrictions on union fee collecting). 
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1. Social Bargaining as a Complement to Exclusive Bargaining Agreements 
To date, social bargaining seems to be strengthening unions’ ability to en-
gage in traditional collective bargaining. Union leaders report that social bar-
gaining has made it easier to obtain successful contracts because it has shifted 
employer expectations.
488
 For example, thousands of nursing-home workers 
recently won a contract guaranteeing $15 an hour from three nursing-home 
chains in Pennsylvania,
489
 while janitors in Colorado and the Pacific Northwest 
won new contracts that will raise their pay to $15.
490
 The mounting political 
support for wage gains seems to have softened some employer opposition at 
the traditional bargaining table. 
To the extent wages and benefits are taken out of competition by local or 
state law, it makes sense that employers would have less reason to resist 
worksite collective bargaining. So too, when the state grants labor power to ne-
gotiate at the sectoral level, it is logical that unions’ overall position in society 
would be strengthened. Historical and comparative experience tends to support 
these assumptions.
491
 Indeed, lessons from history suggest that social bargain-
ing could enhance unions’ ability to organize new workers into traditional un-
ions. As scholars have documented, “during the periods when corporatism was 
in effect, under either the NIRA or subsequent, industry-specific regulation, 
unions grew in strength.”
492
 And newly unionized shops, with successful con-
tracts, can provide continued dues payments for labor organizations. 
2. New Funding Mechanisms 
Still, a system based primarily on social bargaining cannot produce the 
same revenue for unions that was generated by firm-level exclusive representa-
 
488. Telephone Interview with Judy Scott, Gen. Counsel, SEIU (Apr. 10, 2016). 
489. David Wenner, Thousands of Pa. Nursing Home Workers Will Get $15 an Hour, PENNLIVE 
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/04/seiu.html [http://perma.cc/2EFC 
-N6QE]. 
490. Tripp Baltz, Denver Janitors Ratify Deal Paying $15 an Hour in Fourth  
Year, 134 Daily Lab. Rep., at A-6 (July 13, 2016), http://news.bna.com/dlln 
/DLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=93885587&vname=dlrnotallissues [http://perma.cc 
/W3BJ-UVDJ]; Rhonda Smith, SEIU Members OK Pact for 2000 Janitors in Oregon, Washing-
ton, 133 Daily Lab. Rep (BNA), at A-2 (July 12, 2016), http://news.bna.com/dlln/DLLNWB
/split_display.adp?fedfid=93797426&vname=dlrnotallissues [http://perma.cc/4C5J-F3Q8]. 
491. See Wachter, supra note 53, at 631-32; sources cited supra note 421. 
492. Wachter, supra note 53, at 631-32; see Lichtenstein, supra note 61, at 122-23; supra notes 65-68 
and accompanying text. 
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tion at its peak. Unions in a social bargaining context may represent many 
workers, but the workers are not required to pay dues. This problem is not dis-
similar to the challenge facing unions in light of right-to-work laws. As previ-
ously discussed, current law provides that when a majority of employees in a 
bargaining unit choose union representation, all employees in the unit are then 
represented by the union and the union must represent all of the employees 
equally.
493
 Twenty-six states, however, have enacted laws granting such union-
represented employees the right to refuse to pay the union;
 494
 section 14(b) of 
the NLRA gives states the authority to do so.
495
 An inequity in the law results: 
the union is legally obligated to provide services to all workers in the bargain-
ing unit but nonmembers need not pay for services.
496
 
In light of the rise of right-to-work laws, and the threat of new constitu-
tional law prohibiting mandatory union dues, scholars have begun to explore 
alternative funding mechanisms.
497
 Some of these proposals could be translat-
ed to a system of social bargaining. For example, one option, urged by Profes-
sors Catherine Fisk and Benjamin Sachs, is for the NLRB to abandon its rule 
forbidding unions from charging nonmembers a fee for representation ser-
vices. Under the Board’s current rule, a union violates section 8(b)(1)(A) of the 
NLRA if it insists that nonmembers pay for representation in disciplinary mat-
ters, even where the nonmember has a right not to pay for the union’s repre-
 
493. See supra notes 112-113, 115, 162 and accompanying text. 
494. See Right-to-Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl 
.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx [http://perma.cc
/ADK3-P44P]. West Virginia approved right-to-work legislation in February 2016. Id. 
495. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. §164(b) (2012). 
496. Fisk & Sachs, supra note 225, at 880. In recent months, a few judges have concluded that this 
system constitutes an unconstitutional taking. Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 671-84 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting); IAM v. Wisconsin, No. 2015CV00628 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 
8, 2016). Professors Catherine Fisk and Benjamin Sachs argue that the NLRA does not per-
mit the current inequity. In their view, a better reading of section 14(b) would conclude that 
federal law permits states to ban mandatory payments that are the equivalent to the full cost 
of membership, but that states cannot ban lesser mandatory payments to cover the cost of 
services. Fisk & Sachs, supra note 225, at 874-79. 
497. See supra notes 169, 487 (discussing the movement by the then-five-Justice conservative ma-
jority on the Supreme Court toward constitutionalizing right-to-work doctrine in the public 
sector). 




 This position, Fisk and Sachs explain, is required by nei-
ther statute nor court doctrine, and could be changed by agency action.
499
 
Fisk and Sachs’s argument for fee-for-service can be extended to the social 
bargaining context, where the union is advancing the interests of, and may be 
called upon to serve, nonmember workers who are not required to make dues 
payments. Thus, under a social bargaining model, unions should be able to 
charge for services, and specifically should be able to charge nonmembers more 
than they charge members. For example, unions could charge a low monthly 
fee to workers who voluntarily join the union; that fee could be paid by elec-
tronic funds transfer. Members would be entitled to a variety of services and 
benefits. At the same time, the union could offer services on a fee-based model 
to nonmembers.
500
 Such a ruling would require less of a shift in precedent than 
the one urged by Fisk and Sachs, as the existing doctrine does not consider the 
problem of fees absent exclusive bargaining relationships. 
While a fee-for-service arrangement is unlikely to produce substantial in-
come, it could be supplemented with additional revenue streams. One possibil-
ity, offered by some commentators, is for governmental entities to fund worker 
organizations.
501
 A limited variation of this approach is for local and state gov-
ernments to provide grants to worker organizations to help with the enforce-
ment and implementation of social bargaining laws; indeed, several states and 
localities already use worker organizations to help enforce local labor stand-
ards.
502
 Though mandating such arrangements on a national basis would be a 
non-starter, expanded use of this model may be possible in localities where 
workers have significant political power. Grants to unions to run worker-




498. Fisk & Sachs, supra note 225, at 860 (discussing section 8(b)(1)(A), which makes it an un-
fair labor practice for a union to “restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed” in section 7); see, e.g., NLRB v. North Dakota, 504 F. Supp. 2d 750, 757 (D.N.D. 
2007); Columbus Area Local, 277 N.L.R.B. 541, 543 (1985). 
499. Fisk & Sachs, supra note 225, at 860. 
500. Cf. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963) (prohibiting a union from re-
quiring membership). 
501. Daniel Hemel & David Louk, Is Abood Irrelevant?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 227, 229 
(2015); Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective Bar-
gaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 144 (2016) (urging this approach in the public sector as a so-
lution to the perceived First Amendment problem with check offs of mandatory dues). 
502. Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partner-
ships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 558-60 (2010) (discussing existing 
efforts at tripartite enforcement). 
503. In Europe, unions frequently have a role in the administration of social insurance. Streeck & 
Hassel, supra note 418, at 347. 
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While performing these tasks, unions could increase their solicitation of volun-
tary dues from worker-participants. 
Employers might also contribute to union funding. For example, unions 
and employers could agree—privately or through tripartite bargaining—to cre-
ate new hiring halls,
504
 or training funds,
505
 partially funded by employers. 
These models would have to be designed so as not to run afoul of section 
158(a)(2)’s ban on company unions or the prohibition on employers giving a 
“thing of value” to unions, but existing law leaves room to do so.
506
 Indeed, 
many industries have successfully used union-run training programs to the 
benefit of employees and employers.
507
 
Pursuing any of the above alternatives would require attending to im-
portant design considerations, such as how to structure funding to ensure the 
continued independence of unions and their fealty to workers’ interests.
508
 For 
now, however, the point is simply that alternative funding sources are possible, 
even without federal statutory reform. 
3. Worksite Representation and Alternative Forms of Worker Voice 
Not only are alternative funding sources available, but social bargaining al-
so opens up space to explore different forms of worksite representation. The 
Fight for $15 suggests one possibility: that unions could engage smaller groups 
of workers at particular facilities where the union lacks a majority but where 
workers benefit from broader social bargaining. The Fight for $15’s worksite 
 
504. The hiring hall used by the Culinary Union in Las Vegas may provide a model. See Harold 
Meyerson, Las Vegas as a Workers’ Paradise, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 11, 2003), http://prospect
.org/article/las-vegas-workers-paradise [http://perma.cc/88JQ-8UDF]. 
505. See Peter Chomko et al., Union-Management Training that Works, PERSP. ON WORK  
42 (2014), http://1199ctraining.org/docs/POW_Vol18_Rnd4.pdf [http://perma.cc/XZ5C 
-SLB3] (discussing the success of District 1199’s training fund). 
506. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2), 186 (2012); Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211 
(11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2849, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 134 S. Ct. 
594 (2013); Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Dec. 6, 2010); cf. Tang, supra note 501, at 172-
225 (analyzing the legality of employer-funded, that is government-funded, unions in public 
sector and advocating this approach). 
507. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 n.4 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the 
relationship between employees and those who receive government funding). 
508. Cf. Fine, supra note 215, at 610 (discussing the challenges of worker center funding); supra 
note 421 and accompanying text (discussing the contingent relationship between statism in 
labor relations and union independence). 
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actions at facilities where only a small number of workers affiliate with the 
movement are a fledgling example of this strategy.
509
 
To date, the Board has permitted minority unions—and protected minority 
strikes—but it has refused to require employers to bargain with these groups of 
workers.
510
 As Professor Charles Morris has argued, the Board could change its 
position and adopt a rule requiring members-only bargaining.
511
 On his ac-
count, section 7 of the NLRA protects the right to engage in concerted action, 
to organize, and to bargain, but does not limit these rights to workplaces where 
a majority of workers have chosen a union.
512
 Section 9 provides a mechanism 
for choosing a union that enjoys the power of exclusive representation, but it 
does not prohibit members-only bargaining.
513
 Moreover, the Court has recog-
nized that members-only bargaining is consistent with the policies of the 
NLRA and that agreements between employers and minority unions are en-
forceable under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
514
 In 
short, while statutory law is not clear as to the obligation of employers to bar-




Minority unionism on its own, without social bargaining, has significant 
limitations. Small groups of workers lack significant bargaining power. But 
when combined with a social bargaining system under which the state or local 
government requires sectoral bargaining across the region, minority unionism 
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could ensure that the workplace democracy inherent in the current model not 
get lost in favor of far-away tripartite structures. It could also help unions con-
tinue to fund themselves. 
Other alternatives for new worksite structures exist as well; the minority 
unionism emerging from the Fight for $15 is just one possibility. For example, 
scholars have documented how worker movements are experimenting with 
other ways to enhance worker voice, from the use of supply chain agree-
ments,
516
 to the creation of works councils,
517
 to the insistence on worker own-
ership.
518
 Though these approaches have not yet been joined with social bar-




In short, while critics are correct to worry that the “new labor law” and its 
mechanisms for stronger industrial-level wage bargaining and political power 
for workers do not necessarily provide vast resources to unions or entail the 
kind of workplace-level representation or employee voice that firm-based bar-
gaining historically provided in the United States, social bargaining is compat-
ible with sustainable workplace structures. Further exploration of their con-
tours is for another day. 
 
conclusion 
For low-wage workers active in the Fight for $15, the new labor law is a 
matter of personal necessity. But their efforts have broader implications. We 
live today in what many have called a “Second Gilded Age,” with high levels of 
economic inequality, pronounced social and racial stratification, rising anti-
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immigrant sentiment, failing infrastructure, resurgent corporate capital, and 
“an increasingly supplicant public sphere.”
520
 
As in the Progressive Era, a central problem facing the nation is the un-
checked political and economic power of corporations and oligarchs.
521
 The 
new labor law offers a possible path forward.
522
 Harkening back to abandoned 
projects of the Progressive Era,
 523
 it represents a promising strategy for build-
ing a more equitable, inclusive, and democratic state. It suggests that regula-
tion can be a vehicle through which the public contests economic power. It 
suggests that lawmaking can be a site of real democratic participation, where 
different groups in society share in decision making. And it suggests that regu-
lation can strengthen civil society by giving organizations a formal role in the 
democratic process. 
Ultimately, the path out of the ashes of the New Deal labor law is only be-
ginning to emerge. But the contours of a new legal regime are discernible from 
action in workplaces, on the streets, in legislatures, and before agencies. While 
the temptation to patch up the old model remains, to do so without confront-
ing its core weaknesses would be a mistake. Likewise, to abandon collective 
bargaining altogether in favor of governance and regulation would offer little 
hope of addressing the deep structural inequities in our politics and economy. 
The revitalization of American democracy and a return to shared prosperity 
depend on the development of a new, more inclusive, and more political form 
of unionism. The foundation exists for more work to come. 
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